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This book is a product of a joint work programme on "Financing for Deve­
lopment" between the Economic Commission for Latin America and Caribbean 
(ECLAC) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), designed to study national experiences in financial-policy reforms 
and mobilization of domestic resources with a view to drawing policy conclu­
sions for developing countries. ECLAC and UNCTAD gratefully acknowledge 
the financial support provided by the World Institute for Development 
Economics of the United Nations University (UNU-WIDER), without which 
this work would not have been possible.
The present volume contains six papers on financial-policy issues and 
country experiences, presented at a joint ECLAC/UNU-WIDER/UNCTAD 
seminar held at ECLAC headquarters in Santiago, Chile, on 5-6 October 
1992. In the first, Yilmaz Akyuz discusses key issues in financial liberalization. 
Next, Alice Amsden analyses East Asian financial policies, pondering the 
reasons why there is so much effective government intervention. Machiko 
Nissanke then addresses savings and financial-policy issues in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Afterwards, Donald Hanna assesses the Indonesian experience with 
finandal-sector reform, followed by Andras Uthoff's study of pension-system 
reforms and Giinther Held's study of bank regulations, liberalization and 
financial instability in Latin America and Caribbean countries.
Akyüz examines a number of issues in financial liberalization, drawing 
on the experience of industrial and developing countries in the 1980s. He 
argues that the focus of financial policies in developing countries should 
be industrialization and stability, and that a common feature of all modem 
examples of industrialization is that they have succeeded in making finance 
serve industry and trade, not vice versa. He rejects as fallacy the proposition 
that financial liberalization stimulates savings, arguing that there is no simple
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relation between the two. Financial liberalization often gives rise to deepening, 
but the latter is not always associated with a better use of resources since, 
inter alia, it tends to increase financial instability and fragility which, in 
turn, underminebothproductive and allocative efficiency. Prudentialregulations, 
while necessary, may not always be sufficient to prevent instability, particularly 
in developing countries, where financial liberalization often leads to escalation 
of interest rates and excessive risk taking. It may be necessary not only 
to act directly on the asset portfolios of banks but also to use interest 
ceilings. Efficiency also depends on the way finance is organized, since 
it influences the degree of risk, uncertainty and instability. The German- 
Japanese system of bank-based finance tends to be more stable and efficient 
than the Anglo-American system of capital-market-based finance, provided 
that the required fiscal and monetary discipline and prudential regulations 
are in place. Financial instability may be increased, and efficiency reduced, 
also by excessive financial openness. The speculative element that dominates 
international capital flows is capable of generating gyrations in exchange 
rates, giving rise to considerable uncertainty regarding prospective investment 
yields with respect of traded goods. This can be particularly damaging at 
a time when developing countries place greater reliance on trade as an 
engine of growth.
Amsden discusses the rationale for government intervention in financial 
markets in late industrializers and the factors that account for successful 
intervention in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. Challenging 
the conventional wisdom that latecomers industrialize by "getting prices 
right" on the basis of low wages that procure them a comparative advantage 
in labor-intensive industries, she argues that low productivity even in such 
industries cannot always be offset by low wages because of political and 
social constraints. Nor does foreign capital help to overcome the productivity 
drawback: foreign capital typically lags behind, rather than leads, industrial 
development. Thus, late industrialization involves a process of using subsidies 
to "get prices wrong" so as to overcome the productivity handicap. What 
distinguishes the countries that are successfully "sneaking up" to the world 
technological frontier from those that are "stumbling back" or "staying behind" 
is not less State intervention but rather a different set of principles governing 
subsidy allocation. While subsidies in the slow-growing late industrializers 
have tended to be allocated according to the principle of "giveaway", in
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the fast-growing ones they have tended to be allocated according to the 
principle of reciprocity. In both cases the government has disciplined labor, 
but in the East Asian countries it has also disciplined capital. Amsden goes 
on to examine the factors underlying the ability o f the East Asian States 
to impose performance standards on business, and the ways and means 
by which control has been exerted. In the Republic of Korea before the 
1980s, everything was prohibited except what the government specifically 
allowed; since then, all is allowed except what is specifically prohibited. 
The focus of financial policies has been to keep the cost of investment 
finance low: despite liberalization in the 1980s, the government has continued 
to provide subsidized credit to favored activities. As interest rates tended 
to rise, it has concentrated on the promotion of the stock market in order 
to provide cheap finance for investors.
Nissanke examines the factors impeding financial intermediation and 
mobilization of household savings in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), drawing 
on the experience of Ghana, Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. She notes that 
the potential of households to generate savings is much greater than is 
typically believed, particularly in rural areas. Most of these savings, however, 
are held in the informal sector, not because of low deposit rates, but primarily 
because of lack of access of households and small producers to bank credits. 
Thus she stresses the importance of credit in the mobilization of savings, 
maintaining that this is a task performed more successfully by the informal 
sector in SSA as regards households and small producers. Again, access 
to bank credit is impeded not so much by financial repression (i.e. direct 
credit allocation favoring the public sector, credit restrictions and the like) 
as by credit rationing by banks themselves, arising from imperfect and 
asymmetric information and costly contract enforcement. Banks in Africa 
are indeed extremely risk-averse and conservative in their lending policy. 
This, together with the transaction costs involved in tapping small savings, 
explains why they are also often unwilling to broaden their deposit base. 
This behavior is closely linked with non-performing loans that pervade the 
banking system in SSA and is reflected by an excess liquidity syndrome, 
whereby banks permanently hold liquid assets well in excess of legal reserve 
requirements. The unsatisfied demand is met by heterogeneous informal 
lenders, who have considerable comparative advantage in obtaining information 
and enforcing contracts. As Asian experience shows, segmented markets
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can work efficiently provided that there are adequate linkages, but these 
are missing in SSA. Liberalization per se cannot overcome the impediments 
to mobilization of resources arising from market segmentation; nor is the 
capital market a panacea. More active policies would be needed to ease 
the constraints facing banks in financial intermediation and to reduce financial 
dualism.
Hanna begins by examining the theoretical links between finance, savings 
and economic growth. He then focuses on the financial and real effects 
of the financial reforms in Indonesia, which began with the removal of 
ceilings on interest rates and credit expansion, followed by the lowering 
of barriers to entry and the reduction of the direct role of the Central 
Bank in credit allocation. Liberalization led to a large and sustained increase 
in financial depth and breadth in the economy. Econometric work on real 
private savings shows that they were not hampered by increases in financial 
savings, independently of effects stemming from higher income, lower inflation 
and real interest rates. The maturity of bank loans also extended over the 
period of the reforms, better meshing with the investment needs of the 
economy. Cost efficiency improved as well, with a reduction in overheads; 
spreads between deposit and lending rates came down at all banks and 
moved closer to each other at different types of banks. However, given 
the difficulties in allocating credit because of informational and incentive 
problems, efficiency gains were more elusive. The author concludes that 
financial reforms have been successful in Indonesia despite several factors 
that differ from the standard prescription. First, the capital account was 
open at the time of reforms, and second, reform began at a time of important 
macroeconomic adjustment.
Uthoff examines the role of financial markets and pension funds 
management, and their regulation and supervision, in the context of current 
pension-system reforms in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Reforms 
today seek to achieve better pension benefits without generating financial 
and actuarial deficits, higher returns from portfolio investment of pension 
funds, and increased savings and the development of capital markets. Pension- 
system reforms require taking basic decisions regarding (i) the structure 
of financing (ii) the structure of administration; and (iii) the relation between 
contributions and benefits. One major concern of every reform taking place 
in the region has been the proper protection and capitalization of reserve
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pension funds. One of the reforms which has attracted wide attention was 
implemented in Chile in the early 1980s. It replaced a pay-as-you-go and 
publically-administered system with one based on individual capitalization, 
predefined contributions and benefits and private administration of funds. 
The author emphasizes the following aspects with a view to providing good 
pension benefits: (i) the role of the State in closely regulating and supervising 
the portfolio allocation of pension funds, and in the provision of clear, 
timely and simple information to affiliates regarding their individual accounts;
(ii) an efficient administration of reserve funds geared capitalizing them 
at real annual rates of return of at least 5 per cent on average, based 
on contributions equal to 10 per cent of a person's lifetime earnings profile;
(iii) the preclusion of oligopolistic behavior on the part of pension-funds, 
and (iv) the provision of subsidies for participants unable to obtain minimum 
pension benefits on the basis of their own contributions. The system's success 
also depends on fiscal and monetary discipline.
Held looks at the outcome of different financial-policy experiences in 
Latin American and Caribbean countries in the last two decades on the 
basis of institutional arrangements of bank regulation and supervision. He 
argues that the emergence of bank solvency problems in a sample of nine 
countries in the region shares the common condition of severe flaws in 
prudential regulation and supervision. These flaws have quite commonly 
led to financial crises under financial liberalization, but they have also 
engendered solvency problems under financial repression. Since prudential 
regulation and supervision were not in place while credit allocation, interest 
rates and other financial variables were liberalized, these experiences could 
be better described as uncontrolled financial policies rather than financial 
liberalization. In many of the countries studied, highly unstable macroeconomic 
conditions were also responsible for severe solvency problems. The author 
concludes that of the countries in the sample, only the Chilean and perhaps 
the Costa-Rican experiences after the mid-1980s may be regarded as a fair 
testing ground for the effects of financial liberalization on savings and exports.
Yilmaz A kyiiz
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years financial policies in both industrial and developing countries 
have put increased emphasis on the market mechanism. Liberalization was 
partly a response to developments in the financial markets themselves: as 
these markets innovated to get round the restrictions placed on them, govern­
ments chose to throw in the towel. More important, however, governments 
embraced liberalization as a doctrine.
In developing countries, the main impulse behind liberalization has 
been the belief, based on the notion that interventionist financial policies 
were one of the main causes of the crisis of the 1980s, that liberalization 
would help to restore growth and stability by raising savings and improving 
overall economic efficiency; greater reliance on domestic savings was neces­
sary in view of increased external financial stringency. However, these 
expectations have not generally been realized. In many developing countries, 
instead of lifting the level of domestic savings and investment, financial 
liberalization has, rather, increased financial instability. Financial activity has 
increased and financial deepening occurred, but without benefiting industry 
and commerce.
In many industrial countries the financial excesses of the 1980s account 
for much of the sharp slowdown of economic activity in the 1990s. Financial 
deregulation eased access to finance and allowed financial institutions to 
take greater risks. The private sector accumulated large amounts of debt 
at very high interest rates on the expectation that economic expansion would 
continue to raise debt servicing capacity while asset price inflation would 
compensate for high interest rates. Thus, when the cyclical downturn came,
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borrowers and lenders found themselves overcommitted: debtors tried to 
sell assets and cut down activity in order to retire debt, and banks cut 
lending to restore balance sheets. Thus, the asset price inflation was replaced 
by debt deflation and credit crunch.
The recent experience with financial liberalization in both industrial 
and developing countries holds a number of useful lessons. This paper draws 
on this experience to discuss some crucial issues in financial reform in develop­
ing countries. The focus is on how to improve the contribution of finance 
to growth and industrialization; developing the financial sector and pro­
moting financial activity is not synonymous with economic development.
I. INTEREST RATES AND SAVINGS
One of the most contentious issues in financial policy is the effect of interest 
rates on savings. There can be little doubt that short-term, temporary swings 
in interest rates have little effect on private savings behaviour since that 
is largely governed by expectations and plans regarding current and future 
incomes and expenditures: they alter the level of savings primarily by affect­
ing the levels of investment and income. However, when there is a rise 
in interest rates that is expected to be permanent (for instance, because 
it is the result of a change in the underlying philosophy in the determination 
of interest rates), will consumer behaviour remain the same, or will the 
propensity to save rise? The orthodox theory expects the latter to occur, 
and thus argues that removing "financial repression" will have a strong, 
positive effect on savings (Shaw, 1973, p. 73).
Empirical studies of savings behaviour typically do not distinguish 
permanent from temporary changes in interest rates. Recent evidence on 
savings behaviour in a number of developing countries that changed their 
interest-rate policy regimes shows no simple relation between interest rates 
and private savings. This is true for a wide range of countries in Asia 
and the Middle East (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Sri Lanka, Republic 
of Korea and Turkey -Cho and Khatkhate, 1989; Amsden and Euh, 1990; 
Lim, 1991; Akyüz, 1990), Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, United Republic 
of Tanzania and Zambia- Nissanke, 1990), and Latin America (Massad and 
Eyzaguirre, 1990) that undertook financial liberalization, albeit to different
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degrees and under different circumstances.
But this should come as no surprise:
• Even according to the conventional theory, the personal propensity 
to save from current income depends on the relative strength of two forces 
pulling in opposite directions, namely the income and substitution effects. 
Moreover, if current income falls relative to expected future income, a rise 
in interest rates can be associated with a fall in savings. This often happens 
when interest rate deregulation occurs during rapid inflation and is accompa­
nied by a macroeconomic tightening that results in a sharp decline in employ­
ment and income.
• A large swing in interest rates can lead to consumption of wealth, 
especially when non-interest income is declining. This is true especially for 
small savers who can react to increases in interest rates by liquidating real 
assets and foreign exchange holdings in order to invest in bank deposits 
in an effort to maintain their standard of living, consuming not only the 
real component of interest income but also part of its nominal component 
corresponding to inflation. This tendency is often reinforced by "money illu­
sion" or the inability to distinguish between nominal and real interest inco­
mes, something that tends to be pervasive in the early stages of deregulation. 
Thus, the initial outcome of deregulation can be to lower household savings, 
particularly if it is introduced at a time of rapid inflation. For instance 
in Turkey high deposit rates in the early 1980s allowed a large number 
of small wealth-holders to dissave.
• The behaviour of households may be quite different from that assu­
med in conventional theory. For instance, they may be targeting a certain 
level of future income or wealth. Higher interest rates may then lower 
household savings by making it possible to attain the target with fewer 
current savings. For instance, in the Republic of Korea and Japan low interest 
rates combined with high real estate prices have tended to raise household 
savings (Amsden and Eu, 1990).
• Financial liberalization can lower household savings by allowing 
easier access to credit and relaxing the income constraint on consumption 
spending. In many countries financial liberalization has, indeed, given rise 
to a massive growth in consumer loans (such as instalment credits for cars 
and other durables, credit card lending, etc.). This appears to have been 
one reason why the household savings rate declined and the debt/income
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ratio rose in the 1980s in the United States -something which is at the 
heart of the current debt-deflation process (UNCTAD 1991, part two, chaps. 
I-II; 1992, part two, chap. E). An inverse correlation between household 
borrowing and savings ratios has also been observed in most other OECD 
countries since the early and mid-1980s (Blundell-Wignall and Browne, 1991).
• Even if financial liberalization and higher interest rates do not lower 
personal savings, they can reduce total private savings and aggregate domes­
tic savings by redistributing income away from debtors -a category which 
typically includes corporations and the government. In many developing 
countries undistributed corporate profits are an important part of private 
savings and the most important source of business investment. Generally, 
the savings rate is higher than for households: corporate retentions are high, 
ranging between 60 to 80 per cent of after-tax profits, because ownership 
is usually concentrated in the hands of families and there is no outside 
pressure to pay out dividends (Honohan and Atiyas, 1989; Akyüz, 1991). 
The redistribution of income from corporations to households through higher 
interest rates can thus reduce total private savings even if it raises household 
savings. In developing countries this effect can be particularly strong because 
firms operate with high leverage, loan maturities are short and corporate 
debt usually carries variable rates. Thus, a rise in interest rates not only 
raises the cost of new borrowing but also the cost of servicing existing 
debt. Evidence from the studies already mentioned suggests that in a num­
ber of countries (e.g. Philippines, Turkey, Yugoslavia), sharp increases in 
interest rates were a major factor in the collapse of corporate profits and 
savings that took place particularly in the early phases of financial libera­
lization.
Such adverse effects are especially marked when interest rates are freed 
under rapid inflation. There is widespread agreement that financial liberali­
zation undertaken in an unstable environment may make things worse, and 
that such reforms should be undertaken only after macroeconomic balances 
are attained (World Bank 1989; Edwards, 1989). Nevertheless, many countries 
have resorted to liberalization as part of shock therapy against stagflation.
Thus, interest rate increases are not a reliable instrument for raising 
domestic savings, but can damage macroeconomic stability and investment. 
The crucial question is how to design interest rate policies compatible with 
sustained stability and growth.
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The historical experience of major industrial countries holds some use­
ful lessons. Until the 1980s, real short-term interest rates in these countries 
were slightly negative and real long-term bond rates slightly positive; i.e. 
about one to two per cent below and above inflation respectively. Until 
the oil shocks of the 1970s, there was sustained growth and price stability. 
But since the beginning of the 1980s (for reasons to be discussed later), 
real interest rates have been, on average, more than twice their historical 
levels. Nevertheless, these countries enjoyed one of the longest periods of 
economic expansion in the postwar period with low inflation. This genera­
ted a widespread perception that high real interest rates do not impede 
investment and growth, but help price stability. However, the subsequent 
debt-deflation-cum-recession has clearly shown that economic expansion 
attained at very high real interest rates eventually depresses income, invest­
ment and growth.
II. FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION AND DEEPENING
It is generally agreed that financial liberalization raises financial activity 
relative to the production of goods and non-finandal services. However, 
there is much less consensus on the causes and effects of this "financial 
deepening". According to the financial repression theory (McKinnon, 1973; 
Shaw, 1973) financial deepening represents increased intermediation between 
savers and investment because higher interest rates raise savings and shift 
them from unproductive assets towards financial assets, thereby raising the 
volume of productive investment.
While it is true that financial liberalization can shift existing savings 
toward financial assets, reallocation is not the only or even the most impor­
tant reason for financial deepening. Financial liberalization can also lead 
to deepening by redistributing savings and investment among various sec­
tors, and by creating greater opportunities for speculation. Since these can 
worsen the use of savings, financial deepening is not necessarily a positive 
development.
The prime role of the financial system in the savings/investment process 
is to intermediate between deficit and surplus sectors rather than to transfer 
aggregate savings into aggregate investment. Deficit sectors (typically the
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corporate sector and the government) save as well as invest, while surplus 
sectors (households) invest as well as save. Thus, redistribution of savings 
and investment among sectors can, by changing sectoral surpluses and defi­
cits, result in financial deepening without any change in aggregate savings 
and investment - for instance, as already noted, when higher interest rates 
redistribute income and savings from debtors to creditors. Even when this 
does not alter the volume of aggregate savings (i.e. lower savings of debtors 
are compensated by higher savings of creditors), it increases deficits and 
surpluses and, hence, the amount of financial intermediation. Indeed, finan­
cial intermediation can increase while aggregate savings and investment 
fall (Akyüz, 1991). This can happen even under the orthodox assumptions 
that saving rates are positively related to the interest rate and that savings 
determine investment and growth (Molho, 1986, p. 112).
In such cases financial deepening is a symptom of a deterioration 
of the finances of the corporate and public sectors, reflecting an accumula­
tion of debt in order to finance the increased interest bill rather than new 
investment. Financial deepening driven by such Ponzi financing has been 
observed in a number of countries (e.g. Turkey, Yugoslavia and New Zea­
land) where financial liberalization redistributed income in favour of cre­
ditors and encouraged distress borrowing.
Similarly financial deepening can be the result of a redistribution of 
a given volume of aggregate investment, when, for instance, higher inte­
rest rates induce households to reduce investment in housing and shift 
to bank deposits. Then, the increase in the household surplus and in the 
volume of deposits represents a decline in household investment, not a 
rise in savings.
Financial liberalization often raises holdings of both financial assets 
and liabilities by firms and individuals at any given level of income, investment 
and savings. This tendency to borrow in order to purchase assets is driven 
by the increased scope for capital gains generated by financial liberaliza­
tion. Liberalization increases the instability of interest rates and asset prices, 
thereby raising prospects for quick profits through speculation on changes 
in the market valuation of financial assets. It also allows greater freedom 
for banks and other financial institutions to lend to finance activities unrela­
ted to production and investment, and to firms and individuals to issue 
debt in order to finance speculation. These can generate considerable fi-
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nandal activity unrelated to the real economy, and lead to financial dee­
pening -as in the United States in recent years through leverage takeovers, 
mergers, acquisitions and so on (UNCTAD, 1992, part two, chap. II).
Deepening can also result from the impact of changes in interest rates 
on the form in which savings are held. Indeed, one of the main reasons 
why savings do not in practice strongly respond to increases in real interest 
rates is the existence of a range of assets with different degrees of protection 
against inflation; returns on such assets also influence savings decisions. 
The greater the influence of interest rates on the allocation of savings among 
alternative assets, the smaller the influence on the volume of savings.
Whether shifts of savings into financial assets improve the use of resour­
ces depends on where they come from and how efficiently the financial 
system is operating. Clearly, a switch from commodity holdings can improve 
the use to which savings are put. But, contrary to widespread perception, 
there is very little evidence of extensive commodity holding in developing 
countries as a form of savings. Such holdings entail substantial storage and 
transaction costs, making their own real rate of return typically negative. 
Moreover, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the movement of pri­
ces of individual commodities even when the general price level is rising 
rapidly. These factors, together with the existence of more liquid, less costly 
inflation hedges (such as foreign currency or gold) reduce the demand for 
commodities as a store of value. The large commodity holdings that exist 
in African countries typically reflect the nature of production and non­
monetization of the rural economy. Consequently, increases in deposit rates 
are often unable to induce liquidation of commodity stocks (Aryeetey et 
al., 1990; Mwega, 1990; Nissanke, 1990).
An increase in domestic interest rates can induce a shift from foreign 
currency holdings to domestic assets, and repatriation of flight capital. Many 
governments, however, have found it necessary to legalize foreign currency 
holdings and introduce foreign currency deposits for residents and to offer 
very high interest rates in order to attract foreign currency holdings to 
the banking system. Certainly, in both cases the portfolio shifts can increase 
the resources available for investment and deepen finance. However, as 
discussed in section VII, capital flows and dollarization resulting from such 
policies often prove troublesome for macroeconomic stability, investment 
and competitiveness.
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Freeing interest rates in the formal sector can also trigger a shift away 
from informal markets. However, the scope of such shifts may be limited 
since the reason for informal markets is not always interest rate controls 
and credit rationing. They often provide services to small and medium pro­
ducers who do not have access to bank credits. Since financial liberalization 
does not always improve their access to banks, informal markets continue 
to operate after the deregulation of interest rates. As savings placed in 
the informal sector assure these producers some access to credit, they are 
not always willing to shift to banks when deposit rates are raised (Chipeta, 
1990; Aryeteey et al., 1990; Mwega, 1990). On the other hand, when funds 
are shifted to banks, the cost of finance for informal market borrowers 
can rise considerably. Moreover, such shifts can result in financial "sha­
llowing" because informal markets provide more financial intermediation 
due to the absence of liquidity and reserve requirements (Wijnbergen, 1983; 
Owen and Solis-Fallas, 1989).
It can thus be concluded that financial deepening brought about by 
liberalization is not necessarily associated with a higher level and/or better 
use of savings. Indeed, the empirical evidence does not support the claim 
that financial deepening is associated with faster growth (Dombusch and 
Reynoso, 1989). The degree of financial deepening is therefore not a good 
measure of the contribution of finance to growth and development.
The relevant issue in financial reform is efficiency rather than deepen­
ing. There are various concepts of efficiency of financial markets and insti­
tutions (Tobin, 1984), but from the point of view of the role of finance 
in economic growth and development, the conventional notions of allo­
cative and productive (i.e. cost) efficiency are the most relevant ones.
III. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY
1. Market failure
Financial markets and institutions can be said to be allocatively efficient 
if they direct resources to their more socially productive use, i.e. if they 
finance investment with the highest social rates of return. This concept broad­
ly corresponds to what Tobin (1984, p. 3) calls functional efficiency and
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provides a rationale for devoting resources to financial activity.
Allocative efficiency is closely related to the extent of "the accuracy 
with which market valuations reflect fundamentals" ("fundamental-valuation 
efficiency", Tobin, 1984, p. 5). Prices of financial assets provide market 
signals for resource allocation. Speculative bubbles in securities markets 
influence investment and consumption decisions as well as financing plans 
of corporations, while exchange rate misalignments cause misallocation of 
resources between traded and non-traded goods sectors.
There is ample evidence that in industrial countries financial liberali­
zation has resulted in a considerable increase in the volatility of interest 
rates, equity prices, exchange rates and the prices of real estate, gold, silver 
and collectable assets, and caused large and sustained deviation of these 
from their fundamental values (e.g. Cutler, Poterba and Summers, 1990; 
Miller and Weller, 1991; Kupiec, 1991). Similarly, "takeover mania, motivated 
by egregious undervaluations, is testimony to the failure of the market on 
this fundamental-valuation criterion efficiency" (Tobin, 1984, p. 6). These 
deviations reflect pervasiveness of speculative forces: "the similarity of pa­
tterns in a wide range of asset markets suggests the possibility that they 
are best explicable as a consequence of the speculative process itself." (Cutler, 
Poterba and Summers, 1990, p. 36).
Quite apart from the distorting effects of speculation on asset prices 
and resource allocation, financial markets also fail to allocate resources effi­
ciently because of a number of imperfections not attributable to government 
intervention. These include missing markets, asymmetric and incomplete 
information, and various externalities not mediated by markets (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1986; Stiglitz, 1989a; Datta-Chaudhuri,
1990). Such market failures are more serious in developing than in developed 
countries and tend to obstruct the learning process which plays a key role 
in modem industrialization. "Learning ... means that it will not be optimal 
to pursue myopic policies; one cannot use current comparative advantage 
as the only basis for judgements of how to allocate resources. Moreover, 
it may be optimal to initially incur a loss; the imperfections of capital mar­
kets thus may impose a more serious impediment on LDCs taking advan­
tage of potentials for learning" (Stiglitz, 1989a, p. 199).
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2. Successful intervention
Governments in many countries have therefore acted to influence the allo­
cation and pricing of finance as part of their industrial policy. Indeed, al­
most all modem examples of industrialization have been accompanied by 
such intervention. Directed and preferential credits have been the most im­
portant instruments of some successful industrializes in East Asia (Ams­
den, 1989; Bradford, 1986; Cho and Khatkhate, 1989; Hanson and Neal, 
1985; Kato et al., 1993; Westphal, 1990). As noted by a recent report, in 
Japan an important instrument of intervention was policy-based finance, 
used through the Japan Development Bank "to induce the private sector 
to achieve specified policy objectives". It was based on the recognition that 
"if the private financial market were perfect (in terms of competition, infor­
mation and freedom of transactions) policy-based finance would be unne­
cessary. In reality, however, there are limits to the perfect fulfillment of 
these conditions in the financial market. Thus, one can understand the 
significance of policy-based finance as one means of compensating for these 
market limitations" (Kato et al., 1993, p. 28).
In the Republic of Korea "government intervention was necessary not 
just to steer credit in the right direction but to underwrite production during 
the learning process that was far more involved than what is commonly 
meant by 'infant industry protection'. Subsidized credit meant the diffe­
rence between establishing new industries or not, rather than the difference 
between high and low profits" (Amsden and Euh, 1990, p. 31). Thus, "exten­
sive intervention by the government with South Korea's financial system 
can be viewed as an internal capital market and, consequently, it could 
have led to a more efficient allocation of credit than possible in a free- 
market financial system" (Lee, 1992, p. 187).
But many countries have directed credit with much less success. The 
differences between successful and unsuccessful intervention have been par­
tly due to skill in "picking winners". While it is true that governments 
are not necessarily better equipped to do this than markets, the experience 
strongly suggests that whether a firm (or an industry) is a winner depends 
on how it is managed. A number of factors seems to separate success from 
failure in this respect:
• The ability of governments to prevent interventionist finance from
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degenerating into inflationary finance, to resist excessive credit expansion 
and to ensure fiscal discipline: macroeconomic stability appears to have 
been a more important factor in growth than financial liberalization and 
deepening (Dombusch and Reynoso, 1989);
• Making provision of support conditional upon good performance, 
and seeing that government support and protection are actually used for 
the purposes intended rather than simply as a handout;
• Designing objective, well-defined and market-based performance 
indicators -namely, competitiveness in world markets and export perfor­
mance- in order to assess the nature and extent of the support needed, 
and whether it is being used effectively (Amsden, 1989; Westphal, 1990);
• Attaining social consensus on the purpose and modalities of govern­
ment intervention. As noted by a recent report, this was particularly im­
portant in the success of the policy-based finance in Japan: "when the gover­
nment does intervene in private economic activities, or carries out economic 
activities itself in place of private actors, it must not merely give some 
abstract reason, but rather clearly explain the concrete need for and obtain 
social agreement on those activities" (Kato et al., 1993, p. 28). This has 
been achieved through extensive participation of the private sector in the 
policy-formation process based on the "public-private cooperative system", 
i.e. in the advisory councils, including "industry leaders and general citi­
zens", as well as bureaucrats, which is still widely used (Kato et al., 1993, 
p. 85).
3. Measuring efficiency
As noted above, the main impulse to financial liberalization in developing 
countries has come from the frustration with ineffective and wasteful 
interventm t and the belief that liberalization would raise allocative efficiency. 
Thus, m^ty countries have chosen to liberalize finance rather than reform 
their industrial policies and state intervention. However, this has not always 
resulted in a better allocation of credits.
In the orthodox theory, better allocation means a tendency towards 
equalization of rates of return on investment in different sectors. Similarly, 
a more efficient credit allocation is expected to reduce the variation of the 
cost of finance across borrowers on the assumption that profit maximiza-
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tion requires equalization of marginal cost of borrowing and marginal rate 
of return on investment (Cho, 1988).
These measures, however, are highly inappropriate. First of all, as dis­
cussed below, one important determinant of the rate of return and cost 
of capital is risk. When projects carry different risks, an optimal allocation 
must reflect these differences in rates of return and borrowing costs. More 
important, when capital markets are short-sighted, equalization of profit 
rates typically means discriminating against those firms and industries with 
dynamic comparative advantages and learning potentials that have to incur 
initial losses. Since financial liberalization is often associated with a shorten­
ing of time horizons, a tendency towards equalization of rates of profit 
and cost of capital could worsen allocation.
Financial liberalization normally reduces or eliminates credits on pre­
ferential terms and hence diminishes variations in cost of capital across 
sectors. Therefore, measuring the effect of financial liberalization on alloca­
tive efficiency in terms of reduced variations in cost of capital is tautological. 
On the other hand, a successful industrial policy could reduce variance 
in borrowing cost by diminishing the number of industries requiring spe­
cial treatment. For instance, it has been argued that the decline in the inter­
industry variance of borrowing costs in the Republic of Korea in the 1980s 
compared to the 1970s reflects the success not of financial liberalization 
as suggested by some authors (e.g. Cho, 1988), but of industrialization policies 
(Amsden and Euh, 1990, pp. 43-44).
Financial liberalization in developing countries often changes signifi­
cantly the sectoral allocation of credit. Evidence suggests that typically the 
shares of service sectors, consumer loans and property-related credits tend 
to increase at the expense of industry. This may result from a reduction 
in directed credit allocation, which often favours industry and does not 
necessarily indicate a deterioration of resource allocation. However, it is 
important to note that these changes are often associated with shortening 
of maturities and declines in demand for manufacturing investment credits, 
when liberalization takes place in an unstable environment and results in 
very high and volatile interest rates.
Perhaps more important indicators of the effects of financial libera­
lization on allocative efficiency are the number of non-performing loans, 
loan default rates and bank failures. Evidence from a number of countries
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(e.g. the Southern Cone countries, Indonesia, the Philippines, Turkey and 
Yugoslavia) indicates that deregulation of interest rates and elimination of 
restrictions on financial activities have almost always been followed by in­
creases in the proportion of non-performing loans in bank portfolios and 
in bank failures. Again, resort to liberalization to cure instability and stagna­
tion has often played an important role. These, together with external shocks, 
had already greatly weakened the balance sheets of the corporate sector 
and financial institutions. Deregulation of interest rates, often accompanied 
by monetary tightening, further disrupted the financial position of the highly- 
leveraged corporate sector, leading to increased loan default rates and even­
tually to bank failures.
IV. PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY AND COST OF FINANCE
The traditional concept of productive efficiency refers to microeconomic 
efficiency of firms in producing goods and services with given prices for 
their inputs. When applied to the financial system, this concept would sim­
ply be translated into intermediation cost or interest spread. However, one 
must approach productive efficiency from a broader perspective and define 
it as the ability of the financial system to provide finance at the lowest 
possible cost. This depends not only on the extent to which financial inter­
mediaries minimize the cost of intermediation between the ultimate lender 
and the ultimate borrower, but also on the ability of the entire financial 
system to minimize the interest paid to the ultimate lender (the lender's 
interest rate).
1. Risk, uncertainty and interest rates
The Keynesian notions of lender's and borrower's risks provide an appro­
priate framework for discussing the determinants of cost of finance and 
the effects of financial liberalization on productive efficiency (Keynes, 1936, 
p. 144). An important determinant of the lender's interest rate is the risk 
due to the possibility of default by the borrower, i.e. the lender's risk. First, 
there is the risk of voluntary default, or what Keynes calls the moral risk: 
the lender must make an allowance for the possibility of dishonesty of
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the borrower. Second, there is the risk of involuntary default arising from 
imperfect foresight, i.e. from uncertainties over factors outside the control 
of the borrower which affect profitability. This risk, called the borrower's 
risk or the pure risk, is inherent in all investment decisions and cannot 
be eliminated. However, it can be reduced by access of the borrower to 
better information and stabler economic conditions. The pure risk is closely 
related to allocative efficiency. When finance is not efficiently allocated, the 
probability of involuntary default increases. This raises the lender's risk and 
the cost of finance: allocative inefficiency thus aggravates cost inefficiency.
The lender also runs a risk regarding the capital value of his assets 
due to uncertainties over future interest rates and asset prices (as well as 
the price level). The capital-value uncertainty increases with the volatility 
of asset prices and interest rates, as well as with the increased frequency 
of bank failures. These raise liquidity preference and lower the demand 
for capital-uncertain assets, thereby shortening the maturities of financial 
assets and pushing up interest rates, especially long-term. The degree of 
productive efficiency of the financial system therefore depends in part on 
its ability to attain stability and reduce capital-value uncertainty.
The search for greater allocative efficiency through financial libera­
lization can greatly reduce the productive efficiency of the financial system 
by giving rise to increased financial instability and raising the cost of finan­
ce to investors. This is a systemic influence, quite independent of any rise 
in interest rates that may result from eliminating ceilings. Indeed, the fi­
nancial instability and bank failures stemming from financial liberalization 
in the major industrial countries, especially the United States, in the 1980s 
played a major role in considerably raising long-term interest rates and 
reducing their sensitivity to changes in short-term rates (Akyüz, 1992, pp. 
59-60).
2. Intermediation margin
The second component of the cost of finance, namely the intermediation 
margin, reflects the microeconomic efficiency in the use of resources devo­
ted to financial activity. This is particularly important in bank finance, even 
though mark-ups of intermediaries in stock exchanges are not negligible 
(Tobin, 1984, p. 4). The spread between lending and deposit rates is influen­
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ced by operating expenses, legal reserve and liquidity requirements, and 
the pressure of competition on profit mark-ups. Reserve and liquidity 
requirements are typically lowered as part of financial liberalization. Simi­
larly, operating expenses and profit mark-ups tend to fall as entry barriers 
are dismantled.
However, financial liberalization also tends to increase the spread by 
raising the rate of default on loans, since banks often pass the cost of 
bad loans onto other borrowers. Therefore, erroneous investment and fi­
nancing decisions and allocative inefficiency can lead to cost inefficiency 
by raising not only the lender's interest rate, but also the spread. The increa­
se in the cost of finance, in turn, can push sound borrowers into insolvency, 
thereby increasing loan default rates and pushing up the lender's risk and 
the lender's interest rate further. This often leads to Ponzi financing where­
by banks increasingly lend to high-risk, speculative business at very high 
interest rates in order to cover high deposit rates and defaults. Such a 
process is unsustainable, but it can nevertheless cause considerable waste.
V. REGULATION OF FINANCE AND FINANCIAL STABILITY
The preceding discussion has shown that stability is an essential attribute 
of an efficient financial system. After many episodes of turmoil in financial 
markets in both developing and developed countries, there now appears 
to exist a consensus on the need for prudential regulations in order to 
attain stability. But, can such regulations and supervision prevent financial 
instability when interest rates are allowed to fluctuate freely and banks 
are left free to compete for deposits by bidding up interest rates?
1. Risk-taking by banks
The theory of finance suggests that because information is imperfect and 
asymmetric (the borrower knows more about his investment than the len­
der) and contracts are incomplete (lenders cannot control all aspects of the 
borrower's behaviour), banks implement their own quantity rationing by 
imposing credit ceilings, and restrict deposit and loan rates in order to 
avoid excessive risk-taking (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Davis, 1993, pp. 13-
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16). Since higher interest rates tend to reduce the average quality of loans 
through adverse selection (lending to high-risk borrowers willing to pay 
high interest rates) and moral hazard (inducing "good" borrowers to invest 
in riskier projects), the expected rate of return net of default will decline 
once the loan rate has reached a certain level. This implies that even in 
the absence of prudential regulations, there will be limits to price compe­
tition and risk-taking in the banking sector.
However, self-restraint cannot always be relied on to prevent financial 
instability, particularly in developing countries. Banks tend to engage in 
speculative financing and excessive risk-taking provided that failure does 
not have serious consequences for their shareholders and managers. This 
happens when they can easily acquire deposit insurance, enjoy implicit or 
explicit guarantees for bail-out and have easy access to the lender-of-last- 
resort facility, and when sanctions and penalties for failing bank managers 
are inadequate. This is often the case in developing countries where govern­
ments are often all too ready to rescue banks in trouble. The moral hazard 
that results is made worse by the existence of deposit insurance schemes 
designed to give protection to depositors and attract funds into banks. Banks 
often have to pay very little for the insurance coverage while having all 
the incentives to raise deposit rates to mobilize funds to invest in high-
return, high-risk, and often speculative projects.
Furthermore, in developing countries large non-finandal corporations 
are often able to exert strong influence over banks, causing bank lending
to be concentrated on a small number of firms, at the cost of increasing
their own vulnerability. Corporate distress borrowing and Ponzi financing 
tend to be much more common in developing countries, and these become 
particularly visible and problematic during episodes of financial .liberali­
zation. The intense competition that banks in many developing countries 
face from unregulated financial markets can also lead to higher interest 
rates and greater risk-taking.
2. Prudential regulations
Evidence from both developed and developing countries shows that a ju­
dicious combination of effective prudential and protective regulations is 
necessary to prevent financial instability. In many developing countries,
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however, regulations restricting excessive risk-taking and/or covering such 
risks are absent. In some countries government restrictions on lending to 
a single firm and the acquisition of real estate or shares in non-financial 
corporations are strict but not implemented. Legal provisions against bad 
assets are either absent or ignored, and capital requirements are inade­
quate, non-existent or unimplemented. There is widespread non-compliance 
even with legal reserve requirements, not always because they are especia­
lly high, but because the monetary authorities are unable to impose su­
fficient penalties.
However, prudential regulations, while necessary, may not always be 
sufficient to prevent financial instability. With the freeing of deposit rates, 
considerable competition can build up between the newly deregulated and 
unregulated financial sectors, giving rise to sharp increases in deposit rates, 
thereby raising the loan rates and deteriorating the quality of bank assets 
as high-yield, high-risk lending replaces safer but lower-yielding portfolios. 
It is not always possible to check this process through prudential regula­
tions on the asset side of banks' balance sheets. Pressures can develop to 
allow banks to enter into new lines of business in order to restore their 
profitability and viability in the face of higher deposit cost. Such pressu­
res will often find favour with the liberalist view underlying interest rate 
deregulation, and hence result in the relaxation of constraints on types of 
bank lending and investment.
The experience of the United States in the 1980s illustrates how easily 
such a process can develop (UNCTAD, 1992, part two, chap. E). As the 
Fed moved away from targeting interest rates to monetarism in order to 
reduce inflation and the Regulation Q ceilings on deposit rates were lifted, 
banks with long-term portfolios with fixed interest rates (particularly mu­
tual savings banks and Savings and Loan Associations, S&Ls) experienced 
serious difficulties. Considerable pressure developed for the introduction 
of legislation to attract deposits to these institutions (e.g. raising deposit 
insurance limits) and to allow them to invest in high-yield, high-risk assets. 
Thus, these institutions, and subsequently commercial banks, increasingly 
financed consumer and credit card loans, high-yield non-investment grade 
(junk) bonds, leverage buy-outs, real estate acquisition, and development 
and construction loans. A large amount of debt was accumulated by house­
holds and firms while banks acquired high-risk assets. This process ended
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with the collapse of the S&Ls with an estimated cost of about $200 billion, 
and was replaced by the debt-deflation process already mentioned.
Stricter capital adequacy requirements of the type recently introduced 
by BIS (UNCTAD, 1992, part two, Annex I) could have helped to slow 
down this process but would probably not have prevented it. As there 
was simultaneously a speculative bubble in the stock-market, banks would 
have had no difficulty in raising capital on very favourable terms to cover 
their high-risk investment, but would have remained exposed to risks on 
both sides of their balance sheets. Indeed, this is exactly what happened 
in Japan where banks can account as capital almost half of accrued but 
unrealized capital gains on equities and use them to offset potential loan 
losses. As the stock-market was rising rapidly in the 1980s, banks counted 
on these gains instead of setting aside reserves against potential losses on 
high-risk, property-related lending. The subsequent decline in stock prices, 
together with the fall in property prices, thus created difficulties for banks 
from both sides of their balance sheets.
There are also other instances of boom and bust where rapid expan­
sion of some banks through high-risk, high-return lending increased their 
stock prices sharply and allowed them to raise capital at costs lower than 
the prudent banks. "In such cases neither public scrutiny of bank balan­
ce sheets, nor capital ratios would have prevented the propagation of the 
crisis" (Kregel, 1993, p. 10).
3. Interest ceilings
In short, competition among financial institutions can easily result in esca­
lation of interest rates and/or excessive risk-taking either because pruden­
tial capital requirements become ineffective or pressures build up to relax 
controls over bank asset portfolios. Such risks are greater in developing 
countries. This, together with the fact that stability of interest rates and 
asset prices is essential for an efficient financial system, constitutes a strong 
case in favour of controlling interest rates as well as bank lending.
An effective way of doing this is to impose statutory ceilings on deposit 
and/or loan rates. Such ceilings were widely used in industrial countries 
until recent years. In Japan, for instance, interest rate regulations played 
a crucial role as a "policy-based framework established throughout the high
Financial liberalization: the key issues 41
growth period" (Kato et al., 1993, p. 122), and have not yet been abolished 
totally. Again, the recent legislation in the United States regarding the de­
pository institutions (the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improve­
ment Act of 1991, Jones and King, 1992) stipulates mandatory restrictions 
on deposit interest rates for undercapitalized banks in the context of capital- 
based policy of prompt corrective action. Since undercapitalization is wides­
pread among banks in developing countries, the scope for the application 
of such restrictions must be much greater.
Regulation of short-term interest rates through intervention in inter­
bank markets is also essential for attaining greater financial stability and 
preventing frequent bank failures, particularly when there is considerable 
maturity mismatching between banks' assets and liabilities. Under such con­
ditions, large swings in interest rates can create serious dilemmas for banks. 
If banks respond to an unexpected increase in market interest rates by 
raising deposit rates, their profits can be sharply reduced and their solvency 
threatened. If they do not, or if they are prevented from doing so by deposit 
ceilings, they may suffer a considerable deposit drain. Banks can respond 
to increased swings in short-term rates with variable-rate loans or by shor­
tening the maturities of their assets, as they have indeed done in many coun­
tries, but when done on a laige enough scale this simply transfers the interest 
rate risk onto the borrower and replaces it with greater credit risk.
It should be kept in mind that control over interest rates through 
ceilings and intervention does not eliminate the need for certain types of 
prudential regulations to reduce financial fragility, i.e. vulnerability to de­
fault in the corporate and household sectors (Minsky, 1982, 1986; Davis, 
1993). This is particularly true in developing countries where the level of 
economic activity is much more variable. When activity is buoyant, banks 
tend to lend increasingly against assets which carry considerable capital 
risk, including not only illiquid assets such as property but also securities; 
they also expand consumer credits and invest directly in securities and 
property. But when the expansion comes to an end and incomes and asset 
prices start to fall, the quality of bank assets can deteriorate rapidly, and 
even set off a debt-deflation process and credit crunch. Reducing the fragi­
lity of the financial system thus calls for prudential regulations designed 
to prevent excessive investment and lending with considerable capital risk 
arising from their susceptibility to changes in the pace of economic activity.
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VI. OPTIONS IN FINANCIAL ORGANIZATIONS
The discussions above suggest that the efficiency of the financial system 
crucially depends on the way it is organized, because that influences the 
nature and the degree of risk, uncertainty and instability. On the other 
hand, the experience of industrial countries shows that there is no single 
way of organizing finance. Consequently, an important issue in financial 
reform in developing (and Eastern European) countries is what types of 
financial institutions and markets need to be promoted.
1. Bank-oriented and market-oriented finance
It is possible to distinguish between two broad types of financial arran­
gements according to whether or not banks and capital markets serve dis­
tinct functions. In an ideal-type differentiated system, banks act primarily 
within the monetary system, arranging payments and extending short-term 
commercial credits. Corporations obtain investment finance in the capital 
market by direct security issues, often via the intermediation of investment 
banks for underwriting and brokerage. Ownership of companies is highly 
fragmented: an important part of corporate securities is held by households 
and institutional investors in diversified portfolios. Such a segmentation is 
the essence of the Anglo-American system which we will call, for brevity, 
the market-oriented system2.
In the German-type of universal banking (the bank-oriented system), 
on the other hand, commercial banks play a much greater role at all stages 
in the process of corporate investment. They provide investment finance 
and function also, like investment banks. They also have considerable con­
trol over firms both through their own equity holding and proxy votes 
for private investors, and by appointing representatives on the boards of 
firms. They lend primarily to firms in which they hold equity interest. Hou­
2 The description of various systems here draws largely on Corbett and Mayer (1991), Kregel 
(1991) and Somel (1992). For a summary account of the structural aspects of these systems, 
see also Davis (1993, pp. 23-26). We do not examine here how these different systems 
evolved, but there can be little doubt that government policies and regulations played a 
major role.
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sehold financial wealth tends to be held in banks rather than direct secu­
rities, and bank credits account for a larger proportion of external financ­
ing of corporate investment.
There are certainly a number of variants combining elements of both 
systems. In the United Kingdom, commercial banks do not have much con­
trol over corporations, but there is no legal separation between commercial 
and investment banking. In Japan, commercial banks hold corporate equi­
ties but are prevented from playing a major role in the underwriting of 
corporate securities. Individual ownership of stocks is much smaller than 
ownership by financial and non-finandal corporations, and corporate equi­
ty is controlled through interlocking shareholding within industrial groups 
where banks play a central role. Banks also control other financial insti­
tutions (e.g. pension funds) that invest in equity. Lending by banks and 
insurance and pension funds usually takes place within the same groups 
and involves purchase of company bonds as well as loans. In Japan, bank 
credits have played a much more important role in financing business growth 
than in the other countries discussed here, although recently there has been 
a shift to securities markets.
2. Efficiency o f alternative systems
In recent years many developing countries have been seeking to institute 
and promote capital markets, often as part of the structural adjustment 
programmes. One of the main reasons for privatizing public enterprises 
has been precisely to promote capital markets. Similarly, access to equity 
markets has been granted to non-residents in order to boost demand.
There are a number of arguments in favour of developing capital mar­
kets as a way of overcoming the paucity of investment finance in deve­
loping countries. The bank-oriented system of investment finance has tra­
ditionally been viewed as inherently problematic because of the risks asso­
ciated with maturity transformation in a volatile economic environment. 
Such a system increases the vulnerability of firms to financial shocks since 
the cost and availability of bank credit often undergo sharp and unexpected 
changes. By contrast, capital markets are expected to provide firms with 
more predictable, longer-term finance, while secondary markets in securities 
accord savers liquidity. It is also often argued that they would exert better
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financial discipline over firms through shareholder action and the threat 
of being taken over by other firms.
While there are often serious problems and weaknesses with a bank- 
oriented system in developing countries, the benefits claimed for a market- 
oriented system are unsubstantiated. It is often overlooked that the finan­
cial systems in Germany and Japan have not only proved to be remar­
kably stable, but also in the major respects discussed in sections El and 
IV are more efficient than the Anglo-American system. Historically, finan­
cial asset prices and interest rates in Germany and Japan have been less 
volatile than in the United States, bank deposits more stable, and financial 
disruptions and bank failures less frequent. Moreover, the cost of finance 
to industry has been much lower in Germany and, more particularly, in 
Japan. Evidence suggests that high capital costs have contributed to de­
clining competitiveness in both industry and international banking in the 
United States. Lower capital costs and a more predictable supply of fi­
nance appear to have enabled Japanese firms to undertake longer-term pro­
jects, including investment in research and development, whereas United 
States firms have been deterred (McCauley and Zimmer, 1989; Poterba, 1991; 
Zimmer and McCauley, 1991)3.
One of the main reasons for the greater stability and efficiency of 
the financial systems in Germany and Japan is their ability to overcome 
the dilemma posed by modem capital markets. As noted by Keynes (1936, 
chap. 12), modem capital markets reconcile the social need for investment 
with the preference of individual investors for liquidity. This is a necessity 
since "if individual purchases of investment were rendered illiquid, this 
might seriously impede new investment". However, while secondary mar­
kets in securities accord savers liquidity, they also open up prospects for 
speculation whereby most of the players "are, in fact, largely concerned, 
not with making superior long-term forecasts of the probable yield of an 
investment over its whole life, but with foreseeing changes in the conven­
3 In conformity with contemporary trends and in response to outside pressure, Japan has 
been undergoing a transition towards a market-based and open financial system, which is 
not easy to reconcile with the policy of cheap finance. There have been severe fluctuations in 
share prices, interest and exchange rates, and a tendency for the cost of finance to rise 
(Martin, 1992).
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tional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the general public". Thus, 
these markets tend to operate like "casinos" where players speculate on 
the speculations of other players.
The pattern of shareholding and ownership that characterizes the 
German and the Japanese systems has allowed them largely to overcome 
this dilemma. The fact that banks and business groups with a long-term 
stake in the corporations hold the controlling interest means not only that 
secondary markets tend to be less active and volatile, but also that the 
managers do not need to pay much attention to how the market values 
their assets from day to day, and can concentrate instead on the long term. 
This also helps reduce liquidity preference and short-termism on the part 
of individual investors and portfolio managers.
The bank-oriented system can exert a different and more efficient fi­
nancial discipline over enterprises than the market-oriented system. Banks 
in Germany and Japan (and banking groups) are often in a position to 
monitor the performance of management by direct access to information 
through their close and long-term relations with firms as shareholders and 
creditors, and to intervene when needed in order to prevent failure. By 
contrast, in the Anglo-American system of fragmented shareholding, indi­
vidual investors have neither the means nor the incentive to monitor and 
control corporate management. In extreme cases, market discipline is exer­
cised through hostile takeovers, but these are often disruptive and waste­
ful. More important, since markets tend to value the enterprise largely on 
the basis of short-term financial performance, the takeover threat creates 
pressures and incentives for the management to think short-term.
Furthermore, the internal capital market organized within banks and 
firms connected by cross shareholding also improves enterprise performan­
ce by reducing the borrower's risk by permitting economies of scale in 
collecting, processing, evaluating and disseminating information. For the sa­
me reason, there is less credit rationing in a bank-based system (Fama, 
1985; Driscoll, 1991). Such a system also makes it possible to reduce consi­
derably the lender's risk and the rate of interest, since it gives deposit 
holders the liquidity they seek with a smaller risk of capital uncertainty 
by pooling and institutionalizing the risk associated with individual invest­
ment projects, and by reducing erroneous investment decisions.
A financial system with a close interface between banks and corpora­
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tions tends to lower the rate of return required by investors to underta­
ke investment. The expected rate of return on investment must be high 
enough to cover both the borrower's risk and the rate of interest received 
by the lender. However, as noted above, the borrower's risk is an impor­
tant determinant of the lender's risk. The effect of this duplication of the 
borrower's risk on the rate of interest can be reduced by increasing the 
degree of the lender's involvement in the borrower's investment and other 
managerial decisions, since the lender is then better able to assure himself 
that pure risk is being properly weighed by the borrower: indeed both 
components of the lender's risk (i.e. the moral risk and the pure risk) would 
disappear if the lender and the borrower were the same person. The bank- 
oriented system thus reduces the extent to which the borrower's risk is 
duplicated in the lender's risk and the interest rate, and, hence, lowers 
the cost of investment.
3. Requirements for an efficient bank-oriented system
These are particularly important considerations to be taken into account 
in reforming the financial system in developing countries, where the cost 
of finance needs to be kept low and firms must be able to take the long 
view in order to succeed in "learning by doing". However, the experience 
of many developing countries shows that the concentration of ownership 
in the hands of inside investors and close relations between banks and 
corporations are not necessarily conducive to good enterprise performan­
ce and financial stability. Indeed, in many developing countries the equity 
control of corporations is in the hands of families or business groups, and 
interlocking ownership between corporations and banks is widespread. Such 
arrangements have often resulted in corruption, collusive behaviour, specu­
lation and inefficiency. Moreover, financial instability and short-termism in 
bank and corporate behaviour are common features of these countries be­
cause a number of conditions essential for an efficient bank-oriented sys­
tem are not always met.
First of all, for the reasons already explained, price stability is essential 
for a bank-oriented system. This calls for, above all, fiscal and monetary 
discipline and a viable and relatively stable external payments position. 
Prudential regulations and effective supervision are also essential in a bank-
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oriented system. In particular, firms should not be allowed to own and 
control banking organizations, since this will transfer the elements of the 
safety net to them and burden the monetary authorities with tasks they 
cannot undertake (Corrigan, 1991). In the German system prudential limits 
on long-term lending and individual loans, capital adequacy requirements, 
and effective supervision of banks’ risk exposure by an agency separate 
from the central bank play a central role.
One argument against market-oriented finance is that "competition in 
ownership is no substitute for competition in product markets" (Corbett 
and Mayer, 1991, p. 20). This is also true for the bank-oriented system; 
namely, it does not make up for lack of competition in the markets for 
goods and services. Thus, such a system too needs to be combined with 
policies depending on competition as a spur to efficiency. In those deve­
loping countries where the bank-oriented system with widespread inter­
locking ownership has failed, the markets for goods and services were ge­
nerally highly oligopolistic and protected from competition. In contrast, in 
countries where corporations were encouraged and forced to compete in 
export markets, a similar financial organization made a major contribution 
to industrialization.
Finally, new firms should have access to finance, and entry into new 
lines of financial activity should not be impeded. This calls for some com­
petition in the banking sector. However, competition policies should be de­
signed to prevent monopoly power rather than to allow completely free 
entry into the banking sector and unlimited price competition among banks 
-practices that have often led to financial instability in both developed and 
developing countries. Furthermore, specialized banks for industrial deve­
lopment and controls over credit allocation can play an important role in 
providing finance to new entrants.
4. Control and regulation of stock-markets
While reform efforts need to concentrate in these areas, it is also true that 
capital markets are a reality in a number of countries and they also need 
to be improved. While most developing countries regulate primary issues 
and stipulate a number of conditions regarding their size, maturity and 
redemption and disclosure of information, there is very little effective con­
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trol over secondary markets. Irregularities such as insider trading and fraud 
are widespread and administrative capacity to undertake effective super­
vision weak.
Stock prices in many of the so-called emerging markets have been 
extremely erratic and subject to very large swings. By removing credit cons­
traints, financial liberalization has often triggered an increase in speculative 
activity by institutions and individuals. In many such countries, increased 
speculative activity in the secondary market caused stock prices to rise be­
fore 1987 even faster than in most of the world's major stock-markets, and 
to fall, again far more than elsewhere, after October 1987 (Singh, 1992). 
Most of these markets have again shown large swings over the last few 
years.
Since the size of these markets is relatively small, the direct effects 
of sharp falls in stock prices on the economy are negligible. However, the 
state of expectations in the equities market influences the exchange rate 
and capital flows since, as discussed in the next section, these markets 
are open to foreigners and/or provide alternative investment for holders 
of foreign currency assets. Greater stability is thus essential to prevent 
destabilizing feedbacks between equity and currency markets.
One way of reducing volatility is through the so-called "circuit bra- 
kers" introduced in the United States after the October 1987 crash (Kupiec,
1991). These consist of predetermined price floors: when prices fall to the 
floor, trading is suspended for a predetermined period. Such measures can 
be particularly helpful in reducing intra-day bandwagon-type declines in 
stock prices. Another is through the financial transactions tax long advocated 
by Keynes (1936, pp. 160-161). Such a tax may help reduce speculative 
instability by deterring short-term trading, improve the efficiency of the 
stock-market and lengthen the time horizon of corporate managers (Stiglitz, 
1989b; Summers and Summers, 1989).
Public or semi-public agencies with large holdings of securities can 
also play an important role in bringing greater stability to stock prices. 
For instance, in Turkey the agency dealing with privatization has operated 
both as a buyer and a seller in the market for the shares of privatized 
public companies, exerting a significant influence on prices, even though 
its objective has not been to stabilize the market. Institutional investors 
and particularly provident funds can both provide the Japanese/German
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type of shareholding and control over enterprises, and help to attain grea­
ter stability.
VII. EXTERNAL LIBERALIZATION AND FINANCIAL OPENNESS
Recent years have witnessed the increased integration of developing coun­
tries into the international financial system in large part due to widespread 
external financial liberalization. Most of these countries have also liberali­
zed imports and increasingly relied on exports for growth, but the degree 
of internationalization of finance has gone much further than trade. Indeed 
in many countries the share of transactions with international characteris­
tics in the financial sector is far greater than the share of trade in GDP.
1. The concept o f financial openness
By external financial liberalization we mean policy actions that increase the 
degree of ease with which residents can acquire assets and liabilities deno­
minated in foreign currencies and non-residents can operate in national fi­
nancial markets, i.e. financial openness. Three broad types of transaction 
can be distinguished in this respect. First, inward transactions: allowing 
residents to borrow freely in international financial markets, and non-resi­
dents to invest freely in domestic financial markets. Second, outward tran­
sactions: allowing residents to transfer capital and to hold financial assets 
abroad, and non-residents to issue liabilities and to borrow in domestic 
financial markets. Third, domestic transactions in foreign currencies: allow­
ing debtor-creditor relations among residents in foreign currencies such as 
bank deposits and lending in foreign currencies.
Our definition of financial openness is wider than capital account 
liberalization because it includes financial transactions among residents de­
nominated in foreign currencies. These are an important part of banking 
and finance, and affect the national economy in much the same way as 
cross-border financial transactions (Bryant, 1987, chap. 3).
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2. The extent of financial openness in developing countries
Widespread liberalization has occurred on all three fronts. Inward transac­
tions are virtually free in a large number of countries, particularly in Latin 
America where external borrowing by the private sector, often via the in­
termediation of resident banks, is not subject to approval, except for ca­
pital market issues. Similarly, there are few restrictions on the access of 
non-resident investors to domestic capital markets. The debt crisis has pla­
yed an important role in this respect: the "market-based menu" has gene­
rated new prospects for arbitrage and windfall profits and significantly rai­
sed the amount of equities and domestic-currency debt assets held by non­
residents (UNCTAD, 1989, pp. 105-107). More recently, access of non-resi­
dents to national equity markets has been encouraged in the context of 
privatization programmes.
As for outward transactions, an increasing number of developing coun­
tries have adopted capital account convertibility in recent years -some to 
an extent not found in most industrialized countries. Liberalization of 
transactions among residents in foreign currency, however, has gone much 
further. Indeed, there has been a tendency to encourage residents to hold 
foreign exchange deposits with banks at home, increasing the importance 
of foreign currency in the economy, i.e. dollarization. The share of foreign 
currency in total deposits in recent years has reached 50 per cent in a 
number of developing countries in Latin America as well as in Asia (e.g. 
Philippines), the Middle East and Europe (e.g. Turkey and Yugoslavia). This 
figure is well above the levels found in some international financial cen­
ters such as London where the share of total bank claims (including inter­
bank claims) on residents in foreign currencies barely exceeds 20 per cent 
(Bryant, 1987, chap. 3; Akyüz, 1992).
3. Nature of capital flows
The consequences of financial openness in developing countries have not 
been adequately treated in the literature primarily because this is a very 
recent phenomenon. Mainstream thinking is largely an extrapolation of 
"open economy macroeconomics" and treats the issue in the context of 
"sequencing of economic reforms". This literature emerged in large part from
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an ex post attempt to explain why the Southern Cone liberalization expe­
riment failed (Corbo et a l, 1986; Corbo and de Melo, 1987; Diaz-Alejandro, 
1985; Dombusch, 1983; Frankel, 1983; McKinnon, 1982). It takes it for gran­
ted that external financial liberalization is desirable on efficiency grounds: 
it is said to have positive effects on the level and allocation of invest­
ment, and these efficiency gains more than compensate for the loss of po­
licy autonomy, i.e. reduced ability of governments to achieve national 
objectives by using the policy instruments at their disposal (Bryant, 1980, 
chap. 12).
According to this view, external financial liberalization may give rise 
to perverse results only if there are problems elsewhere in the economy 
-e.g. budget deficits, monetary instability, and distortions and imperfections 
in goods and labour markets. On the other hand, since it is not possible 
to correct these at once, external financial liberalization must be properly 
sequenced. Although it is sometimes argued (e.g. Krueger, 1984) that it 
may be difficult to control inflation without liberalizing the economy, the 
majority view is that domestic financial markets and the current account 
should be liberalized before the capital account, and that fiscal balance and 
monetary stability should be attained before any liberalization (Dombusch, 
1983; Edwards, 1984,1987 and 1989; Fischer and Reisen, 1992; Frankel, 1983; 
McKinnon, 1982).
The benefits claimed for financial openness are generally based on 
the assumption that the internationalization of finance allows savings to 
be pooled and allocated globally through movement of capital across coun­
tries in response to opportunities for real investment, thereby improving 
the allocation of resources internationally and equalizing rates of return 
on investment everywhere. Accordingly, external financial liberalization in 
developing countries is expected to give rise to capital inflows, provided 
that it comes after domestic financial markets have been liberalized and 
interest rates raised. This is seen as a one-off phenomenon of adjustment 
of domestic interest rates to world levels as capital scarcity is reduced through 
an increase in the underlying capital flows.
However, the evidence strongly suggests that international capital 
flows do not in practice improve the international allocation of savings. 
There has been no narrowing of differences in rates of return on capital 
investment in the major industrial countries, or in real long-term interest
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rates; nor has the link between the levels of savings and investment in 
individual countries been considerably weakened (UNCTAD, 1987; Kasman 
and Pigott, 1988; McCauley and Zimmer, 1989; Akyüz, 1992). The main 
reason is that most international financial transactions are portfolio deci­
sions, largely by rentiers, rather than business decisions by entrepreneurs. 
The bulk of capital movements is motivated primarily by the prospect of 
short-term capital gains, rather than by real investment opportunities and 
considerations of long-term risk and return. The speculative element is ca­
pable of generating gyrations in exchange rates and financial asset prices 
by causing sudden reversals in capital flows for reasons unrelated to policies 
and/or the underlying fundamentals. Rather than penalizing inappropriate 
policies, capital flows can help to sustain them, as has been the case in 
recent years in the United States and Italy where inflows have helped to 
run chronic fiscal deficits.
Thus, financial openness tends to create systemic problems regardless 
of the order in which various markets are liberalized and distortions re­
moved. The exposure to short-term, speculative capital flows is much grea­
ter for developing than for developed countries because their instability 
provides greater opportunities for quick, windfall profits on short-term capital 
movements while their ability to influence capital flows through monetary 
policy is much more limited.
While internal financial liberalization strengthens the link between in­
flation and interest rates, external financial liberalization (unlike trade 
liberalization) weakens that between inflation and the exchange rate, bringing 
the latter under the domination of capital flows instead of trade balances 
and the relative purchasing power of currencies: inflation differentials are 
more readily reflected in nominal interest rate differentials than in the mo­
vement of the nominal exchange rate. Thus, although short-term capital 
inflows motivated by the lure of quick, windfall profits are often associated 
with positive real interest rate differentials in favour of the recipient, such 
a differential is neither necessary nor sufficient in all cases. Capital inflows 
usually occur in response to a nominal interest rate differential that mar­
kets do not expect to be fully matched by a nominal exchange rate depre­
ciation. Such differentials often emerge when domestic inflation is much 
higher than abroad and domestic financial markets have been liberalized. 
Since in many developing countries inflation rates close to those prevailing
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in the major OECD countries are very difficult to attain, the scope for big 
arbitrage opportunities to emerge is much greater. Similarly, an expectation 
that equity prices will rise faster than domestic currency depreciation can 
prompt an inflow of capital. Both types of expectation can be self-fulfilling 
since the inflow of funds, if large enough, can itself maintain the value 
of the currency and boost equity prices.
Such inflows are typically initially a response to a favourable shift 
in market sentiment regarding the recipient country. This shift may result 
from external causes such as a sudden rise in export prices, or from internal 
ones such as reduced inflation, better growth prospects, and greater politi­
cal stability and confidence in the government's policies. After the initial 
shift in market sentiment, a bandwagon develops and creates a speculative 
bubble where people are lending or investing simply because everybody 
else is doing so. The boom does not necessarily peter out smoothly: a re­
cently liberalized, well-performing economy can suddenly find favour with 
foreign capital of all sorts, but if things go wrong for some reason, the 
capital can disappear just as rapidly. When the bubble bursts and the cu­
rrency comes under pressure, even a very large positive real interest rate 
differential may be unable to check the capital outflow.
4. Recent capital flows to Latin America
That was the story of the liberalization episodes in the Southern Cone in 
Latin America in the 1970s, when high domestic interest rates, overvalued 
exchange rates, freedom to borrow abroad and plentiful international li­
quidity combined to induce capital inflows. But there are strong signs that 
a similar process is again under way in a number of Latin American coun­
tries. It is estimated that the region as a whole received about US$40 billion 
in 1991, three times the level of 1990, the main recipients being Mexico, 
Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Chile. Not all the capital inflows have 
been for short-term uses, but much of them do appear to have been, particu­
larly in Argentina and Brazil (Griffith-Jones et a l, 1992, tables 4 and 5; 
UNCTAD 1992, part two, Annex A). In the majority of these countries capital 
inflows continued at an accelerated pace in 1992. In Chile where "the mone­
tary authorities adopted a cautious approach based on the assumption that 
the oversupply of foreign exchange was only temporary and was due to
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the unusually high price of copper and the low international interest ra­
tes" (ECLAC 1991, p. 41), short-term capital inflows slowed down conside­
rably in 1992 thanks to various measures designed to reduce the arbitrage 
margin.
What is remarkable about recent capital inflows to Latin America is 
not only that the recipient countries are in very different positions com­
pared to the 1970s, but that they differ widely among themselves with 
respect to inflation, fiscal posture, and exchange rate and trade policies. 
Argentina, Chile and Mexico have liberal trade regimes whereas Brazil has 
tight controls. While Brazil has had a large fiscal deficit and very high 
inflation, others, particularly Chile and Mexico, have had balanced budgets 
or fiscal surpluses, and moderate inflation. Capital has been attracted by 
a combination of currency appreciation and high real interest rates in Chile, 
Mexico and particularly Argentina (and also a booming stock-market in 
the latter two), but not in Brazil where the underlying factor has been 
very high real interest rates (about 4 to 5 per cent per month). Currency 
appreciation is due to exchange rate policy in Argentina (which uses the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor to reduce inflation), but not in Chile 
and Mexico where it is market-generated. It has led to a considerable dete­
rioration of the trade balance, especially in Argentina and Mexico.
The ideal response to such capital inflows is a corresponding increase 
in domestic investment in traded goods sectors. This not only prevents 
a sharp appreciation of the currency by raising capital goods imports, but 
can also enhance export capacity- something that may be needed especially 
when capital flows dry up or are reversed. But higher investment is not 
always possible when domestic interest rates are prohibitive and long-term 
investment with funds borrowed abroad at lower rates carries considerable 
exchange rate risk. In other words the high interest rates and/or currency 
appreciation that attract short-term capital also deter investment. In Latin 
America, capital inflows resulted in a sharp swing in the transfer of resources 
abroad by about 4 per cent of the region's GDP during 1990-1991, but 
investment remained depressed: in Brazil and Argentina the investment ratio 
remained below the levels of the 1980s when these countries had been 
making large transfers on debt servicing.
The problems of macroeconomic management in the face of a massive 
capital inflow are well known. Sterilizing them by issuing domestic debt
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can impose a serious burden on the public sector, particularly when the 
arbitrage margin is large. In Brazil, for instance, the cost of carrying the 
extra US$5 billion of reserves purchased in this way amounted to about 
US$2 billion during 1991-1992, adding considerably to domestic public debt 
(UNCTAD, 1992, part two, Annex II; Junior, 1992). Furthermore, by incre­
asing the stock of government debt, sterilization itself tends to raise domes­
tic interest rates and, hence, the arbitrage margin. If, on the other hand, 
the currency is allowed to appreciate, it can undermine the competitiveness 
of the domestic industry, possibly eventually triggering a sharp reversal 
in short-term capital flows.
5. Opening stock-markets to non-residents
Instability in short-term capital flows combined with the inherent volatility 
of investment in company equity exposes the economy to even greater risks. 
Since opening up domestic capital markets requires some form of currency 
convertibility for non-resident equity investors, a close link can develop 
between stock and currency markets even in countries where the capital 
account is not fully open. This may prove to be a serious problem in Latin 
America because of the increased presence of non-residents in capital mar­
kets. In Mexico, for instance, equity holding by non-residents is estimated 
to have amounted to more than $25 billion, or about a quarter of the mar­
ket's capitalization in the second quarter of 1992 (Latin American Economy 
and Business, May 1992, p.4), compared to about 5 per cent in the major 
capital markets such as New York and Tokyo. The link between these two 
inherently unstable markets can be further strengthened by dollarization 
of the economy, when that occurs.
This link increases the potential for the emergence of foreign exchange 
and/or stock-market crises. Since the return on investment to the foreign 
investor depends largely on the movement of the exchange rate, a serious 
shock (e.g. a terms-of-trade deterioration) that makes a devaluation appear 
inevitable can trigger both a sharp decline in equity prices and an outflow 
of capital. Similarly, the mood in equity markets can exert a strong in­
fluence on the exchange rate -e.g. bullish expectations can trigger capital 
inflow, leading to appreciation. By contrast, a bearish mood in the capital 
market and/or massive profit-taking in dollars by non-residents can not
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only prick the speculative bubble in the stockmarket, but also lead to a 
currency crisis. Recent evidence suggests that chaotic feedbacks between 
financial and currency markets can easily develop: for instance, when the 
bubble burst in the Tokyo stock exchange at the beginning of 1990, there 
was a massive shift out of yen-denominated assets, causing also considera­
ble drops in the government bond index and the currency (Akyüz, 1992).
6. Effects of volatile capital flows on investment and trade
One important consequence of sharp swings in the direction of capital flows 
and greater instability of exchange rates is to increase borrower's risk. For 
investors in traded goods sectors, the real exchange rate is the single most 
important relative price affecting profits. But firms in non-traded goods sec­
tors are also affected, depending on the imported inputs they use. Exchan­
ge rate gyrations produce considerable uncertainty regarding prospective 
yields of investment. By raising the average rate of return required by in­
vestors to undertake investment, particularly in the traded goods sectors, 
this will depress the level of investment corresponding to any given rate 
of interest.
The influence of the exchange rate on investment decisions increases 
with the share of foreign trade in the economy. It is thus of growing im­
portance in the developing world because of widespread import liberali­
zation and emphasis on export-led growth. It is therefore ironic that the 
exchange rate is increasingly determined by purely financial forces delinked 
from trade and investment. Exchange-rate instability can thus undermine 
"outward oriented" strategies by depressing investment in exports. The evi­
dence suggests that such adverse effects have occurred even in industrial 
countries, where firms are better equipped to hedge against unexpected 
swings in exchange rates, and that exchange rate stability has been characte­
ristic of countries with sustained export growth (UNCTAD, 1987; UNCTAD, 
1989, part one, chap. V).
The second systemic effect of volatile capital flows is through interest 
rates. As already noted, capital-value uncertainty and interest rates both 
rise as a result of increased borrower's risk as well as greater instability 
in interest rates and prices of financial assets, including equities, associated 
with volatile capital flows. More important, increased competition between
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domestic currency and foreign currency assets also tends to raise the cost 
of finance because of the greater risk and uncertainty in developing coun­
tries. The fact that most developing countries are economically and po­
litically less stable than developed countries, with financial and legal sys­
tems that are less able to ensure enforcement of contracts, increases the 
hazards of financial investment. In a financially closed economy the safety 
premium on foreign currency assets is counter-balanced by the high tran­
saction costs of shifting into them, at least for most small savers, but fi­
nancial openness reduces these costs considerably. Consequently, domestic 
assets need to carry much higher rates of return than external assets. This 
can reduce investment and impair competitiveness.
7. Controlling capital flows
Complete isolation of the financial system in a developing country from 
the rest of world is neither feasible nor desirable. Successful export perfor­
mance requires close interaction of banks at home with world financial 
markets in order to provide trade-related credits and facilitate international 
payments. The ability to borrow in international capital markets allows di­
versification in corporate finance, while foreign investment in capital mar­
kets can help broaden their equity base and reduce their leverage. Foreign 
banks can bring greater competition in the provision of banking services, 
thereby reducing the intermediation margin and the cost of finance.
Nevertheless, most developing countries need to exercise considerable 
control over external capital flows in order to minimize their disruptive 
effects and gain greater policy autonomy to attain growth and stability. 
There are a number of techniques to control capital flows with different 
degrees of restrictions and effects that were widely used in industrial coun­
tries in the 1960s and 1970s (OECD, 1972, pp. 71-77; Fleming, 1973; Swi- 
drowski, 1975; Swoboda, 1976; OECD, 1981; OECD, 1982). Quantitative mea­
sures to limit short-term capital inflows through banks include reserve 
requirements on foreign liabilities, limits on their net external or foreign- 
currency positions, or on gross external or foreign currency liabilities, and 
minimum holding periods and blocking of foreign deposits for such pe­
riods. Similarly a number of measures may be applied to restrict external 
borrowings by non-banks, including reserve requirements on their foreign
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liabilities, and exchange controls such as prohibition of borrowing other 
than commercial or supplier credits received by importers, control on do­
mestic foreign currency credits to domestic importers and exporters, and 
regulations regarding the timing of export and import settlements. Of these, 
limits on banks' net external or foreign currency positions and exchange 
controls regarding non-banks can also be applied to restrict outflows. Res­
trictions on interest payments on non-resident deposits and negative inte­
rest rates are also among the measures that can be used to deter capital 
inflows.
Taxes may also be used to reduce the arbitrage margin and discoura­
ge speculative capital flows. A tax designed to reduce interest differentials 
(like the interest-equalization tax used in the United States in the past to 
check outflows) can also be especially effective in checking capital inflows 
in developing countries where inflation and interest rate differentials with 
developed countries tend to be large. The tax rate can be used flexibly 
according to the behaviour of capital flows and the objective pursued. Si­
milarly Keynes' proposal for a financial transactions tax may be extended to 
apply to international financial transactions in order to "throw some sand in 
the wheels" and "deter short-term financial round-trip excursions" (Tobin, 1978).
Finally, various restrictions may be introduced on the access of non­
residents to capital markets. One common measure is to limit foreign owner­
ship to approved country funds and allow transactions on such funds only 
among non-residents in order to control the flow of foreign funds in and 
out of the country via capital markets. This can be combined with the 
requirement that such funds be managed by local managers who are gene­
rally more amenable to "moral suasion" by the authorities.
It should be kept in mind that in several industrialized countries capital 
markets have been opened to non-residents only very recently. In Japan, 
for instance, they were largely closed until the 1984 agreement with the 
United States, and even in Europe, where an integrated financial market 
is seen as an important step in the completion of a single EEC market, 
restrictions on entry into capital markets still remain in a number of countries 
(e.g. France and Italy). Again, the Republic of Korea only recently opened 
up its capital market to non-residents, but restricted foreign acquisition to 
10 per cent of total equity capital, and to 2 per cent in some strategic 
industries.
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Some of these techniques have recently been used in Latin America 
in order to slow down short-term capital inflows. These include reserve 
requirements for foreign currency liabilities (Chile and Mexico), compul­
sory liquidity requirements on the short-term forex liabilities of commercial 
banks (Mexico), minimum holding periods (Chile), extension of the fiscal 
stamp tax to foreign credits (Chile), restrictions on company borrowing 
abroad through stock and bond issues (Brazil), and limits on the dollar 
amounts that banks can raise in deposits abroad as a proportion of their 
total deposits (Mexico). However, such measures have generally had only 
limited success. Governments are often very shy in applying effective con­
trols for fear of fending off genuine, long-term capital and investment. This 
is certainly a legitimate concern, particularly in Latin America, after a de­
cade-long foreign exchange strangulation. However, experience shows that 
capital controls might have to be introduced anyway if the process develops 
into a payments crisis and capital flight. It may be easier to restrict short­
term inflows and prevent debt accumulation early on than to check capital 
flight in a crisis.
Controls on capital flows are not always effective when there are lar­
ge arbitrage opportunities. It is thus important to bear in mind that price 
stability is vital for a financially open economy, since high inflation and 
wide interest rate differentials with reserve-currency areas often lead to large 
arbitrage opportunities and encourage unsustainable capital flows. Further­
more, exchange rate management plays an important role. Explicit or im­
plicit exchange rate guarantees tend to reduce the risk involved in arbitrage 
and encourage capital flows. As noted above, this has been an important 
factor in attracting short-term capital to Argentina. In Chile, by contrast, 
"the monetary authorities moved to resist revaluation of the peso by intro­
ducing changes to create uncertainty concerning yields on short-term capital 
flows" (ECLAC, 1992, p. 40). These measures included the ending of the 
practice of advance announcement of devaluation of the peso, widening 
of the currency band, and linking the peso to a basket of currencies instead 
of the US dollar. They appear to have played an important role in slowing 
down short-term capital inflows and securing greater real exchange rate 
stability by introducing uncertainty regarding the movement of the exchan­
ge rate. In Mexico too the authorities widened the differential points for 
the peso-US dollar exchange rate to allow larger fluctuations, although its
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effects on capital flows seem to have been limited (Banco de Mexico, 1992, 
p. 144).
Historical experience clearly shows that capital controls are no ans­
wer when the underlying policies are not sustainable. For instance, mea­
sures to control capital inflows are generally ineffective against capital flight 
stemming from economic and political instability. Moreover, it is important 
to bear in mind that capital controls are needed not in order to pursue 
inappropriate policies and exchange rates, but to minimize the disruptive 
effects of short-term capital flows and gain greater policy autonomy to attain 
growth and stability.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
The focus of financial policies in developing countries should be industria­
lization and stability. A common feature of all modem examples of indus­
trialization is that they have all succeeded in maldng finance serve industry 
and trade, not the other way round. This has often necessitated a considera­
ble amount of intervention and control over financial activities. On the other 
hand, despite widespread claims for efficiency of financial markets, financial 
liberalization in many countries in recent years has generated more costs 
than benefits. These have included persistent misalignment of prices of fi­
nancial assets, resulting in inefficiencies in the allocation of resources; sharply 
increased short-term volatility of asset prices, resulting in greater uncer­
tainty, shorter maturities and higher interest rates; excessive borrowing to 
finance speculative asset purchases and consumption, resulting in unsus­
tainable stocks of debt, increased financial fragility and reduced household 
savings; and loss of autonomy in pursuing interest-rate and exchange-rate 
policies in accordance with the needs of trade and industry.
It is equally true that government intervention in finance has often 
been misguided, giving rise to inefficiency and waste. However, the appro­
priate response should be to reform the State and rationalize intervention 
rather than throw in the towel and simply "unleash market forces". The 
main challenge is to determine where and how governments should inter­
vene and to make sure that the intervention achieves its aims. The dis­
cussions so far suggest the following:
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• Macroeconomic stability is of cardinal importance for the stability 
and efficiency of the financial system, since excessive volatility of prices 
and economic activity tends to increase financial fragility, create uncertain­
ty, raise interest rates and shorten the time horizon. While macroeconomic 
stability itself is influenced by financial policies, monetary and fiscal dis­
cipline is crucial.
• In cases where directed credits and financial subsidies are success­
fully used as part of industrial policy, winners are not picked by "bureau­
crats", but through a process based on a close interaction between the go­
vernment and the business and the use of market signals to assess risks 
and opportunities. Success also depends on ensuring reciprocity between 
support and performance; use of controls, regulations and subsidies for the 
intended purposes; and readiness to revise them as necessary.
• Financial policies must take account of the dual nature of interest 
rates: the return aspect, which primarily influences the distribution of asset 
holdings in different forms, and the cost aspect, which determines the ca­
pacity of the corporate sector to generate internal funds, to undertake in­
vestment and to compete in world markets. It is important to bear in mind 
that while high interest rates are not necessary to increase savings, low 
and stable capital cost is crucially important for investment and compe­
titiveness.
• There is often a need for deposit ceilings and intervention in the 
money market in order to stabilize interest rates and asset prices and pre­
vent excessive risk-taking and price competition in the financial sector. Such 
controls should be applied with flexibility and discretion, taking into account 
macroeconomic conditions as well as the needs of trade and investment. 
Rigid rules regarding the level of real interest rates are no more sensible 
than those about the rate of growth of money supply in the conduct of 
monetary policy.
• Prudential regulations and strong bank supervision are also essential 
to prevent excessive risk-taking and financing of speculative activities by 
banks. Measures such as capital requirements are not always enough to 
reduce fragility: it may also be necessary to act directly on the asset port­
folios of banks and restrict lending against or investment in highly capital- 
uncertain assets such as securities and property, and exposure to a single 
firm. Firms should not be allowed to own and control banks. Protective
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regulations such as deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort facilities 
should only be introduced in combination with prudential regulations.
• Most developing countries need to concentrate their energies on 
strengthening their existing bank-based financial systems rather than pin 
their hope on transplanting Wall Street. They also need to promote long­
term equity holding via institutional investors such as provident funds, and 
permit banks to hold equities within prudential limits. Transfer taxes and 
"circuit breakers" may be used to deter short-term trading and reduce vola­
tility in stock markets. Easy access to stock-markets and readily available 
short-term financial instruments paying market returns tend to increase fi­
nancial instability.
• Particular care needs to be given to the design of external financial 
policies since mistakes in this area tend to be very costly and difficult 
to reverse. Allowing residents uncontrolled access to international capital 
markets has proved damaging in many developing countries, and short­
term speculative capital flows have proved extremely troublesome. Deve­
loping countries need to exercise a considerable degree of control over ex­
ternal capital flows through taxes, quantitative restrictions and exchange 
controls in order to minimize their adverse effects on macroeconomic equi­
librium, exchange rates and trade; to control the pace of accumulation of 
external debt; and to gain greater autonomy in monetary policy. Access 
of non-residents to domestic capital markets should be restricted since close 
links between the two inherently volatile markets can be very dangerous. 
It is also important to resist the temptation to dollarize the economy in 
order to keep capital at home: policies should address the root cause of 
the problem and eliminate the reasons for extensive demand for foreign 
currency.
• A pragmatic not a doctrinaire approach is needed towards financial 
control and liberalization in developing countries. Restrictions on financial 
flows and interest rates may be removed over time as they fulfil their 
functions. Financial liberalization undertaken as a result of a successfully 
implemented industrial policy is very different from liberalization as a reac­
tion to misguided and failed intervention. Has financial liberalization ever 
remedied stagnation and instability?
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INTRODUCTION
Because the economies of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Province of 
China, have grown so fast, their financial systems, and the reforms they 
underwent in the 1980s, have been objects of curiosity in other developing 
countries. This is especially the case since the financial systems of both 
countries have exhibited high degrees of repression. Although both systems 
were reformed in the 1980s they still deviate substantially from the free 
market model.
This paper has four purposes. The first is to explain why govern­
ment intervention in financial markets has been so extensive, not just in 
the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Province of China, but in the general 
case of countries that have industrialized "late". Late industrialization is 
defined here as a process of industrial development in countries without 
the competitive asset of pioneering technology, which was the hallmark 
of the First and Second Industrial Revolutions. The second purpose is to 
analyse why government intervention in financial markets in the Republic 
of Korea and Taiwan, Province of China, has worked relatively well. The 
third purpose is to review briefly the major characteristics of the financial 
system of the Republic of Korea. Finally, the paper makes some observa­
tions about Korean financial reform in the 1980s.
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I. WHY SO MUCH GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION?1
The basic Heckscher-Ohlin trade model assumes identical production func­
tions in the same industry in all countries, but in reality more advanced 
economies may be more cost effective, even in industries with a high la­
bour content, due to superior infrastructure in their operating setting, better 
management and workforce skills, as well as their store of tadt, nontransfe- 
rable productivity and quality improvements. At least in the short run, 
the standard form of technology transfer -designs, blueprints and production 
equipment- or even a turnkey transfer, are usually insuffident to overcome 
the productivity gap. Under these conditions, relatively low wages do not 
translate into relatively low unit labour costs, and do not serve as an entrée 
into world markets.
Exchange rate devaluations may lower real wage costs in international 
markets. But currency depredations are usually constrained by political and 
social conditions, workers' physiological intake requirements, and the need 
to import production inputs, including wage goods. Even after real currency 
devaluations in the 1960s in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Province 
of China, low wages were found to be an insufficient competitive advanta­
ge against Japanese competition notwithstanding the labour intensity of a 
leading sector like cotton textiles (see, for example, Amsden, 1989; Clark,
1987). Latin America in the 1980s demonstrated that it was impossible to 
lower real wages without triggering a wage response that led to serious 
price instability and general macroeconomic disorder in the form of volatile 
nominal and real interest rates, unpredictable foreign exchange rates, variable 
and large fiscal defidts, and stop-go growth (UNCTAD, 1989, chap. 4; Taylor,
1988).
In contrast with conventional arguments favouring specialization in 
labour-intensive industries, the doyen of institutional theories of late indus­
trialization, Alexander Gerschenkron, views catching up as a process of 're­
volutionary', 'eruptive' spurts, with backward countries promoting "those 
branches of industrial activities in which recent technological progress has 
been particularly rapid" (1962: 9-10). Leading American and German enter­
1 Sections 2-5 (a) rely heavily on Hikino and Amsden (1993).
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prises could and did leap-frog ahead of Britain in the most dynamic sectors 
such as chemicals and steel because British firms could not establish impe­
netrable international entry barriers in the nineteenth century.
By the twentieth century this strategy had become impractical for two 
reasons. First, over time the gap between the most and least advanced 
countries (or even the average developed and developing country) had grown 
far greater. The distance to the world economic frontier, measured as the 
ratio of GDP per capita of the most developed countries to the appropriate 
comparison, ranged from only 1.8 to 3.3 for the average backward European 
country at the end of the nineteenth century compared with 11.9 for the 
average developing country after the Second World War and 25.7 for the 
typical least developed country in the 1970s (Hikino and Amsden, 1993).
Second, with the rise of global enterprises possessing "organizational 
capabilities" based on a core technology (Chandler, 1990), Gerschenkron's 
idea of leaping to the world technological frontier was no longer feasible. 
The institutionalization of R&D in such enterprises allowed them to erect 
entry barriers around their proprietary technology, which kept newcomers 
out. The only economy in the twentieth century to attempt to leap-frog 
to the world technological frontier ended in failure, namely the former 
USSR, which was Gerschenkron's primary concern.
Gerschenkron conceived domestic enterprises in Europe as the agents 
of industrialization, but increasingly after the Second World War, the 
multinational firm came to be viewed in certain development theories as 
the agent capable of transferring technology to backward countries. By rais­
ing productivity there, the multinational supposedly precluded the need 
for government intervention. Whether in the role of exporter of labour- 
intensive manufactures (as in Taiwan, Province of China, and Puerto Rico), 
or developer of import substitution industries (as in Mexico and Brazil), 
the multinational firm was credited with nudging backward countries closer 
to world productivity standards.
Nevertheless, casting the multinational firm at the heart of the deve­
lopment drama has proved to be problematic in practice. Few developing 
countries after the Second World War have managed individually to attract 
significant amounts of foreign investment. Even in those Asian countries 
which the multinationals have patronized, investments from abroad have 
been found to amount to only a small fraction of aggregate capital require­
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ments (Amsden, 1992). Foreign capital typically lags rather than leads indus­
trial development and tends to flow to backward countries where industria­
lization has already started, and only then accelerates it (Herman, 1991). 
Moreover, simply because a foreign investor is a multinational firm no longer 
necessarily implies that it operates at the world frontier. The production 
and design problems that afflict it at home may merely be transferred abroad 
-as in the case of the South American operations of some North American 
automobile companies (Shapiro, forthcoming). Thus, the multinational firm 
cannot be counted on automatically to overcome the diseconomies of back­
wardness mentioned above.
In sum, conventional development theory recommends that latecomers 
industrialize by "getting the prices right" (allowing supply and demand to 
determine prices), and typically by using low wages to gain a comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive industries. But, in fact, successful late 
industrialization has been a process of using subsidies to lower production 
costs, such as capital, to get the prices "wrong" (preventing market forces 
from determining prices, such as interest rates) in order to overcome the 
handicap of an absence of proprietary technology, the inability to leap­
frog over more advanced countries, and the inadequacy of a low wage 
advantage (Amsden, 1989; 1992). Therefore, a necessary condition for 
industrializing in the twentieth century is systematic and well-coordinated 
government intervention to promote manufacturing investment. As sugges­
ted below, what seems to distinguish developing countries that are "sneak­
ing up" to the world technological frontier from those that are "stumbling 
back" (such as the Philippines and Argentina) or "staying behind" (say, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan) is not less state intervention but rather a different 
set of principles governing subsidy allocation.
II. REPRESSION IN FINANCIAL MARKETS
Even in the classic economic liberalism of the First Industrial Revolution 
in England, the Government played a positive and significant role (Coats, 
1971; Taylor, 1972). Starting from the late eighteenth century, governments 
were actively involved in developing transportation, communications, and 
all sorts of education as well as stable banking systems and legal and
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administrative frameworks generally. Over time, more direct microecono­
mic intervention that affected price competition increased everywhere to 
the extent that tariff protection to infant and other industries became wides­
pread for a host of reasons related not just to industrial development but 
also to revenue and politics (Nye, 1991). Ideology aside, laissez-faire simply 
never existed (lively, 1955; Goodrich, 1967; Hughes, 1991). As Maddison 
has observed: "Before 1913, government intervention had a similar flavour 
almost everywhere" (1989: 108).
Nevertheless, given a lack of competitive assets, late-industrializing 
states in the twentieth century did all this and much more, examples being 
Brazil, Turkey, India, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, Province of China, 
and Japan, but because Japan was relatively less developed, it could do 
less than later industrializers. A case in point relates to financial markets, 
where state intervention went much further than even Alexander Gerschen- 
kron envisioned. In the absence of highly developed banking institutions, 
Gerschenkron recognized the need for governments to arrange finance for 
manufacturing investments. But late-industrializing governments have not 
only made finance available, they have also targeted capital to specific firms 
as well as selected industries on highly concessionary terms.
In Taiwan, Province of China, for example, a market-determined inte­
rest rate could be said to have been approximated in the 1960s, 1970s and 
1980s by the "curb market" interest rate. The curb rate was not determined 
in perfect competition because there were large, wholesale lenders, but it 
was still quite competitively established. Below the equilibrium curb market 
rate was the rate set by the government-owned commercial banks. These 
banks were habitually getting the interest rate "wrong", as evidenced by 
the fact that the commercial bank rate was consistently below the curb 
rate, often for one and the same borrower. Moreover, the nominal interest 
rate paid by the big firms that received commercial bank credit was higher 
than their effective interest rate because they on-lent to smaller firms at 
higher prices (Biggs, 1988).
After the Republic of Korea's financial "liberalization" of the 1980s, 
the "right" price of capital may be said to have been approximated by 
the interest rate in the secondary short-term government bond market. The 
misnomer of "liberalization" is indicated by the fact that, whereas in May 
1989 the interest rate in this market was 18.9 per cent, the loan interest
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rate of government-controlled commercial banks was only 12.5 per cent 
(Amsden and Euh, 1993). Obviously, commercial bank credit was still being 
subsidized even after "liberalization". The Republic of Korea had a three- 
tier financial structure for the first 25 years of its development. It was 
characterized by a curb market interest rate, a commercial bank rate, and 
a rate on foreign loans. Due to inflation and the relative constancy of the 
exchange rate, the real interest rate on foreign loans was negative through­
out most of this period (Park, 1985). Not all three different prices that exis­
ted side by side in the Republic of Korea's capital market could have been 
right, and the negative real interest rate on foreign loans was fundamentally 
"wrong" in a capital-scarce country.
Even Thailand, with its reputation for economic liberalism, had positive 
real interest rates for only 24 out of .52 quarters between 1970 and 1982. 
A World Bank study called this performance "quite respectable in compari­
son with most developing countries" (Hanson and Neal, 1984: annex 6,3).
III. DISCIPLINE OF BUSINESS
In comparing the behaviour of more and less economically- successful la­
te industrializers that are "sneaking up" closer to the world frontier with 
those that are "stumbling back" or just "staying behind", an important di­
fference between them lies in their management of the subsidy allocation 
process. Slow-growing late industrializers have tended to blanket business 
with subsidies without being willing or able to extract concrete performan­
ce standards in exchange. By contrast, fast-growing late industrializers have 
generally succeeded in disciplining subsidy recipients, imposing strict and 
monitorable performance standards on them (Amsden, 1989; 1991a; 1992). 
In imposing performance standards on business, the government also sub­
jected itself to evaluation by objective criteria.
In the case of Taiwan, Province of China, subsidies to exporters in 
the 1960s were tied to targets administered by industry associations that 
were overseen by government agencies. These associations acted as cartels. 
They collected dues from members out of which bonuses to exporters were 
paid. Firms were allocated export targets and penalized if they fell short 
of their targets (Haggard, 1990; Wade, 1990). Loan officers of Taiwan, Pro-
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vince of China's State-owned banks were also held personally responsible 
(in terms of pay and promotion) for the credit they allocated. Consequen­
tly, they were both conservative in their lending policies -lending only to 
relatively large firms- and careful in their monitoring of how effectively 
borrowers used their credit (Biggs, 1988).
While "infant industry protection", as conceived in the nineteenth cen­
tury, was in theory a one-shot deal, designed to enable a new enterprise 
to reach a minimum efficient scale of operation, subsidization in late 
industrialization has in practice been multi-stage. It has operated not just 
at the start but also at later points in an economy's catch-up trajectory. 
For instance, the Taiwan, Province of China's machine tool industry re­
ceived little government support in its early growth phase, but was sub­
sidized subsequently to help it acquire financially troubled United States 
machine tool companies and move up into a higher quality market niche 
(Amsden, 1977; OECD, 1990). Ironically, the United States machine tool in­
dustry was also receiving government subsidies at the same time as the 
Taiwan, Province of China's machine tool industry was receiving them, but 
with no performance standards attached (Amsden, 1991b). By the 1990s the 
Taiwan, Province of China's Government was making preferential treatment 
of business depend on whether the firm in question met conditions related 
to R&D spending, personnel training, and even environmental protection 
standards (Dahlman and Sananikone, 1990).
Thus, subsidies in the slow-growing late-industrializing countries have 
tended to be allocated according to the principle of "giveaway" whereas 
in the fast-growing ones they have tended to be allocated according to 
the principle of reciprocity. In both cases the government has disciplined 
labour. What distinguishes the East Asian countries is that the government 
has also disciplined capital.
IV. THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO IMPOSE
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
The factors underlying the ability of the East Asian States to impose per­
formance standards on business have operated at different layers of com­
plexity.
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1. The state autonomy
Imposing performance standards on business in exchange for subsidies in 
the early phase of industrialization requires a critical degree of "autono­
my" on the state's part. This autonomy is influenced by the political power 
of private economic interest groups, whose strength and cohesiveness, in 
turn, seem to depend upon: (a) the level of development of the manufac­
turing sector; and (b) income distribution. What made it possible for the 
East Asian states to discipline business was the relative weakness of both 
manufacturing and agrarian interest groups at the outset of postwar in­
dustrial development.
Asia's manufacturing sector, except for Japan's, was extremely un­
derdeveloped after the war even by the standards of other backward coun­
tries. According to two indicators of manufacturing development presented 
in table 1 -the ratio of manufacturing to agricultural net product and the 
net value of manufacturing per capita- East Asia's manufacturing sector 
in 1955 was much less advanced than Latin America's (the backwardness 
of India's manufacturing sector is exaggerated due to India's huge agrarian 
population). Owing to their weakness, East Asian manufacturing enterpri­
ses became dependent on state support to achieve a growth spurt, and 
had fewer of their own institutions than Latin American business to shield 
them from state interference.
Second, East Asian income tended to be more equally distributed than 
Latin American income (see table 2). Assuming that unequal income dis­
tribution implies access to a disproportionate share of resources by small 
groups in agriculture or industry, the more concentrated economic power 
is, the more these groups can both by-pass state sources of investment 
finance and buy government favours. Japan, the Republic of Korea and 
Taiwan, Province of China, all underwent a land reform in the late 1940s 
during which time their agrarian aristocracies were expropriated. With a 
manufacturing sector only in its infancy, and an agrarian sector devoid 
of powerful interest groups, the challenge to state authority remained weak. 
The Philippines represents the outstanding Asian exception to sustained 
growth, and it has regressed economically, bearing the burden of a highly 
unequal income distribution.
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2. Financial system characteristics: The case of the Republic of Korea2
Another set of historically-spedfic factors influencing the East Asian state's 
ability to discipline business relates to the character of financial institu­
tions. All major financial institutions under Japanese colonialism (which 
emerged in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Province of China, before 
the turn of the century and endured until the end of the Second World 
War) were state-owned, and commercial banks continued to be state-owned 
after independence. The ownership and control of commercial banks gave 
the postwar state in the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Province of China 
control over investment finance (including foreign borrowing) and hence 
enormous leverage over borrowers.
Over time, all institutions of the Republic of Korea's financial system 
have been unified under one regulatory umbrella, the Ministry of Finance, 
so that the parts and the whole of the system can act in concert. Political 
leaders have come and gone in the Republic of Korea since the 1950s, and 
Korean students have returned from the United States brandishing first 
Keynesian and now monetarist theories, but there has been some continuity 
in the way the Korean "State" has managed financial activities. Such consis­
tency has arisen from the professionalism and high calibre of the bureau­
cracy in the Ministry of Finance, which recruits its officials from the elite 
universities on the basis of a gruelling civil service exam3. Up until the 
present, virtually no bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance (except poli­
tically-appointed Ministers) had been educated outside the Republic of Ko­
rea (aside from short-term courses). Such bureaucrats consult and possibly 
respect the importance of the free market theories of United States-trained 
economists, but they do not necessarily implement them, which is one rea­
son for the yawning gap between what the Republic of Korea's financial 
system is said to be and what it actually is.
2 Sections 5(b)-6(c) rely heavily on Amsden and Euh (1990 and 1993).
3 Tokyo National University, Seoul National University and Taiwan National University (the 
last two in emulation of the first), were all founded with the purpose of supplying educated 
government officials, all of whom had to pass a "high" civil service exam. In general, all 
three East Asian countries have invested heavily in education, and this has undoubtedly 
contributed to the efficiency of the bureaucracy.
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The financial system has incorporated an intangible set of dependen­
cies, power relationships, and informal understandings that lends flexibi­
lity to the management of political and economic contingencies and variabi­
lities in the environment. Informality has been instrumental in providing 
government officials with levers to discipline big business and other reci­
pients of state support.
Before the 1980s, the government prohibited a myriad of financial prac­
tices; since the 1980s, it is more likely to prevent them. At one time, eve­
rything was prohibited except what the government allowed. Since then, 
all is allowed that is not prohibited. In addition to political pressures, this 
change reflects the demands which a more complex economy places on 
the financial system in terms of flexibility: the need for greater flexibility 
to meet unforeseen contingencies is best handled by informal understand­
ings and mutual dependencies rather than formal rules. The shift from 
prohibition to prevention hinges more on informal than formal methods 
of government intervention.
Since 1988 the monetary authorities have prevented interest rates from 
rising too high -in both commercial banks and non-bank financial institu­
tions (NBFIs)- by means of "window guidance": for instance, a Bureau Chief 
in the Ministry of Finance will call the President of a bank, finance or 
trust company, and /or officials of associations of financial institutions and 
provide "advice" on both deposit and loan rates.
The Ministry of Finance has several means at its disposal to make 
"window guidance" binding. In the case of commercial banks, which were 
privatized in the early 1980s, the MOF (and not shareholders) still influen­
ces the appointment of officers, privatization notwithstanding. The appoint­
ment of directors is enforced a fortiori in the case of specialized banks, 
which have not been privatized and which account for roughly 20 per cent 
of total financial assets (see table 3). In the case of non-bank financial ins­
titutions, which have always been private, the MOFs leverage over inte­
rest rates hinges on its power: (i) to regulate these institution's financial 
portfolios by setting limits on the amount of funds they can invest in, 
say, real estate, stocks, and bonds; (ii) to regulate their size, by deciding 
whether they may increase their paid-in capital (previously the MOF had 
control over the ability of NBFIs to create new branches); (iii) to order 
the Superintendent of Banks or another regulatory agency comparable to
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the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to investigate a fi­
nancial institution for "irregularities"; and (iv) to control the ability of 
NBFIs to refinance through the Bank of Korea, which the MOF governs.
V. KEEPING THE COSTS OF INVESTMENT FINANCE LOW: THE
CASE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA’S FINANCIAL REFORMS
1. Interest rates
Whether before or after reform, Korea's Ministry of Finance (MOF) has had 
as one of its objectives lowering the level of financial costs for an ever- 
increasing circle of firms. One consideration that has guided the Ministry 
of Finance is that low interest rates are necessary to stimulate investment, 
while high interest rates are not as necessary to mobilize savings.
In December 1988 the monetary authorities became serious about re­
form and, as part of a sweeping financial reform, deregulated interest rates 
on bank loans and discounts, and on the rates of both short-term and long­
term financial markets. After December 1988 the MOF was no longer em­
powered to set ceilings on interest rates (which, in a repressed financial 
market, had become actual rates) or to earmark subsidized credit for spe­
cial borrowers.
A brief example suffices to substantiate the continuation of the MOF's 
informal interventions. In May 1989, the interest rate in the secondary short­
term government bond market (special law bonds), which is a close appro­
ximation to a free market rate, was 18.9 percent. The loan interest rate 
of commercial banks was only 12.5 percent. This represents a big gap bet­
ween the two markets and is therefore evidence against the liberalization 
of interest rates which, in theory, occurred from 5 December 1988 onwards.
The only interference by government in loan allocation in the Republic 
of Korea that is supposed to continue to exist is in relation to small and 
medium-sized firms: all financial institutions, even branches of foreign banks 
operating in the Republic of Korea, are required to set aside a certain portion 
of their loans for small and medium-sized enterprises, since even foreign 
banks, which were always free to choose their clients, tended to slight such 
firms in the past. In practice, the MOF determines to which firms financial
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institutions may lend long term. Targeted industries receive preferential 
credit in the form of access to bank loans which, as noted above, carry 
below- market interest rates, if not the super preferential rates they once 
carried. The government has also acted to help targeted industries by other 
means, for instance, by developing plant sites for them near Seoul, whe­
re land is expensive but labour prefers to live; by providing tax breaks 
for R&D; and by financing joint ventures in R&D between business and 
government.
Thus, despite liberalization in the 1980s, the government of the Repu­
blic of Korea continues to provide subsidized credit to special customers. 
Nevertheless, the principal means by which the government has tried to 
reduce the costs of finance have come from outside the banking system.
2. Developing the stock market
Instead of liberalizing (raising) the interest rates of commercial banks to 
mobilize domestic savings (and thereby reduce reliance on foreign loans), 
the government has also attempted to provide both attractive outlets for 
savers and cheap finance for investors by expanding the stock market. The 
government has also attempted to expand the stock market to diffuse the 
wealth of the "chaebol" (big diversified business groups) through greater 
public ownership.
In 1980, price-eamings ratios in the Republic of Korea averaged 3 
(compared to 8 in the United States and 20 in Japan). The cost of finance 
through the issuance of stocks was therefore 33 per cent. In 1989, such 
ratios averaged 14, which meant that the cost of finance had fallen to 7.1 
per cent. Euh and Baker (1990) estimate that equity financing in 1989 cost 
only 3 per cent, in terms of cash flow, even considering tax effects, as 
dividend yields were only 2 per cent versus 12.5 per cent for preferential 
commercial bank loans.
Price-eamings ratios have risen in the Republic of Korea in response 
to general prosperity -a current account surplus provided unprecedented 
liquidity- and government plans to develop the capital market. Prices also 
responded to the performance of the Korea Fund, and other open-end type 
investment trusts sanctioned by the government, which enabled foreigners 
to invest indirectly in the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE). The Fund, amount­
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ing to US $60 million, was established in May 1984. It aimed at long­
term capital appreciation through investment primarily in equity securities 
of Korean companies. It soon traded at a 100 per cent premium, driving 
up the price of a wide range of shares traded on the KSE.
The government intervened on both the supply and demand sides 
to deepen the stock exchange. The Ministry of Finance drew big companies 
into the capital market as suppliers of stocks and bonds by preventing 
them from borrowing overseas. Ceilings on debt-equity ratios were also 
enforced by closing a loophole whereby business groups tried to evade 
debt-equity ceilings by cross-holding stocks of affiliated companies. Such 
ceilings have represented a far-reaching form of government intervention 
in the affairs of business by international standards. The MOF began to 
enforce debt-equity ceilings and thereby reduce the financial instability of 
big business and increase the supply of corporate stocks and bonds for 
sale. A regulation that required share issues to be offered at par was res­
cinded (with a notable exception, which will be discussed below). By the 
late 1980s, real interest rates in the Republic of Korea were roughly three 
times higher than international rates, once an appreciation of the Korean 
won is taken into account (see table 4). This made it even more advanta­
geous for firms to acquire finance on the capital market by issuing bonds 
or stocks than by borrowing from the banks.
The number of companies Usted on the Korean Stock Exchange rose 
from 342 in 1985 to 669 at the end of 1990 (see table 5), and the number 
of shares traded rose from 0.8 bilhon to 3.2 bilHon. On a cumulative basis, 
indirect bank finance remained more important in the RepubUc of Korea 
than direct equity and bond finance, as in almost every developed and 
developing country except the United States. On an annual basis, howe­
ver, indirect finance became less important than direct finance in the late 
1980s (see table 6).
On the demand side, government measures to deepen the stock mar­
ket had a dual objective: to mobilize savings and speculative funds by 
raising demand for securities, and to spread stock ownership among the 
lower income earners of the population. In addition to providing tax breaks 
and opening investment trusts for foreigners, demand-side measures have 
included the following: first, the MOF has aimed to enhance the integrity 
and trustworthiness of the capital market. Government guarantees of cor­
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porate bonds, introduced in 1972, have continued. Stocks have been divi­
ded into two tiers, blue chips and more risky issues. A country-wide drive 
has attempted to educate the ordinary investor. Measures have been con­
sidered by the government to reduce insider trading and improve disclo­
sure.
Second, stock market institutions themselves have been strengthened, 
partly in anticipation of the opening of the Republic of Korea's capital mar­
ket to foreign investors and securities companies. The MOF allowed Korean 
securities companies to increase their paid-in capital by a multiple of 7 
in a four-year period. An attempt has also been made to increase participa­
tion on the KSE of institutional investors by allowing non-bank financial 
institutions to hold securities in their portfolios. The ownership structures 
of life insurance companies and securities dealers themselves have been 
amended to encompass ownership of corporate equities and bonds. At the 
end of 1990, institutional investors accounted for 46 per cent of outstanding 
shares, a lower proportion than in most advanced countries but a far higher 
one than five years earlier (Securities Supervisory Board, 1992).
Third, to spread "people's capitalism", the government allowed 5 per 
cent of a company's new issues of stocks or debentures to be reserved 
for its employees for sale at par rather than market value. Directors and 
executives were not allowed to be included in the scheme. Some finance 
companies were successful in establishing such a programme, and since 
they had a relatively high level of paid-in capital and few employees, the 
gains to any individual employee sometimes reached US$20,000. This sti­
mulated demands by workers in other companies for the establishment of 
similar schemes, demands that were sometimes supported by strikes. By 
1990 Employee Stock Ownership Associations covered some 945,600 wor­
kers in 784 companies. The total number of shareholders was roughly 10.4 
million people out of a population of about 42 million.
3. Interest rates and savings
In the 1980s, credit continued to be allocated preferentially, but real de­
posit rates rose as did savings. Whereas real savings deposit interest rates 
were negative through most of the 1970s, they became positive in the 1980s, 
reaching a peak of 7.3 per cent in 1986 (see table 7). Nevertheless, there
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does not appear to be any simple relationship in the Republic of Korea 
between interest rates and savings.
Table 8 provides data on national and household savings rates, expre­
ssed as percentages of GNP. What is evident is that the rising trend of 
rates of saving began well before the onset of liberalization and low in­
flation rates. In 1978-1979, when inflation was high and real savings deposit 
interest rates were negative during the big push into heavy industry, the 
ratio of national saving to GNP reached 28 per cent. This almost equalled 
the savings rate of 1984-1985 (29 per cent), when inflation was down and 
the era of positive real interest rates had dawned (see table 8). Savings 
rates jumped in the late 1980s, but this coincided with a surplus in the 
current account of the balance of payments. By definition, therefore, sav­
ings rose.
Any postulation of a simple relationship between real interest rates 
and savings is further discredited by econometric exercises suggesting that 
the two variables are weakly and insignificantly correlated with one ano­
ther in the Republic of Korea, whether savings are defined at the national 
or household level (Han, 1988; Yu, 1988). If simple explanations are preferred, 
then income is a better explanator of savings behavior than real interest 
rates, a finding for the Republic of Korea that is in keeping with more 
general observations for developing countries. Khatkhate (1988) reports that 
in a wide range of developing countries, "the level of the real interest rate 
by itself has little or no impact on the selected macroeconomic variables" 
(p. 577, emphasis added).
The message seems to be that savings behaviour must be understood 
in a wider policy-making and socio-economic context than merely interest 
rate determination. The econometric findings in the Republic of Korea of 
a weak relationship between savings and real interest rates open the door 
to the possibility that savings in the 1980s were influenced by opportuni­
ties for capital gains in the stock market, and by an increased demand 
for housing, both induced by rising incomes. Housing as a share in total 
urban household expenditure rose from 14 per cent in 1965 to 17 per cent 
in 1975 and to 27 per cent in 1985 (Song, 1991). The demand for housing 
may be expected to raise the savings rate insofar as the Republic of Korea's 
financial sector still does not provide mortgage loans.
88 A l ic e  H . A m sd e n
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Without the competitive asset of new products and processes, late-indus­
trializing countries have found it difficult to propel themselves into the 
league of international competitors on the exclusive basis of a low-wage 
advantage. Even in their leading sector in the 1960s (cotton spinning and 
weaving), and notwithstanding their relatively modem physical and hu­
man infrastructure achieved by dint of United States aid, the Republic of 
Korea and Taiwan, Province of China, still could not compete on quality 
and price using market-determined production costs against the higher 
productivity of Japanese textile manufacturers. Government intervention in 
financial markets, therefore, has been oriented towards lowering costs, es­
pecially of capital, by subsidizing interest rates.
The Governments of both the Republic of Korea and Taiwan, Provin­
ce of China, have intervened fairly effectively, as measured by aggregate 
rates of productivity and output growth, because they instituted a principle 
to guide subsidy allocation that differed from that of slower-growing late- 
industrializing countries. In the two countries, subsidies have tended to 
be allocated to business according to the principle of reciprocity, in exchan­
ge for concrete and monitorable performance standards, whereas in slower- 
growing countries they have tended to be allocated without strings attached.
In the 1980s, both countries (the focus of this paper) reformed their 
financial systems by making them more competitive, but the Ministry of 
Finance continued to coordinate financial market institutions and to intro­
duce measures to keep credit articifially cheap for selected firms. Interest 
rates in the 1980s were not deregulated, but the major method employed 
by the government to create cheap credit was largely institutional: it in­
troduced a series of measures to strengthen the stock market.
The Republic of Korea has achieved its objective of modernizing its 
financial sector, therefore, principally by creating institutions or remode­
lling old ones, not by relying exclusively on market forces to achieve de­
sired goals. Sometimes new institutions have liberated market forces, but 
at other times they have repressed them. To achieve similar goals, other 
countries wishing to follow the Republic of Korea's experience would have 
to create equivalent, if different, institutions, but not assume that goals are 
achievable merely by letting the forces of supply and demand operate freely.
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Table 1
RATIO OF MANUFACTURING TO AGRICULTURAL NET PRODUCT 
AND NET VALUE OF MANUFACTURING PER CAPITA, 
LATIN AMERICA AND ASIA, L955
Country
Ratio of manufacturing 
to net agricultural 
product
Net value of m anu­













Republic of Korea 0.20 8
Philippines 0.32 13
Thailand 0.28 10
Source: Alfred Maizels, Industria l G row th  and  W orld Trade, (Cambridge: At the Uni­
versity Press, 1953), as cited in Christopher Freeman, "Catching up in world growth 
and world trade," (mimeo), Science Policy Research Unit, Sussex University, Uni­
ted Kingdom
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Table 2
INCOME DISTRIBUTION (THE RATIO BY WHICH THE INCOME 





Hong Kong 1981 12.1
Japan 1979 4.0
Korea, Republic of (a) 1981 4.9
Southeast Asia
Taiwan, Province of China (b) - 4.3











Dominican Republic (d) 1976-77 12.5
H  Salvador (d) 1976-77 8.6
Guatemala 1979-81 10.6
Mexico (d) 1977 15.4
(a) Urban only (data for other countries are national).
(b) Statistic reported in Kuo-Ting Li, The E vo lu tion  o f Polio / Behind T aiw an 's  
D evelopm ent Success (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988).
(c) Rural only, as reported in Alan Gelb and associates, Oil W indfalls: Bless­
ing  or C urse? , New York, Oxford University Press, 1988.
(d) Based on available rather than total households, which tends to bias 
estimates of inequality downwards.
Source: (all countries and territories except Taiwan, Province of China, and 
Indonesia): National survey data reported in United Nations, "Special study”, 
N ational A ccoun ts  S ta tistic s, (New York: 1985).
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Table 3
DEPOSITS BY TYPES OF INSTITUTIONS
(end of year - billion won, %) (a)
1975 1980 1985 1990 1991
Banking Institutions 2,779.2 12,421.8 31,022.7 84,054.1 98,507.9
(Deposit money banks) (b) (78.9) (70.4) (53.7) (41.2) (40.1)
Commercial banks 1,923.3 7,752.1 18,157.0 51,174.6 59,494.9
(54.6) (43.8) (31.4) (25.1) (24.2)
Specialized banks 855.9 4,669.7 12,865.7 32,879.5 39,013.0
(24.3) (26.4) (22.3) (16.1) (15.9)
Nonbank financial institutions 743.5 5,281.4 26,780.2 120,078.1 146,918.6
(21.1) (29.8) (46.3) (58.8) (59.9)
Development institutions 28.8 144.8 227.2 1,773.8 2,281.1
(0.8) (0.8) (0.4) (1.5) (0.9)
- Korea Development Bank 28.8 135.8 198.5 846.0 860.3
- Korea Long-Term G ed it Bank - 9.0 28.7 927.8 1,420.8
Investment companies 195.3 1,771.9 9,552.6 33,964.0 25,120.3
(5.5) (10.0) (16.5) (28.3) (14.3)
- Investment and Finance Co. 180.5 902.0 3,238.6 8,575.3 7,012.6
- Merchant Banking Corp. - 213.2 835.4 1,209.0 1,443.1
- Securities Investment Trust Co. 14.8 633.1 5,399.6 24,179.7 26,664.6
Saving institutions 382.6 2,445.8 10,273.4 55,961.2 72,675.0
(10.9) (13.8) (17.8) (46.6) (29.6)
- Trust accounts at banks 186.5 1,042.7 3,928.0 29,174.6 36,619.4
- Mutual Savings Finance Co. 50.4 419.5 2,765.4 8,940.3 12,021.2
- Credit unions 7.4 121.9 556.5 2,657.7 3,827.3
- M utual credit 138.3 861.7 2,814.4 13,823.5 18,317.9
- Postal savings - - 209.1 1,365.1 1,889.2
Insurance companies 136.8 918.9 6,727.0 28,379.1 36,842.2
(3.9) (5.2) (11.6) (23.6) (15.0)
Life Insurance Co. 136.8 918.9 6,580.7 27,165.8 35,316.0
Postal Life Insurance - - 146.3 1,213.3 1,526.2
Total 3,522.7 17,703.2 57,802.9 204,132.2 242,426.5
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
(a) Deposits in won currency on the balance sheet of institutions.
(b) Figures in ( ) indicate shares of deposits at each type of institution.
Source: The Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin (various issues), as cited in Amsden and Euh (1993).
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Table 4
A COMPARISON OF INTEREST RATES IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA
A. Real prime rate in Korea adjusted for changes in exchange Rate
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991
(1) Korean prime rate (a) 18.5 19.0 10.0 11.5 11.5 12.5 12.5
(2) Exchange rate changes (b) 0 -6.2 -6.2 -7.6 8.0 0.7 -6.2
(3) (1) in terms of dollars 18.5 12.8 3.8 3.9 19.5 13.2 6.3
B. Real (dolar adjusted) Korean prime rate on US prime rate.
1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991
(1) Korean prime rate 18.5 12.8 3.8 3.9 19.5 13.2 6.3
(2) US Prime Rate 15.3 15.8 11.0 9.5 8.8 10.5 6.5
(3) (l)/(2 ) (%) 120.9 81.0 34.5 41.0 221.0 125.7 96.9
(a) At the end of the year.
(b) Negative numbers indicate won depredation.
Source: The Bank of Korea, Monthy Bulletin (various issues), as cited in Amsden and Euh (1993).
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Table 5
SOUTH KOREA’S FINANCIAL REFORMS 
STOCK MARKET INDICATORS
(end of year -100 million won)
1980 1985 1990 1991
Listed companies 352 342 669 686
Number of stocks listed 437 414 1,115 1,013
Total capital of listed companies (a) 24,214 46,654 239,816 255,096
Total market value (a) 25,266 65,704 790,197 731,178
(as % of GNP) 6.9% 9.0% 60.6% 51.6%
Total trading volume (a) 11,340 36,206 534,545 625,649
Stock population (b) 753 772 1,731 1,432
(as % of total population) 2.0% 1.9% 4.0% 33%
Composite stock price index 106.9 163.4 696.1 611.0
Dividend yield 19.6% 6.0% 2.6% 3.1%
P /E  ratio 2.6 5.2 12.8 10.4
(a) 100 million won.
(b) Thousand.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Capital Market Statistics (January 1992), as cited in Amsden and Euh (1993).
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Tableó
SOUTH KOREA'S FINANCIAL REFORMS 
SOURCES OF FUNDS BY THE CORPORATE SECTOR 
(in percentage)
63-65 66-71 72-76 77-81 82-86 87-91
Internal funds 47.7 25.4 32.9 23.3 33.5 26.4
External funds 52.3 74.6 67.1 76.7 66.5 73.6
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
External funds 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Borrowings from
Monetary
institutions 48.4 41.8 51.1 53.7 41.8 36.0
Banks 33.5 32.8 34.3 32.6 22.6 17.0
Nonbanks 15.0 9.0 16.8 21.1 19.2 19.0
Securities
(direct finance) 27.6 14.3 21.8 24.8 27.5 37.4
Debts 1.2 0.7 2.5 4.2 11.0 14.5
Stocks 21.4 11.8 18.1 14.4 16.5(a) 22.9(a)
Capital paid in 5.0 2.7 1.3 1.9
Corporate bills - - 1.8 5.5 3.9 3.3
Government and
curb market loans 8.5 7.8 -0.3 0.8 24.9(b) 20.2(b)
Borrowing
from abroad 15.4 36.2 26.6 15.2 1.9 3.1
(a) Stocks and capital paid in.
(b) Others included.
Source: The Bank of Korea, Annual Report, (various issues), as cited in Amsden and Euh (1993).
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Table 7
TREND OF NOMINAL AND REAL INTEREST RATES
(in percentage) (a)
Nominal interest rate GNP deflator Real interest rate Change
Savings Curb (Rate of Savings Curb in the
deposit market change) deposit market price
rate (b) rate (c) (d) rate rate of land
1963 15.0 52.4 29.3 -14.3 23.1 -
1964 15.0 61.4 30.0 -15.0 31.4 47.0
1965 18.8 58.8 6.2 12.6 52.6 32.0
1966 30.0 58.7 14.5 15.5 44.6 -
1967 30.0 56.4 15.6 14.4 40.8 101.0
1968 27.6 55.9 16.1 11.5 39.8 51.3
1969 24.0 51.2 14.8 9.2 36.4 122.5
1970 22.8 50.8 15.6 7.2 35.2 2.8
1971 22.2 46.3 12.5 9.7 17.7 51.3
1972 15.7 38.9 16.7 -1.0 16.1 4.0
1973 12.6 39.2 13.6 -1.0 25.6 8.1
1974 14.8 37.6 30.5 -15.7 7.1 25.5
1975 15.0 41.3 25.2 -10.5 16.1 21.9
1976 15.5 40.5 21.2 -5.7 20.3 21.0
1977 16.2 38.1 16.6 -0.4 23.3 46.7
1978 16.7 41.7 22.8 -6.1 18.9 79.1
1979 18.6 42.4 19.6 -1.0 22.8 22.0
1980 22.4 45.0 24.0 -1.6 21.0 17.0
1981 19.2 35.3 16.9 23 18.4 7.1
1982 10.9 30.6 7.1 2.1 23.5 5.6
1983 8.0 25.8 5.0 3.0 20.8 31.7
1984 8.9 24.9 3.9 5.0 21.0 21.6
1985 10.0 24.0 4.2 5.8 19.8 7.0
1986 10.0 24.3 2.7 7.3 21.6 7.3
1987 10.0 23.2 3.4 6.6 19.8 14.7
1988 10.0 22.7 5.9 4.1 18.4 27.4
1989 10.0 23.1 5.2 4.8 17.9 32.0
1990 10.0 19.9 10.6 -0.6 9.3 20.6
1991 10.0 23.4 10.9 -0.9 12.5 12.8
(a) Bank of Korea survey data.
(b) Market rate from December 5,1988.
(c) Unofficial rate surveyed by the BOK.
(d) Until 1970 based on 1975 constant price; from 1971, based on 1985 constant price.
Source: The Bank of Korea, Monthly Bulletin, (various issues), as cited in Amsden and Euh (1993).
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Table 8
GROWTH OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
(unit: %)
1975 1978 1980 1985 1990 '91 (a)
M l/G N P 11.7 11.3 10.4 10.4 9.5 10.6
M 2/GNP 31.3 33.1 34.2 39.2 40.8 40.7
M 3/GNP 36.0 42.7 48.6 75.2 114.8 118.4
Corporate bond/G N P - 2.5 4.5 10.0 7.0 15.2
Domestic credit/GNP 39.5 36.4 45.8 58.4 56.1 57.4
Deposit share (%) 
Banks 82.1 76.6 69.9 53.7 41.2 40.1
NBFls 17.9 23.4 30.1 46.3 58.8 59.9
National saving 
(as % of GNP) 18.2 29.7 23.1 29.1 35.5 36.1
Stock market 
Capitalization/GNP _ - 6.9 9.0 60.6 51.6
(a) Estimated data.
Source: Ministry of Finance, Fiscal and Financial Statistics, Pt. 1 (1992), as cited in Amsden and Euh 
(1993).
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INTRODUCTION
It has been increasingly recognized in recent years that the financial system 
and its intermediation function could play a vital role in economic deve­
lopment by effectively mobilizing and allocating resources and facilitating 
transformation and distribution of risks and maturities among savers and 
investors (World Bank 1989).
The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in Sub-Saharan Africa 
adopted by many countries in response to the worsening economic crisis 
of the 1980s have placed high priority on financial sector reform. Financial 
liberalization policy, based largely on the arguments advanced by the Me 
Kinnon-Shaw school1, has been implemented subsequently in these countries 
as part of economic reform packages. Special Financial Sector Adjustment 
loans (FINSAP loans) have been taken up to uphold reform measures and 
to restructure and strengthen distressed financial systems in several coun­
tries (e. g. Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda). However, the FINSAP has focused 
mainly on putting distressed formal institutions on a sound financial foot­
ing through restructuring and refinancing of balance sheets. Emphasis is 
placed on prudence, an improved regulatory environment and supervision 
of the banks' operations. However, these reform measures, together with 
the financial liberalization policy, have at best had limited impact on econo­
mic development so far.
1 See, Mckinnon (1973), Shaw (1973) and Fry (1982, 1988). For a critical literature survey of 
this school, see Nissanke (1991).
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Drawing on the lessons of liberalization experiences of a number of 
Latin American and Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s, recent literature 
on financial policies emphasizes the need for careful design of the sequence, 
pace and timing of financial liberalization and the importance of its coor­
dination with changing macroeconomic conditions2. In the case of low-inco- 
me economies, however, it is particularly critical to design the financial 
sector reform with a view to the speed of deepening of markets. Extensive 
efforts at institution-building are needed to achieve sufficient market depth 
with adequate market-support structure.
Contrary to the main thrust of financial reform within structural ad­
justment programmes as originally devised, interest rate adjustments alone 
are neither effective nor sufficient to stimulate improved resource mobi­
lisation and allocation as they do not directly address the core systemic 
or structural problems as perceived either by individuals or by the financial 
institutions.
This paper examines, drawing largely on case studies of Ghana, Kenya, 
Malawi and Zambia (Nissanke et al. 1991a), first, the current fragmented 
state of savings mobilization and intermediation in Sub-Saharan Africa (sec­
tion I) and then presents various theoretical explanations for this prevailing 
condition (section H). The concluding section attempts to address the issue 
of how best to overcome the existing situation.
I. FRAGMENTATION OF SAVINGS MOBILIZATION AND
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
1. Characteristics of household savings in Sub-Saharan Africa
Even in the low-income economies of Sub-Saharan Africa the potential of the 
household sector for generating savings is significant. Our study suggests that 
savings capacity and potential for growth in this sector is by no means negli­
gible. However, there are several characteristics of household savings to note.
2 See, for example, Cho and Khatkhate (1989), Corbo and DeMelo (1985,1987) and the World 
Bank (1989).
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First, a critical difference in the size, form and pattern of savings be­
tween rural and urban households may be noted. Rural households tend 
to have higher average and marginal propensities to save. Voluntary savings 
capacities in rural areas may be substantial, with far more liquidity than 
is usually assumed. Though liquidity generated does not necessarily consti­
tute a surplus as such3, the agricultural production cycle and the seasonal 
and highly variable income creates an absolute need for savings. The pa­
tterns are distinctly "short-run", governed by the seasonality of agricultu­
ral production and that of liquidity flows of rural household income.
Secondly, to the extent that rural households dominate the household 
sector, financial savings have a modest share in total household savings. 
According to the theory, non-financial forms of asset-holding as stores of 
value indicate large-scale 'efficiency loss' to the economy, where the finan­
cial system can potentially perform an efficient intermediation function. Un­
productive commodity holdings could entail substantial storage and tran­
saction costs. In the countries studied, the insignificant share of financial 
assets in total savings undoubtedly also reflects the insufficient degree of 
monetization of the economy at large. Indeed, a reverse process of de­
monetization has taken place in the countries where economic conditions 
had deteriorated sharply in the 1980s4. The asset composition of household 
savings is generally determined by the nature of the economic activities 
which a particular household is engaged in as well as the degree of liqui­
dity, risk, return structure of different assets and their storage and trans­
portation costs. In this latter sense, it is also affected by the perception 
of the households as to their liquidity constraints and the ease with which 
they can switch between different sets of assets.
The third characteristic of household savings to note is that the finan­
cial savings of the household sector are small in size per unit of transaction 
and short-term in frequency. As noted by Deaton (1989), savings by the 
household sector in developing countries are of a "high frequency" natu­
re, as opposed to the "low frequency" life-cycle savings in developed eco­
3 As Von Pischke notes, low levels of surplus do not necessarily accompany low levels of 
liquidity (Von Pischke (1991) p. 81).
4 For the degree of monetization and the factors explaining the process of de-monetization in 
the sample countries, see Nissanke et. al. (op. cit.).
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nomies: savings, in essence, provide a buffer between uncertain and unpre­
dictable income and an already low level of consumption. High volatility 
and seasonality in income necessitate savings of this nature primarily to 
protect one's livelihood in high-risk environments. Under these conditions, 
financial savings of household display strong preference for more liquid 
assets and maxi-mum flexibility. Even contractual savings, conducted within 
the informal sector, e.g. for insurance purposes, tend to be for a very short­
term time horizon and on a limited scale.
At the same time the small size and high-frequency of savings imply 
high transaction costs to financial intermediaries in tapping the household/ 
non-corporate sector. Nevertheless, small but regular savings by large num­
bers of householders/traders have been the basis of operations for many 
informal associations, such as ROSCAs (rotating savings and credit associa­
tions) and susu-collectors. This is closely related to the fourth characteristic 
of household savings: most of the financial savings of the household sector 
have been mobilized through informal financial agents or institutions. The 
country-estimates suggest that savings mobilized and credit extended by 
the informal financial sector appear to exceed by a large multiple those 
of formal institutions. These savings are used for social and private consump­
tion, as well as productive purposes, including farming activities such as 
purchasing fertilizer or small-scale investment, mostly in retail trade and 
commercial activities.
Numerous factors may be advanced as reasons inhibiting a large part 
of the population from using formal institutions, even where such facilities 
exist in rural areas. In our case studies, the high transaction cost of borrow­
ing, lack of marketable collateral and low probability of acquiring credit 
in addition to mistrust ranked high on the list; low interest rates were 
only a marginal factor affecting borrowers' attitude to using savings facili­
ties. From the lenders point of view, the combination of high risks (arising 
from lack of marketable collateral and default risk) and high transaction 
costs associated with small short-term loans and deposits have undermined 
efforts to bring financial services to low-income groups, the micro and small- 
scale enterprise sector and rural small holders. It is commonly believed 
that an insufficient branch network, particularly in the rural areas, is the 
inhibiting factor. However there is only weak statistical evidence connect­
ing the rate of diffusion of banks (and real interest rates), on the one hand,
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and the growth of financial savings, on the other. Unless transactions costs 
can be lowered and risks management improved, neither the expansion 
of the number of branches, mobile facilities and specialized rural banks 
nor interest rate adjustments will rectify the current inefficient and passive 
attitude of banks towards savings mobilization in the household sector.
The persistent financial dualism between the formal and informal sec­
tors and the limited progress in financial "widening"5 by the formal sector 
can thus be attributed specifically to the incentive to interact of both bo­
rrowers/savers and lenders/intermediaries. As mentioned above, the lack 
of access to credit facilities has hindered the majority of the population 
in using the savings facilities of formal institutions. Our country studies 
point to the critical importance of linking savings mobilization with credit 
provision. There is also ample evidence that credit unrelated to savings 
has undermined many targeted programmes (Adams et al. (1984), Seibel 
(1989), Meyer (1989) among others).
At the same time, commercial banks, the dominant financial institu­
tion in these countries, often do not have the incentive to actively mobilize 
savings, due largely to the excess liquidity syndrome. Thus, one of the prime 
factors explaining the relative size of the informal financial sector and its 
vibrant presence within the household sector lies in the striking degree 
of constrained behaviour of formal institutions. The characteristics of the 
financial system will be examined below.
2. Fragmentation of financial systems
a) Informal finance
While many of the traditional forms of savings and informal financial ac­
tivities have existed for a long time in these countries, a dynamism has 
begun to gain momentum in recent years, as the formal sector has failed 
to stimulate economic growth or respond to the need of real sector deve­
lopment, in particular, that of the private sector. Rather financial distress
5 The process of financial widening can be viewed as extending the frontier/boundary between 
formal and informal activities (Von Pischke (1991)).
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permeated the formal system in many of Sub-Saharan African countries 
as the financial position of governments and many parastatals had sharply 
deteriorated in the 1980s. Presently, thriving forces are operating on a visible 
scale within parts of the informal financial sector. In Ghana, the informal 
sector, SHSM-collectors in particular, performs a very dynamic role in savings 
mobilization (Aryeetey et a l  1991a). In Malawi and Zambia the informal 
sector plays a more active role in lending operations, enjoying considerable 
comparative advantages over the formal sector in terms of accessibility, 
flexibility, transaction costs, and low default rates (Chipeta and Mkandawire 
(1991a) and Mutukwa (1991a). Alternative methods of risk assessment, 
monitoring and the application of social peer pressure for repayment has 
achieved results unattained by the formal sector.
The emerging dynamism of the informal sector has not been transmi­
tted to the formal financial sector through complementary relationships or 
links on any significant scale. Indeed, the informal market has continued 
to thrive out of a need to fill gaps in the financial system. Despite the 
growing size of the informal sector, the process of forming an integrated 
financial system through developing linkages of these activities to more 
efficient forms of mobilization and intermediation of savings has hardly 
begun.
However, in emphasizing the strengths of the informal system, one 
should also be aware of its limitations in financial intermediation on a larger 
scale. In the absence of sufficient information and market signals, funds 
mobilized through the informal sector are at present rarely channelled into 
economic activities beyond a confined sphere. For example, most of savings 
mobilized by s«sw-collectors from small-scale trading activity are channelled 
into the expansion of that sector only. The money is not used for lending 
to other groups in informal activity, such as small-scale manufacturing, re­
pair shops or handiwork on a significant scale. Informal lenders in Malawi 
and Zambia do lend to a wide range of productive activities. Yet, the high 
risk of these activities and the extreme short-run nature of lending impe­
de the full financial intermediation function to be performed by these single 
agents. Mutukwa (1991) notes that group-based associations are subject to 
highly co-variant risks, since their members tend to engage in the same 
economic activity in the same community and belong to the same income 
group. This factor and the seasonality of most rural income make it hard
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for these associations to expand and perform a dynamic role in financial 
intermediation.
The localized nature of the informal activities, combined with high 
risks and transaction costs beyond the limited vicinity act as a constraint 
on viable large-scale financial intermediation by the informal financial sec­
tor on its own. For this reason, the potential use of savings mobilized through 
the informal sector for economy-wide diversification remains unrealized. 
Consequently, a process of industrialization and development based on in­
formal small production units has not yet got off the ground. Savings mo­
bilization is also currently fragmented into a large number of operations 
by multifarious informal activities.
Moreover, there is little intermediation between saving and investing 
units within the informal sector. Intermediation usually takes place only 
over time for each individual unit. Informal savers often earn no interest 
or may even incur a negative nominal interest rate (as in the swsM-collector 
system), even though investing units in the economy would be willing to 
pay positive real rates for funds. Few informal financial institutions provide 
term finance (either directly or through linkages with the formal system).
b) Formal financial institutions
The paucity of institutions in terms of both structure and numbers is not 
necessarily the kernel of the problem: a large number of institutions have 
been established. However, despite their institutional diversity and efforts 
to extend the branch networks, the formal financial institutions have failed 
to meet the need of the real sector development in Ghana, Zambia and 
Malawi, particularly. Nor have they succeeded in meeting the credit needs 
of the wider groups of population in all four countries studied. The pro­
blem of poor performance of formal institutions arises from the severity 
of their operational constraints and fragmentation within the formal sys­
tem, which is most clearly demonstrated by the coexistence of "excess li­
quidity syndrome" and "non-performing term loans"6.
6 See Nissanke (1992a) for a fuller discussion of the brief description of the two phenomena 
summarized here.
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i. Excess liquidity in the banking system
For a number of Sub-Saharan countries, the disequilibrium resulting from 
the "excess liquidity" syndrome has long been a wide-spread phenomenon 
where banks have been allowed to operate largely on a commercial basis7. 
The term is applied here to the situation where the banking institutions, 
in particular those specializing in the short end of the market such as com­
mercial banks, hold liquidity in excess well above the required statutory 
level. Excess liquidity is defined as net excess of actual voluntary hoard­
ings of liquid assets (in cash and short-term government paper) over the 
minimum reserve requirements8. The levels of minimum reserve require­
ments in developing countries are usually set as high as 40 to 50 per cent 
of total bank deposits compared to the typical levels of around 10 to 15 
per cent in industrialized countries (Kitchen 1986). This implies that total 
assets held in liquid assets can often exceed the level of 70 per cent of 
total deposit liabilities of the banks. These banks have held their surplus
7 Some commercial banks were established by expatriate banks primarily for financing external 
-often colonial- trade in preindependence years and later nationalized to become majority- 
govemment owned or remain foreign controlled. Others were newly established in the post- 
independence era as publicly owned. Operational decisions of most of these banks are in 
principle guided by commercial considerations, though they were often required to take on 
a developmental function in advancing loans to priority sectors. In contrast, banking 
operations of some state-owned commercial banks have been governed primarily by the 
need to finance fiscal deficits and to cover operational loss of public enterprises and marketing 
boards (eg. Tanzania and Uganda, see Collier and Gunning (1991) for the Tanzanian case).
1 The term "excess liquidity" here refers to banks' voluntary hoardings of liquid assets as 
opposed to "monetary overhang" when nonbank public accumulates liquidity as a result of 
shortages in the goods markets. The former phenomenon becomes prevalent, when perceived 
default risks increase and banks resort to a sharp retrenchment in lending, exacerbating the 
recessionary tendencies resulting from reduced aggregate demand. Caprio and Honohan 
(1991) report that in the United States of America this was observed during the Great 
Recession of the 1930s as well as in the "credit crunch" of 1990-1991. In the earlier episode, 
the share of liquid assets in total deposits of the US banking institutions was reported to 
have nearly doubled from 35 per cent in 1929-1930 to 65 per cent in 1935, then further to 70 
per cent in 1940. The deep recession that seized major industrialized economies in  1992 has 
also been characterized by debt deflation on a global scale, where portfolios of banking 
institutions have been rapidly deteriorating with increasing non-performing loans and 
debtors-consumers have been making adjustments to their over-leveraged positions from 
excess borrowing in the previous period (UNCTAD 1992).
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assets on their own volition in liquid form, in cash with no return or in 
treasury bills or government stocks which, until very recently, yielded low 
returns9.
An explanation of this phenomenon can be manifold: First, it is a 
reflection of the early stage of real sector development and a generally 
poor, often unstable economic environment. Further, part of excess liqui­
dity in the banks' portfolio may simply reflect a degree of inefficiency of 
banking operations, i.e. their disproportionately high operational/interme­
diation costs, which are not covered by the prevailing spreads and thus 
require holding a large proportion of liquid assets. A high proportion of 
non-performing loans with inadequate provisions for bad debts also forces 
banks to hold more liquid assets than would appear necessary on the basis 
of a balance sheet analysis.
Furthermore, liquidity in excess could contain transitory components 
as well as permanent ones. The former would in fact reflect some time 
lags in bankers' responses to temporary external shocks (sudden changes 
in the terms of trade or a large influx of capital) or policy shocks such 
as devaluation or uncontrolled money supply. Accordingly they should be 
viewed as short-term disequilibrium phenomena. The accumulation of liqui­
dity in these cases is temporary, reflecting the slow speed of adjustment 
by banking institutions to shocks and thus also a degree of operational 
inefficiency.
The main component of excess liquidity holdings of the commercial 
banks in Kenya belongs to this category; the Kenyan banks have indeed 
been dynamic in savings mobilization and credit provision (Mwega 1991). 
As shown in Fig. 1, the minimum statutory required liquidity ratio in Ke­
nya has been set at the very low level of 14 to 18 per cent, a level not 
far from that observed in industrial countries. Indeed, the actual liquidity
9 Naturally Treasury Bills and Government Paper held as secondary reserves are not nearly 
as liquid as cash prim ary reserves. Risk-adjusted returns on these holdings have been, 
however, high enough to justify investment in them compared to lending to activities 
perceived to be highly risky, even when nominal returns on them were low. The recent 
upw ard adjustments of rates of returns on these paper as a part of financial liberalization 
and monetary stabilization policies implemented in a number of con tries have made most of 
lending operations unattractive to banks, except very low cost and highly remunerative 
lending (Nissanke 1992a).
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ratio maintained by the commercial banks has been far below those ob­
served in the other case studies throughout the 1970s and 1980s, ranging 
from 18 per cent in 1974 to 1975 and 1983 to 28 per cent in 1977 and 
1986, with fluctuating margins from year to year. A preliminary analysis 
of annual changes in the commercial bank liquidity ratio (Mwega 1991) 
suggests that there are the considerable adjustment lags involved between 
an increase in commercial banks deposit liabilities and their increased lend­
ing to borrowers10. In contrast to the other three countries studied, excess 
liquidity in Kenya is of more transitory nature. Nevertheless, the excess 
in liquidity ratio has still averaged more than 5 per cent of deposit liabi­
lities throughout the 1970s and 1980s, exceeding 10 per cent in some years.
The sheer scale and persistence of the syndrome in the other countries 
studied (Ghana, Malawi and Zambia) points to the need for analytical ex­
planations of the permanent components of excess liquidity. The nature 
and scale of the phenomenon of excess liquidity in these three countries 
are illustrated in the following statistics:
In Ghana, the required minimum reserve requirements have histo­
rically been set very high (Fig. 2): over 80 per cent of deposits in 1979 
and 1980. The statutory level had been gradually brought down to 40 per 
cent in 1985. The actual reserves held in liquid assets by the banks were 
over 70 per cent in 1980-1983, indicating the extreme degree of 'low lend­
ing trap1 in those years. In 1988, the year when the liberalization policy 
was already well in place, the commercial banks held about 15 per cent 
of their total deposit liabilities as excess reserves. Of these, about 5 per 
cent was held in cash (in addition to the statutory requirement for 20 per 
cent cash reserves) and 10 per cent was in the form of government paper 
(over and above the statutory requirement for 25 per cent secondary re­
serves). This brought the share of liquid assets to 60 per cent of total de­
posit liabilities for the entire banking system in that year. The level of 
liquid assets actually held by the banks subsequently increased, reaching 
over 65 per cent in March 1991, as shown in Fig. 3.
10 The Kenyan country study suggests that the commercial banks liquidity decisions are 
influenced by several factors including the maximun lending rates, the structure of deposit 
liabilities, the required minimum ratios, and the changes in the commercial banks mone­
tary base.
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In Malawi, the excess liquid assets held by the commercial banks 
amounted to from 20 to 25 per cent of total deposits in the period 1973 
to 1985, while the minimum reserve ratio required was set at 25 per cent, 
making 45 to 50 per cent of their total assets cash or government papers11. 
There was a sharp run-down of liquid assets in the late 1970s, when the 
commercial banks had accumulated non-performing loans through their lar­
ge exposure towards the estate tobacco sector, as tobacco prices collapsed. 
This experience has made the commercial banks, which had taken some 
years to recuperate their loan portfolio, much more conservative in asset 
management. Despite the rise in the minimum liquidity ratio to 30 per 
cent in 1980, the scale of excess liquidity began to escalate further after 
198312. Voluntary holding of excess liquid assets were over 20 per cent 
in 1985; this persisted throughout the liberalization period, further increas­
ing to 40 per cent above the minimum reserve ratio, bringing the share 
of liquid assets to 70 per cent of total deposits in 1987 (see Fig. 4)13.
The scale of the problem has been much greater in Zambia than in 
the other countries in the sample (Fig. 5). The commercial banks are 
known to have persistently carried considerable amounts of excess liqui­
dity throughout the 1970s and 1980s, excepting 1974. First, the statutory 
required ratio had been set in a range of 25 to 40 per cent most years. 
To mop up liquidity in the system, seen to affect the monetary stability, 
the central bank raised the minimum required level to 40 per cent in re­
cent years. The actual liquidity ratio has been above 60 per cent for most 
years, reaching 82 per cent in 1988, exceeding the already high statutory 
level by 25 to 45 per cent.
As explanations for the excess liquidity syndrome illustrated by the­
se statistics, two theoretical propositions may be advanced14:
n In the 1970s, the largest component of liquid assets was held in government stocks rather 
than in Treasury Bills.
12 During the 1980s, the major part of liquid assets was held as deposits at the central bank, 
rather than in government securities, as in the 1970s. Some of these deposits at the central 
bank reflected the bank's liabilities for outstanding import payments awaiting extemali- 
zation because of inadequate foreign exchange.
13 It is reported that the trade liberalization measures taken in 1989 subsequently eased the 
banks' excess liquidity problems to some extent.
14 For more detailed discussion of the two paradigms, see Section II below.
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First, using the Financial Repression Hypothesis, McKinnon (1973), 
Shaw (1973), Fry (1982, 1988), it may be argued that the problem is asso­
ciated with the governments' intervention in credit markets through a poli­
cy of low interest rate, a government credit ceiling and a restrictive sec­
toral credit- allocation policy.
Indeed, there is indication that the policies of low interest rates and 
directed credit allocation have had, to a varying degree, negative impacts 
on the operations of commercial banks. Credit guidelines imposing man­
datory sectoral allocation have undoubtedly served to undermine incenti­
ves for banks to mobilize savings, as is most apparent in the Ghanaian 
case. Once banks had enough deposits to meet the set credit targets of 
the central bank, savings mobilization was no longer encouraged. If the 
banks were not favourably disposed towards those priority sectors, loans 
were withheld. Consequently they did not see an urgent need to mobilize 
additional savings.
Furthermore, lending decisions by banks have not been based strictly 
on commercial assessments of risks against expected rates of return but 
rather have often been influenced by political clout and connections. In­
deed, notable conflict between government sectoral credit allocation and 
the banks' commercial considerations has been with sectors designated as 
the priority, as these are identified by the bankers as high-risk areas. Hence, 
such conditions may have contributed to passive banking practice; a com- 
po-nent of excess liquidity may have thus been related to 'involuntary cre­
dit rationing' as a result of enforced patterns of credit allocation.
An alternative hypothesis can be drawn from the Imperfect Informa­
tion Paradigm (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Stiglitz (1989)), to explain the persis­
tence of the syndrome, even in the-post liberalization years, as resulting 
from 'voluntary credit rationing' and self-imposed caution on the part of 
bankers operating in a high risk environment with imperfect and costly 
information.
In less developed economies, successful applicants who are conside­
red low-risk tend to represent established large-scale enterprises or estate 
owners, either foreign or publicly owned. Many, particularly the state enter­
prises, are known to have chronically suffered from poor management, low 
capacity utilization and acute financial problems, prompting the current 
privatization debate (Adam et al. 1992). Potentially dynamic productive small-
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scale entities have little chance of obtaining bank credit due to high tran­
saction costs and perceived risks in dealing with them. High transactions 
costs can prevent banks from undertaking adequate screening, monitoring 
and credit-enforcement procedure against default risks. The perceived high 
risks of lending make banks extremely risk-averse in extending credit to 
small borrowers, particularly those without collateral assets.
Bankers often explain their overly conservative lending policy by cit­
ing the absence of viable projects to which to lend. It can be argued that 
it is not necessarily the absence of viable projects per se but the lack of 
mechanisms by which risks and viability can be adequately assessed, and 
new ventures selected, monitored and repayment enforced. The adoption 
of liberalization policies have had limited impact on this component of ex­
cess liquidity. While latent demand for credit by solvent borrowers may 
remain unsatisfied, the banking sector accumulate excess liquidity, withdraw­
ing support from productive investment. Excess liquidity can thus give rise 
to 'a low lending trap' (Caprio and Honohan (1991)) and can impede the 
emergence of vigorous entrepreneurship.
Several implications may be derived from the Excess Liquidity Syndrome:
First, faced with limited lending opportunities worthy deemed and 
excess liquidity hoarding, the banks lack incentive to mobilize additional 
savings. Banks have even regarded the shift to deposits with longer matu­
rity as raising the average costs of keeping funds, given the absence of 
good investment opportunities promising a high rate of return which could 
justify the wide margin between deposit and lending rates to cover high 
intermediation costs. Therefore, commercial banks in Malawi and Ghana, for 
example, are reported to have been turning depositors away, in particular 
discouraging them from opening accounts bearing high rates of intrest15.
15 The adoption of an interest rate liberalization policy has had very limited impact on the 
resolution of this phenomenon, even where higher financial savings at the formal financial 
institutions followed, as illustrated by the reaction of Malawian banks to the upw ard 
adjustments in interest rates in 1987-88 (Chipeta and Mkandawire (1991a) and Nissanke 
(1992a). The banks are, first of all, constrained to raise the lending rate because of the 
adverse selection incentive and moral hazard effects (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). Even if the 
lending rate is raised to cover the intermediation cost after the upw ard adjustment in the 
deposit rate, the resulted reduction in demand for loanable funds squeezes their profit 
margin and makes it expensive to keep interest-bearing deposits.
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Secondly, the 'low lending trap' engendered by the excess liquidity 
syndrome implies a serious deficiency in the system of financial interme­
diation and it obstructs a steady flow in the savings-investment circuit. 
Given the short-term liability structure, and the weak capital base in most 
cases, the portfolio management of the commercial banks is geared to match­
ing the maturity structure of assets with the existing maturities of liabi­
lities. Very little term transformation has taken place. Thus, the commercial 
banks in Ghana, Malawi and Zambia have been very selective and discrimi­
natory, exhibiting extreme conservatism in their portfolio-management.
Thirdly, there is an interesting link between excess liquidity and the 
mechanism of crowding-out of private finance by public finance requirements 
in these economies. From the commercial banks' point of view, there is 
little effective demand for credit from the private sector and hence the pu­
blic sector automatically assumes an unrivalled position as a receiver of 
formal credit and as a vendor of financial paper. Yet, existing literature 
suggests that limited access to credit is one of principal constraints for 
hindering an expansion of the productive capacity of micro enterprises and 
the SSE sector. This points to the considerable gaps between effective secu­
ritized demand and notional unsecuritized demand for credit16. Conven­
tional asset-based lending which requires tangible collateral has put a ma­
jor restriction on lending.
Finally, the prevalence of the excess liquidity syndrome casts serious 
doubts on the efficacy of monetary instruments for stabilization. Monetary 
tightening -a standard policy response to the emergence and growth of 
excess liquidity in these economies- would not get to the crux of the pro­
blem. Credit ceilings imposed under stabilization programmes are singu­
larly ineffective in an environment in which the portfolio management of 
banks is conservative and reactive rather than dynamic. At the same time, 
it is difficult to regulate the money supply through manipulating bank li­
quidity, when the relationship between bank liquidity and credit is unsta-
16 Von Pischke (1991) argues, however, that the concept of credit needs and the perception of 
unsatisfied credit demand should not be adopted as a prime criterion for lending. In order 
to achieve long-run viability and sustainability of financial institutions, he instead advoca­
tes using the risk-adjusted debt capacity, which could dynamically evolve over time, as a 
basis for credit policy.
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ble and unpredictable due to excess liquidity. Furthermore, upward adjust­
ments to returns on treasury bills necessiated for monetary stabilization 
can render most private sector lending unattractive, resulting in a further 
intensification of the "crowding-out" effect.
ii. Non-performing loans
Excess liquidity holdings are observed alongside a growing number of non­
performing loans and low recovery rates, particularly among publicly 
owned financial institutions, where political interference in lending deci­
sions is prevalent. The World Bank (1989) has suggested that in developing 
countries well over 20 per cent of total loans of banks are non-perform­
ing. This may be an under-estimate for Africa, where loan repayment rates 
are often reported as low as 2040 per cent.
In general, the causes of financial distress manifested in large pro­
portions of non-performing loans in the banks' portfolio can be attributed 
to numerous factors, both internally and externally generated. In the low- 
income, often commodity-dependent economies, the financial institutions 
are frequently exposed to large external shocks with the subsequently re­
quired policy adjustments far exceeding the capacity of the economies or 
the financial institutions to absorb these volatile forces and manage the 
associated aggregate risks. The portfolio structure of these institutions is 
little diversified. This makes it hard to offset financial loss of one activity 
against gains from others. Hence a wave of loan defaults can ripple through­
out the financial system, due to high risk covariance17 characteristic of the­
se economies. Financial distress ensues.
The difficulties of financial institutions to cope with these external 
forces are undoubtedly exacerbated by their internal structural weakness, 
such as the low capital adequacy ratio, poor asset quality as a result of 
inadequate loan appraisal and poor contract enforcement procedures, not 
to mention political patronage and corruption. The inadequate bank super­
vision by the central bank makes it hard to arrest an accumulation of non­
performing loans at an early stage.
17 When economies are narrowly based, credit risks are highly correlated across loans exten­
ded for similar economic activities.
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The problem of non-performing loans is, however, most pronounced 
among the development finance institutions (DFIs) or the targeted credit 
schemes such as agricultural credit schemes. These were established at a 
time when the supply-leading approach was prominent; the former were 
set up in recognition of the shortages of medium- and long-term credit 
to the priority sectors; the latter were expected to encourage flows of 
concessionary formal credit specifically to the rural areas. Many of the 
DFIs were also created so as to achieve developmental and social objec­
tives, such as diversification and enterprise/employment creation and thus 
to provide combined financial and technical services to local enterprises. 
For this the DFIs were typically funded on term-loans/equity from external 
sources which involved exchange and interest rate risks. They have conti­
nued to be financed either by external finance or through the government, 
often through refinancing schemes of the central bank when they failed 
to meet the capital adequacy requirements.
Most DFIs or special schemes have not been involved in mobilization 
of local savings to any significant extent and loan recovery was not given 
high priority, with inevitable consequences for their funds. Their portfolio 
position has been further weakened by taking on large financial risks, and 
specializing in long-term lending to high risk areas such as agricultural 
and industrial finance. Their excessive exposure in high risk sectors is 
compounded by generally poor risk analysis or inadequate assessment of 
debt capacity, excessive political pressure on lending decisions, and limited 
opportunities for asset divestiture.
Frequent recapitalization has not solved the underlying problem fac­
ing the DFIs. This points to a failure of the standard 'supply-leading' 
approach, which creates financial institutions to meet demand for term ca­
pital without simultaneously addressing other fundamental bottlenecks in­
hibiting the viability of these banking operations -high transaction costs 
and inadequate risk analysis and management- indispensable for their 
spedalized lending operation. Conventional term risk management schemes 
appear to have been inadequate, and in some cases inappropriate, to cope 
with the degree of risk facing the DFIs.
It is important to recognize the need to resolve, in practical terms, 
the tension that exists between the developmental and social objectives of 
the DFIs (and other special lending schemes) and their financial and ope­
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rational liability. Yet, there are several examples of DFIs which have achie­
ved better performance by adopting a more flexible, pragmatic and com­
mercial approach, while at the same time managing to meet development 
objectives. Good performers can be found not only in more dynamic Asian 
economies but also in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. in Zimbabwe and Botswana).
The recommendation that DFIs should reorientate their priorities to 
commercial goals, however, leaves open the critical question of how to reach 
the social objectives of loan provisions to the priority sectors and meet 
the credit need of micro enterprises and low-income people, thus follow­
ing a broad-based and more equitable development path. Adams and his 
associates (1984) suggest that policies affecting income levels through input 
and output pricing policies are more appropriate in stimulating economic 
development than special credit programmes.
However, serious reservations have been cast on the notion that cre­
dit will "trickle down" to where it is needed through market forces and 
without policy intervention. Can a viable alternative system to the conven­
tional DFIs be created to ensure equitable development, through a combi­
nation of financial institution-building, market deepening, linkage develop­
ment and new innovative schemes and instruments? The example of NGO 
and donor involvement in innovative schemes suggests a possible way, 
although it is impossible to deduce that these will proliferate to the point 
where widespread self-sustained development is achieved unless it is foun­
ded on active mobilization of local savings18.
The phenomena of excess liquidity and non-performing term loans 
suggest that banking institutions taking the traditional approach have fai­
led to make any significant inroads on expansion at the "frontier". Further­
more, the co-existence of these two phenomena not only highlights a de­
gree of fragmentation within the formal system, but also the serious mis­
match of liquidity positions and the asset maturity structure of the sys­
tem: While short-term money abounds in the form of excess liquidity in 
one segment of the banking system, within the economy as a whole the­
re is an endemic shortage of capital, particularly long-term loan provisions
18 For these "grassroots" banking programmes, modelled largely on the Grameen Bank of 
Bangladesh, see below.
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for productive investment and diversification. The formal system lacks the 
abi-Hty to take on the risks associated with the maturity term transformation19. 
The absence of functional inter-bank money and viable capital markets li­
mits the ability of financial institutions to reduce or hedge against these 
risks. Resources mobilized by financial institutions are used more by go­
vernment and the public sector, with no real choices being made in terms 
of risk assessment or prudent resource allocation to private users of credit. 
The intermediation function of the formal system is thus seriously cir­
cumscribed.
Meanwhile, dualism of the formal and informal sectors has been in­
creasing and little progress has been made in financial widening by the 
formal institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa in the last three decades. Any 
practical long-term financial sector development policy for these economies 
has to take into account predominant characteristics of their financial sys­
tem and operations; namely, financial market fragmentation and pronounced 
dualism between the formal and informal financial sectors. The next section, 
explores theoretical explanations for this phenomenon.
II. FINANCIAL DUALISM AND MARKET FRAGMENTATION
The conventional theory of "financial dualism" suggests that the extent and 
degree of segmentation of financial markets between formal and informal 
sectors reflects the inherent dualism of economic and social structures, 
rooted firmly in the population's traditional values and practice. It is sug­
gested that as development proceeds, the informal sector would wither 
away as it would be integrated into the formal system.
Empirical evidence emerging from developing countries indicates, ho­
wever, that the actual process of interaction between the financial struc-
19 Many argue that this weakness in maturity transformation and long-term loan provision 
may not present a problem, so long as the formal banking institutions are able to supply 
sufficient working capital, while retained profits and internally generated savings could be 
used for term investment as Mckinnon's complementary hypothesis suggests. It should be 
noted, however, the growth of enterprises may be slower if fixed investment is solely 
dependent on retained earnings.
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ture and real sector development is more intricate than this simple view 
suggests. In some dynamic economies of Asia, integration of the financial 
system has indeed taken place; the intermediation efficiency of the sys­
tem as a whole has increased over time. Neverhteless, a heterogenous and 
dynamic informal financial sector continues to exist. Indeed the formal and 
informal sectors form a continuum of the integrated and well-functioning 
financial system, with specialization in financial services by each sector 
(Biggs 1991, Ghate 1990).
In contrast, in other developing countries, where economic performan­
ce has been poor or stagnant, financial dualism appears to have deepened 
over time; the two sectors persistently form almost discrete financial en­
claves with little interaction between them. In such circumstances, market 
segmentation can be detrimental to efficient functioning of the financial 
system. A theoretical explanation is required to understand this phenome­
non20.
The 'financial repression' hypothesis attributes the prime cause for the 
dualism and fragmentation to repressive financial policies. With selective 
or sectoral credit policies, a segmented and fragmented credit market emer­
ges in which some borrowers obtain (rationed) credits at highly negative 
real interest rates, while non-favoured borrowers must seek funds in ex­
pensive and unreliable informal credit markets21.
In contrast, the imperfect information paradigm (Stiglits and Weiss 
(1981), Stiglitz (1989)) explains the fragmentation of financial markets in 
terms of the nature of credit transactions. According to this paradigm, in 
the presence of imperfect information and costly contract enforcement, 
market failures result from adverse selection and incentive effects and moral 
hazard, which undermine the operation of financial markets. As the interest 
rate charged increases, borrowers with worthwhile investments may be 
discouraged from seeking loans and the 'quality' of the mix of applicants 
changes adversely. Further, borrowers have an incentive to adopt projects 
that promise higher returns but with greater risks; this increases the pro­
20 Explanations for market segmentation are not necessarily limited to the two hypotheses 
discussed below, nor are these mutually exclusive competing hypotheses. Both Hypotheses 
may well be valid in combination, as suggested by Roemer and Jones (1991), (see below).
21 See Nissanke (1991) for a critical review of this thesis.
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bability of defaults. There is also a moral hazard with high interest rates, 
when applicants borrow to pay interest on previous loans or simply to 
stave off bankruptcy rather than to invest or to finance working capital.
With these possibilities, lenders may choose not to raise interest rate 
to clear the market, when faced with excess demand for loans, since the 
lenders' expected return on a loan could deteriorate as the interest rate 
increases. Instead, they opt to select borrowers by adopting their own ra­
tioning procedure. Thus, the interest rate has generally to take on an addi­
tional function of regulating the risk composition of the portfolio of finan­
cial intermediaries; it then often fails to perform its market clearing role; 
hence market equilibrium is frequently characterized by credit rationing, 
even in the absence of credit controls and direct credit allocation. In such 
a case, by this paradigm, free markets do not ensure Pareto efficient allo­
cation, nor do policies that move the economy closer to free market so­
lutions enhance welfare.
While these features are universally applicable to all credit transac­
tions, the problems arising therefrom are likely to be most pronounced in 
low-income countries, where the economy-wide information flows are ex­
tremely limited, access to information asymmetric and information gather­
ing extremely costly. Where there is a generally low level of income and 
asset accumulation, with widespread poverty and highly skewed income 
and asset distribution, strict collateral requirement restricts access to credit; 
moreover the applicability of various colla teral-substitutes, such as reputa­
tion and group responsibility, cannot be well tested. There is limited scope 
for legal enforcement owing to the inadequate infrastructure of legal ins­
titutions.
With these deficiencies in markets and market-support infrastructure, 
the transaction costs for financial intermediaries -which in addition must 
minimize depositors' risks- are prohibitively high. As discussed above, banks 
tend to become overly conservative and risk-averse in extending loans to 
non-established borrowers. This sets economic constraints on the growth 
of the formal financial institutions in these countries, unless there is some 
impetus to break through the stalemate. If the formal institutions are push­
ed against these operational constraints, their commercial viability is threa­
tened. It is this particular aspect of credit transactions that largely explains 
both the failure of the subsidized credit programmes administered through
S a v in g s  a n d  f in a n c ia l  p o l ic y  is s u e s  in  S u b- S a h a r a n  A fr ic a 127
formal institutions to reach the targeted group and the high loan concen­
tration in the relatively well-off groups which have collateral or reputa­
tion at their disposal.
The recent study by Hoff and Stiglitz (1990) advances an explanation 
for the extreme segmentation of markets in terms of asymmetric access 
to information on borrowers and the differences in costs of screening, mo­
nitoring and contract enforcement across lenders. The formal institutions, 
even those specifically established for this purpose, faced with high tran­
saction costs, ration out smaller borrowers, farmers and the poor, so as 
to safeguard their operational viability. The unsatisfied demand for credit 
of those left out by the formal sector is satisfied by heterogenous informal 
lenders. Informal lenders have access at reasonable costs to local informa­
tion on their borrowers with whom they have social interpersonal rela­
tions, thus reducing screening and monitoring costs. Furthermore, tangible 
assets are not necessarily the only form of collateral since informal len­
ders are flexible in using other available means/forms for collateral subs­
titute. They could, for example, rely on interlinked credit contracts with 
other markets (land, labour and product), social group pressures and per­
sonal knowledge of borrowers for their risk management and assessment 
of debt capacity. Their service is far more flexible in loan terms and speed 
compared with formal institutions. Hence, informal lenders have sizeable 
comparative advantages over the formal lenders in engaging in small-scale 
credit transactions because of their lower transaction costs and different 
ways of handling risk. Informal associations and agents have a competitive 
edge in small and short-term deposit mobilization. The result is market 
segmentation and there is no automatic mechanism to integrate these seg­
mented markets.
In examining the applicability of these two hypotheses explaining mar­
ket segmentation by formal and informal sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
one can note an interesting conceptual distinction made by Roemer and 
Jones (1991) between 'fragmented market’ and 'parallel market'; parallel mar­
kets arise principally to evade government controls and regulations; mar­
kets can be fragmented owing to some inherent characteristics of particular 
market operations, even in the absence of government controls. They sug­
gest that "credit markets in developing countries display characteristics of 
both parallelism and fragmentation" (p. 8).
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Evaluated in this light, it can be said that while parallelism stems 
mainly from the adoption of repressive policies, fragmentation is more effec­
tively explained by the imperfect information paradigm. If the informal fi­
nancial sector were strictly a parallel market, its activities would have been 
reduced by liberalization measures. General evidence from the 1970s and 
1980s suggests strongly that liberalization per se cannot overcome the 
fragmentation of the markets, leading to financial integration.
III. POLICY REQUIRED TO OVERCOME MARKET
FRAGMENTATION
As part of Stabilization-cum-Structural Adjustment Programmes, many 
Governments in Sub-Saharan Africa initiated large-scale restructuring of the 
financial system in the 1980s. Emphasis in these programmes was placed 
on the need (i) to adopt financial liberalization measures, i.e. de-controlling 
interest rates and credit allocation to provide savers and intermediaries suffi­
cient incentives, and (ii) to enhance regulatory and supervisory functions 
so as to ensure prudence of the financial institutions.
Indeed, alongside a stable macroeconomic environment, adequate pru­
dential supervision and regulation over financial institutions and transac­
tions are now widely recognized as among the prerequisites to successful 
financial liberalization. In the absence of these conditions and lack of 
uncoordination with other macroeconomic and trade reform measures, a 
hasty implementation of financial liberalization can further destabilize the 
economies, as witnessed by the Southern Cone countries.
However, financial policies in Sub-Saharan Africa should also encom­
pass measures which look into the phase that extends beyond the 'repair' 
of the financial system and 'restoration' of the solvency of financial institu­
tions. Our studies suggest that liberalization per se has failed to improve 
the performance of banking institutions in savings mobilization and finan­
cial intermediation in any sustainable manner. Difficulties in performing 
effective intermediation continue to impede further advancement in savings 
mobilization. In advancing liberalization measures, little attention has been 
paid to the fact that motivation for increased financial savings at the for­
mal financial institutions is closely related to accessibility to credit facilities
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offered. At the same time, the limited lending opportunities considerably 
dampen efforts for active savings mobilization by the formal institutions. 
This interrelationship between savings and credit facilities/lending condi­
tions from the perspectives of lenders and savers/borrowers has been ne­
glected in the financial repression hypothesis, where lending opportunities 
are assumed to abound.
Indeed, financial liberalization policies have hardly addressed the issue 
of high credit risks and transaction costs -the key constraint facing the bank­
ing institutions in their lending operations. This remains the prime cause 
for the extreme risk aversion and conservatism of many commercial banks 
as well as the financial distress and illiquidity of many DFIs sp ecializing  
in development term loans.
As in many other cases of policy reform measures, getting 'prices 
right' is not sufficient to promote savings mobilization and financial inter­
mediation, unless efficient markets and financial institutions are in place 
(Collier and Mayer (1989)). Price signals transmitted from shallow markets 
are inherently unstable and volatile. Furthermore, literature suggests that 
financial liberalization could result in higher overall intermediation costs 
in economies where the informal sector has been playing an important in­
termediation function.
Among the measures addressing institution building, capital market 
development has become one of the focal points in the recent discussions 
on finandal-sector development. Indeed, the chronic mismatch of liquidity 
and portfolio positions of different financial institutions calls for the crea­
tion and development of inter-bank money markets by which to facilitate 
rapid and easy realignment of liquidity positions. There are few well-func­
tioning inter-bank money markets in the developing countries. Where they 
do exist, their operations are dominated by treasury bills and other govern­
ment short-dated stock, issued as government's short-term deficit financ­
ing instruments. Government stocks and bills are treated by financial ins­
titutions as almost 'risk-free' assets and often constitute a major compo­
nents of their liquidity holdings. Other instruments such as CD, commercial 
papers and inter-bank lines exist in a few countries but are used much 
less.
However, our research suggests that the gap in the liquidity posi­
tion of different banking institutions is of a structural nature. It cannot
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be eliminated simply by activating short-term inter-bank transactions. Ge­
nerally, the capacity to generate long-term capital does not emerge spon­
taneously. In the demise of DFIs, capital markets are seen increasingly as 
a credible alternative source and mechanism of supporting long-term in­
vestment financing. Particularly, in the light of the structural gap in the 
maturity structure of financial assets in the economies and the shortage 
of long-term loan provisions, many policy-makers have turned to develop­
ment of the capital market as a potential conduit for channelling long­
term funds into the productive sectors while the banking system provides 
short-term finance to investors.
Though potentially useful, capital markets take time to develop and 
mature; they often fail to perform many of the functions ascribed to them 
in the short-term. The paucity of financial instruments and potential parti­
cipants inhibits deepening the market. Presently, in many countries, govern­
ment long-dated securities and bonds tend to be placed outside the mar­
ket with quasi-public institutions and held to maturity. In most cases, the 
market in corporate bonds or other private share stocks is at a very inci­
pient stage of development in the economies where the public sector has 
hitherto dominated. Many family-owned indigenous enterprises are unders­
tandably reluctant to go public. Tax policy in favour of deposit income 
over dividends is also seen as impeding a transfer from the bank-based 
financial system to the capital market based one.
In terms of sequencing the financial sector development, many argue 
that the capital market could play its full potential only at the later stage 
of economic development. For many developing countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, it is unrealistic to expect discernable benefits from capital market 
development in the immediate future. As policies are introduced to encou­
rage capital markets, the improvement in banking institutions' operation 
should be given due attention so that the two policies are mutually rein­
forcing; the economies could eventually benefit from the advantages of both 
bank-based finance and capital-market-based finance. The capital market 
development is not a panacea. It should not be seen as a substitute for 
policies of strengthening banking and other financial institutions through 
lifting their operational constraints, namely addressing the issue of high 
credit risks and transaction costs in dealing with small borrowers and sa­
vers. This calls for more proactive policies to ease constraints facing bank­
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ing institutions in financial intermediation. Our discussion shows that such 
steps could make these institutions more innovative and active in savings 
mobilization. One possible way forward may be to address directly the cu­
rrent state of market fragmentation.
In this regard, it is interesting to note the argument advanced by 
Biggs (1991), suggesting that market fragmentation per se does not neces­
sarily entail intermediation inefficiency and that market fragmentation 
could work. This stands in sharp contrast to the popular view that finan­
cial dualism can have an adverse impact on economic development, equity 
and the allocative efficiency of resources22. Biggs takes the opposite view: 
that the benefits of financial dualism could outweigh the cost associated 
with it.
Gting the experience of Taiwan Province of China, Biggs argues that 
the decentralization of lending and fragmentation of borrowing groups, to 
optimize screening and monitoring of loans, can reduce an economy's ove­
rall intermediation costs and increase investment efficiency in developing 
countries with information-imperfect financial markets. The high opportu­
nity cost of investable funds, determined by the market rates prevailing 
in the curb market, kept the average efficiency of aggregate investment 
high, and deterred entrepreneurs from undertaking lower yielding invest­
ments, even when they had access to cheap bank funds. He concludes that 
the development of a dualistic financial system -with the formal sector serv­
ing 'full-information' borrowers, the informal lenders serving 'information­
intensive' borrowers- "helped credit intermediaries allocate funds to 'informa­
tion-intensive' borrowers at a lower cost and more efficiently than would 
have been possible if all investable resources were channelled through for­
mal sector banks" (p. 168).
A key to success in Taiwan Province of China in achieving interme­
diation efficiency in the fragmented markets appears to be dependent on 
creating conditions both for individual segments to evolve and grow and 
for effective linkages to develop between them. First the government adop­
ted a deliberate policy to encourage the development of an active informal
22 Qiandavakar (1985) address the issue of the impact of the large presence of the informal 
financial sector on the efficacy of monetary control.
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sector (the curb market) as "an efficient adjunct to regulated credit institu­
tions". Secondly, the informal lenders have been adaptive to develop new 
and innovative instruments for risky projects, and hence, they have ex­
tended loans to borrowers without demanding real assets as collateral. 
Furthermore, while the financial market exhibited a clear dualism into for­
mal and informal segments, demarcated for borrowers depending on the 
size of their activities, formal credits were available indirectly to smaller 
borrowers through an extensive subcontracting system. Larger firms offered 
on-lending facilities such as trade credit or suppliers credit to their sub­
contractors and suppliers, acting as "de-facto intermediaries". The use of 
"market interlinkage" and "credit layering" has been instrumental to their 
success and supportive to industrial growth.
In other Asian countries, "interlinking" of contracts across financial, 
trade and production transactions and "credit layering" have been used by 
informal lenders for risk management in rural areas, wherever informal 
sectors do perform an intermediation role effectively. These techniques help 
to improve information gathering and contract enforcement. Yotopoulos and 
Floro (op. cit. 1991) report that the informal lending operations with two- 
tier credit layering, involving traders-lenders (commodity-based) and far- 
mers-lenders (land-based), are extensively used in the rural Philippines.
These experiences in Asia suggest that market segmentation may not 
be necessarily a sign of inefficiency, or a cause of inefficient intermediation. 
Market segmentation, however, constitutes a problem when there is total 
lack of communication or links between the different segments, constraining 
severely the transmission of price and policy signals across the system. 
This points to one key condition for a segmented system to work efficiently; 
namely, there must be linkages, indirect if not direct, between segments.
In low-income African economies, this condition appears to be absent 
or under-developed. Fig. 6. illustrates the flow of funds (savings and credit) 
among different economic agents and sectors in these economies. Following 
the conventional classification adopted in the literature on "dualism", econo­
mic activities (the real sector) and financial services ( the financial sector) 
are sub-grouped into the formal (modern) and the informal (traditional) 
sectors.
The formal financial institutions predominantly provide services to 
established large-scale "formal" sector activities, many of which, (in parti­
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cular, State-owned) have had very low returns and shown poor financial 
performance. The fiscal record of the governments -beneficiaries of most 
of the credit from the central banks and whose papers other formal insti­
tutions have largely invested in- has been generally dismal, exposed to 
large external and internal shocks. The performance of many formal ins­
titutions has been correspondingly poor. Past attempts to provide credit 
and loans to the small-scale sectors, through the DFIs and the targeted 
credit schemes, have largely failed, as little attention was given to the build­
up of viable financial institutions (Meyer, 1989, 1991). Thus, the formal fi­
nancial sector has suffered from a legacy of either conservatism or finan­
cial distress. There is at present very little financial flow to the small-scale 
sector from formal financial institutions (diagonal flows from the upper- 
left box to the lower-right one in Fig. 6).
The financial needs of 'peripheral' activities of micro enterprises, SMEs 
and small-scale farmers -upon whom the livelihood of a majority of the 
population is dependent- are met by heterogenous informal financial orga­
nizations and agents. Multifarious informal financial activities have deve­
loped a dynamism of their own, demonstrating flexibility and adaptability 
to the needs of local communities in which they operate. However, infor­
mal financial arrangements are usually organized in a confined local vici­
nity; hence their intermediation function is often constrained by their limi­
ted scale of contacts, subject to highly seasonal funds and highly covariant 
risks affecting the whole local community.
Consequently, markets and financial flows are largely segmented. 
Critically, horizontal linkages are weak in both financial and real activities: 
linkages between the formal and informal financial sectors (between the 
two upper boxes in Fig. 6) are insubstantial. Since backward -and forward- 
linkages of economic activities also tend to be weak (between the lower 
boxes), formal credit fails to reach smaller borrowers through indirect rou­
tes such as "credit layering" or subcontracting systems. Thus there is little 
effective linkage whereby information and funds can flow between segments.
Presently, there is neither a dynamic market force for workable spe­
cialization of financial intermediation by sector, nor policies to recognize 
efficient functioning of the informal sector as intermediaries, i.e. those who 
could sort borrowers according to 'information intensity' and credit risk. 
There is no automatic mechanism to integrate the segmented markets into
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a coherent system through specialization. Flows of funds take place mostly 
within an enclave sphere in each sector, i.e. flows are restricted to vertical 
movements.
In the face of fragmentation -where functional specialization by each 
sector has not materialized as part of an integrated system to perform effi­
cient mobilization and intermediation- the required policy would be not 
to deregulate markets in haste, but to work first on closer integration of 
the informal and formal markets (Roemer and Jones 1991).
Given the positive role played by the informal sector, many today 
recognize that integration through simple institutionalization (formaliza­
tion) of informal activities is not appropriate. As suggested by Yotopoulos 
and Floro (1991), the necessary integration may be achieved several other 
ways; (i) infusing into the formal institutions some of the flexibility of in­
formal operations; (ii) strengthening the structure and performance of 
informal market operations; (iii) developing linkages between the formal 
and informal financial sectors so that the latter becomes a conduit of loana­
ble funds of the formal institutions to reach borrowers otherwise rationed 
out. Such schemes can lead to improved repayment rates, as informal len­
ders screen and monitor a smaller group of borrowers on the basis of per­
sonal relationships. The development of better linkages could be seen as 
leading to a financial system where the formal and informal markets could 
specialize and function complementarily, mutually reinforcing each others' 
strengths.
This line of thinking has been echoed in several recent studies. For 
example, the study by Germidis et a l  (1991) recommends policies of both 
integration of the informal sector into the formal system so as to reduce 
financial dualism, through in-depth institutional and operational reforms 
of the latter, and interlinkage between the informal and formal sectors, by 
maximizing the positive and minimizing the negative aspects of each. The 
objective of developing linkages is defined as to "reduce the gap between 
the two sectors by promoting closer links between formal and informal 
operators on a more systematic scale" (p. 214). The informal sector is seen 
as "a means of retailing formal financial services to areas, sectors or popu­
lation groups that are difficult to reach". They further propose that inte­
gration and interlinkage should be undertaken not only concurrently but 
somewhat sequentially, arguing that linkage in the short term would en-
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train integration in the long term. Development of linkage is viewed as 
a strategy of "soft integration", a step towards achieving the goal of an 
integrated and competitive financial system. Indeed, better linkages are al­
so desirable, and required, among institutions and agents within each seg­
ment for better intermediation.
This new thinking has begun to replace the traditional approach as 
a basis for developing innovative financial schemes to provide credit to 
the SSE and microenterprise sector as well as the small-scale agricultural 
sector (Levitsky et a l  1989, Meyer 1991). In them, credit delivery tends 
to be linked to savings mobilization. Seibel (1989) proposed a model of 
linking savings and credit: "as savings without credit lead to demotivation, 
resource deflection and the inadequate financing of small enterprise, and 
as credit without preceding savings leads to haphazard loan spending, to 
risky business ventures and poor repayment morale." (p. 103). Empirical 
evidence confirms that loan recovery is higher if credit provision originates 
at least partially in mobilized savings. This basic philosophy has been adop­
ted by many donor agencies and NGOs for instituting grassroots banking 
(for poverty alleviation) and income-generating programmes (Von Pischke 
1991, Holt 1991 and Yaron 1991).
The new experimental schemes tend to adopt other features of infor­
mal financial activities such as group formation, replacing traditional tangi­
ble collateral requirements with group guarantees and using peer pressure 
and assessment of reliability based on knowledge of the participants. Many 
of them also charge commercial-based interest rates to recover, at least par­
tially, operational costs and thus create conditions for self-sustainability of 
the programmes in the long-run.
The applicability, replicability and long-term viability of these schemes 
are yet to be tested in Sub-Saharan Africa; several schemes, based on the 
experience of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, have been instituted by 
NGOs and donor agencies in a few countries (e.g. the Mudzi Fund in Mala­
wi and K-REP in Kenya). However, the schemes are still at an incipient 
stage and require laborious efforts of committed staff for initiating then 
developing them into programmes and institutions that are self-sustainable. 
Many regard these as too specialized to be a part of normal banking opera­
tions. Furthermore, the majority of these schemes are at present heavily 
dependent on financial and technical assistance from external agencies and
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NGOs. They do not perform a function of financial intermediation with 
locally generated savings. It may take some time before they can form part 
of countries' integrated financial system.
In many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, few positive steps have yet been 
taken in this direction; even a nascent form of linkages in financial inter­
mediation is yet to emerge. Consequently, the economies persistently lack 
a system of effectively intermediating funds between surplus and deficits 
units. While integration of the financial system could also be achieved 
through dynamic growth of the informal sector, a policy of developing fi­
nancial interlinkage might accelerate financial intermediation and stimulate 
linkage development between the financial and real sectors as well as among 
informal and formal financial intermediaries. Whichever policy measures 
are taken, they should strengthen both existing formal institutions and in­
formal operators by easing their respective operational constraints. This may 
allow formal financial institutions to engage, without jeopardizing their 
commercial liability, in broad-based development, meeting the latent de­
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INTRODUCTION
Maintaining growth and development of the real economy requires a 
complementary growth of the financial system capable of providing indispen­
sable financial resources to the growing markets as cheaply and efficiently 
as possible. For some time, Indonesia has been engaged in serious efforts 
to stimulate the domestic financial system, and thereby economic growth, 
through major policy packages in 1983, 1988, 1990 and 1991. This paper 
begins with a discussion of the nature of the specific reforms carried out 
in Indonesia, the environment in which they were undertaken and, most 
importantly, their effects on the real economy.
Theories of the link between financial performance and economic 
growth, particularly as advanced by McKinnon (1973), and Shaw (1973) 
have been the basis for a series of financial reforms around the world, 
most prominently in the Southern Cone of Latin America, but also in Tur­
key, parts of Africa and East Asia, including Indonesia. These experiences 
have raised concerns about the real sector effects of financial reforms, parti­
cularly with regard to the freeing of interest rates and their effects on savings 
and investment1. Various authors analyzing this experience have focused
1 Van Wijnbergen (1983) and Taylor (1983) present an argument based on the efficiency of the 
curb market and the effects of interest rates on the supply of goods (through the cost of 
working capital) whereby freeing interest rates may not lead to growth. These arguments 
turn on empirical magnitudes that need to be evaluated for each case. Other prominent 
debates concern the timing and sequencing of financial reforms, the content of reforms and 
the nature of financial-market supervision. See for example Edwards (1984), Caprio and 
Atiyas (1992).
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on the need to avoid severe macro-imbalances as a precondition for success­
ful financial reform because of the reduced likelihood of engendering high 
ex post real interest rates and the risk of currency substitution exacerbating 
any fiscal imbalance (Hanson, 1992). Others have cited the examples of 
the Southern Cone as warnings of the dangers of opening the capital account 
before the current account (McKinnon, 1973, 1982; Edwards, 1984; Khan 
and Zahler, 1983). Others have argued that the timing should be simulta­
neous (Little, et al. 1970; Krueger, 1981 and Michaely, 1986, cited in Hanson 
1992). After discussing the nature of the financial reforms implemented in 
Indonesia over the last decade, this paper addresses their effects on the 
real economy and on the financial system itself. Questions analyzed inclu­
de:
• The effect on the financial system itself, including asset growth, 
maturity structure, spreads, profitability and interest rates and risk;
• The effects on the level of investment and savings;
• The impact of the macroeconomic environment on financial reform;
• The sequencing of financial reform, in particular the opening of 
the financial system in the presence of a closed current account 
and an open capital account.
I. THE 1983 FINANCIAL REFORMS:
BACKGROUND AND CONTENT
1. Macroeconomic Background
Indonesia began the 1980s as a high growth, low-income country heavily 
dependent on oil (Table l)2. Growth had averaged 7.6 per cent through 
the 1970s, while inflation, low in the early part of the decade, had picked 
up to levels over 40 per cent in 1974 before falling to the 10-20 per cent 
range for the rest of the decade. Revenues from oil, which accounted for 
up to 80 per cent of exports, kept the current account balance positive
2 For an excellent overview of the Indonesian economy, with a focus on international debt, 
see Woo and Nasution (1989).
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or at a mild deficit. Oil revenues from the State-owned oil monopoly, Per- 
tamina, also accounted for as much as 70 per cent of budgetary revenues, 
keeping the domestic tax effort low. A period of hyperinflation in the mid- 
1960s had led to the imposition of a policy that eschewed domestic-bond 
financing of the government budget. The same concern over inflation led 
to the adoption of an open capital account in 1970, whereby all movements 
of capital by the non-finandal private sector into and out of the country 
were completely unrestricted. Only banks and public enterprises faced 
restrictions on the amount of foreign lending they could undertake. A debt 
crisis in 1975 brought on by irresponsible borrowing by Pertamina led to 
tight controls over public-enterprise borrowing and a strong desire by the 
Indonesian government to limit its external debt burden. The crisis helped 
Indonesia avoid the external debt build-ups that plagued many other middle- 
and low-income oil producers in the late 1970s and early 1980s.
Government revenues were used throughout the 1970s to promote key 
domestic industries, usually State-owned, behind a barrier of tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions. Oil inflows created a Dutch disease problem during 
the 1970s that Indonesia attempted to counter in 1978 by devaluating its 
fixed exchange rate. Although non-oil exports initially responded positively 
(Woo and Nasution, 1989), inflation in the intervening period, however, 
led to continued appreciation of the rupiah.
Table 1
KEY MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS (a)
75-83 83-87 88-89 1990 1991
Average real growth rates (% p.a.)
GDP 6.5 5.0 6.6 7.1 6.6
Non-oil GDP 7.0 5.7 7.8 7.5 6.3
Non-oil exports 10.5 12.2 17.8 2.8 24.3
Non-oil imports 13.8 -8.2 12.7 26.0 9.6
Fixed investment 10.7 -3.7 11.9 14.6 6.0
Macroeconomic balances (%) (b)
Current account/GNP -7.8(d) -2.5 -1.9 -3.4 3.8
Non-interest current account/GNP -6.0(d) 2.0 2.3 0.4 0.3
Overall public sector balance/GDP -4.3(d) -3.0(e) -2.1 (e) 0.2(e) -0.4 (e)
MLT debt service/exports 16.8 (d) 34.8 35.8 29.7 31.6
MLT debt/exports 127.6 234.3 212.2 187.6 196.5
MLT debt/GNP 33.1 65.5 60.1 57.8 59.0
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Table 1 (Con t.)
75-83 83-87 88-89 1990 1991
Structure of the economy (%) (b)
Non-oil manufacturing/GDP 9.9 12.8 13.9 14.9 15.4
Non-oil exports/non-oil imports 37.4 80.8 88.8 71.2 77.5
Public savings/GDP 8.9 4.8 6.4 10.2 9.4
National savings/GDP 21.0 19.1 20.9 20.9 20.3
Fixed investment/GDP 25.1 19.2 20.6 22.5 22.7
Private fixed investment/total
fixed investment 52.1 59.2 58.7 59.0 57.7
Consumption/GDP 73.9 75.6 74.2 74.2 75.0
Prices
Oil prices (US$/bbl) (b) 28.9 17.6 17.9 22.6 18.7
Non-oil terms of trade (83/84 =  100) (b) 100.0 96.3 95.3 95.3 91.5
Domestic inflation (% p.a.) (b) (c) 16.2 7.9 6.7 7.9 9.4
(a) Balance o f payments and fiscal data are for fiscal years (starting April 1). Other indicators are for 
calendar years.
(b) For last year of multi-year periods.




Source: Central Bureau of Statistics.
2. Financial Sector Pre-reform Structure
Indonesia's financial system at the beginning of the 1980s was typical of 
most developing countries (Nasution, 1983; Balino and Sundarajan, 1986). 
Finance was dominated by commercial banks, which accounted for 95 per 
cent of financial assets (Table 2). Banking was dominated by five State 
commercial banks which, along with the Bank of Indonesia (BI) the central 
commercial bank, controlled 80 per cent of financial assets. State banks had 
a number of advantages, including extensive branch networks, access to 
BI, and the exclusive right to receive public-enterprise deposits.
The other 15 per cent of the banking systems assets were in the hands 
of 21 banks authorized to operate in foreign exchange (11 foreign and 10 
domestic), 60 private domestic banks limited to rupiah operations and 29 
development banks. Private banks had grown during the 1970s after having 
been outlawed in the early 1960s. They were hampered, however, by res-
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frictions on branching and access to BI as well as to public enterprises. 
Domestic private banks were nonetheless favoured over foreign banks which 
operated without access to BI credit and were limited to a maximum of 
two branches. Two national and twenty-six development banks, all but one 
State-owned, provided some long-term financing with funds from the public 
and multilateral banks. In addition, an extensive rural financial system ope­
rated through thousands of very small village banks which were precluded 
from offering demand deposits. Other institutions in the financial system 
played a very minor role. Some 13 non-bank financial institutions had been 
set up in the early 1970s to promote investment banking and the stock 
market. Their activities were funded through the issuance of certificates 
of deposit (CDs), purchased by commercial banks, and through equity, again 
chiefly supplied by the state banks and BI. A domestic stock market, revi­
ved in 1977, was moribund. By 1982 only 24 companies had issued shares, 
mostly foreign-owned ones seeking to comply with investment laws requir­
ing gradual sales of equity to Indonesians. A few bond issues had also 
been floated in the market, but overall the funds raised in the capital mar­
ket amounted to only 1.7 per cent of financial assets in 1982. Insurance 
companies and pension funds were small, keeping what assets they had 
in land or short-term deposits.
3. Financial Repression
Recycling oil revenues within Indonesia in the 1970s led to an elaborate 
system of directed, subsidized credit, known in the country as liquidity 
credit, that accounted for 48 per cent of all bank lending by 1982 (Table 
3). Refinancing by BI at subsidized rates was plentiful so long as the loans 
met the criteria for any of a myriad of directed credit schemes. Schemes 
targeted small-scale firms, farmers, transmigrants, home owners and public 
enterprises. Terms varied, with the portion of a loan eligible for refinancing 
varying from 20 per cent to 100 per cent and the rediscount interest rates 
from one-third to one-half of the subsidized rate paid by the final borrower. 
The bulk of refinancing was provided through State banks which granted 
loans on the credit at rates of 6 to 12 per cent. Refinancing was the chief 
source of funding for State banks since, despite the open capital account, 
their interest rates on deposits of over 3 months were controlled by BI
Table 2
STRUCTURE AND GROWTH OF THE INDONESIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
(number, billions of rupiah and %)
Number Nominal Asset Size Real Growth
1982 1988 1991 1982 1988 1991 1978-82 1982-88 1988-91 1990-91
Bank of Indonesia 1 1 1 13,707 42,445 55,220 1.4 10.8 0.5 2.4
DMB 118 111 185 17,105 65,693 159,392 8.7 14.4 21.3 6.4
State 5 5 5 12,257 39,862 70,158 1.8 11.6 10.6 -1.5
Private FX 10 12 23 1,168 10,189 45,654 23.7 28.1 41.7 10.7
Foreign 11 11 29 1,172 3,215 12,070 -2.6 8.8 35.8 11.6
Non-FX Private 60 51 96 720 4,972 12,868 22.5 24.2 23.4 7.8
Development 29 29 29 1,336 5,046 14,505 8.8 14.1 26.9 25.3
Savings Bank 3 3 3 452 2,409 4,137 57.4 19.8 9.8 20.2
Other (a) 113 209 276 1,447 6,681 N.A. N.A. 17.5 N.A. N.A.
Rural banks (b) 5,808 5,783 6,243 86 637 N.A. 19.5 25.3 N.A. N.A.
Total (c) 6,040 6,104 6,954 32,345 115,456 225,575 6.2 13.2 14.1 4.6
(a) Comprises NBFls, insurance and leasing companies. The nbfi data are as of March 1991.
(b) Village and Urban Peoples Credit Banks (BPRs).
(c) Totals reflect previous year stocks for those categories for which 1991 data is unavailable. 
Source: Bank of Indonesia.
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(Table 4). Private banks, on the other hand, were not subject to interest- 
rate controls, neither on deposits nor on loans. As a result, private banks 
offered deposit rates two to three times higher than State banks.
Table 3 
LIQUIDITY CREDITS














Liquidity Credit (LC) 3,876 6,426 9,176 13,873 10,807 12,048
LC/State Bank Credit 43.8 46.7 10.1 32.6 19.8 19.5
State Bank LC/A ll LC 92.2 93.6 89.0 79.5 82.7 87.5
Private National Banks
Liquidity Credit 208 298 753 2,602 1,693 1,280
LC Share (%) 15.4 9.1 9.2 11.5 4.8 3.0
LC/A11 Bank Credit 1.8 1.6 2.2 3.7 1.7 1.1
All Banks
Liquidity Credit 4,203 6,862 10,311 17,451 13,061 137,68
LC Share (%) 37.1 36.8 30.7 24.6 13.1 11.9
Source: Bank of Indonesia.
Table 4
INTEREST RATES AT COMMERCIAL BANKS, 1982-91 (a)
(annual %)
December of 1982 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Nominal Deposit Rates (b) 
State Banks 6.0 16.0 14.7 17.3 18.2 17.2 19.4 22.3
Private FX Banks 18.5 17.8 15.5 18.5 19.6 18.2 20.0 23.3
All Banks NA 16.9 15.4 18.4 19.0 17.7 19.6 22.7
Ex post Real Deposit Rates (c) 
State Banks -3.4 9.0 6.4 10.6 9.1 6.5 11.2 16.1
Private FX Banks 8.0 10.7 7.1 11.7 10.4 7.5 11.7 17.1
All Banks N.A. 9.9 7.1 11.6 9.9 7.0 11.4 16.5
Nominal Lending Rates (d) 
State Banks 12.0 15.3 18.5 20.0 20.2 19.7 21.2 25.1
Private FX Banks N.A. 24.2 23.02 3.6 23.8 21.7 25.1 28.2
All Banks N.A. 22.1 21.12 2.1 22.3 21.0 23.0 26.1
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Table 4 (Cont.)
December of 1982 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
Ex post Real Lending Rates (c) 
State Banks 2.1 8.4 9.9 13.1 11.0 8.8 12.8 18.8
Private FX Banks N.A. 16.7 14.1 16.5 14.3 10.6 16.5 21.7
Interest Rate Spreads 
Lending-Deposit Spread (d) 
State Banks 5.7 -0.6 3.3 2.3 1.7 2.1 1.5 2.3
Private FX Banks N.A. 5.4 6.5 4.3 3.5 3.0 4.3 4.0
All Banks N.A. 4.4 4.9 3.1 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8
On-shore Off-shore 
Dollar Spread (e) 0.9 -0.5 -0.0 1.0 1.9 -0.0 0.3 2.5
On-Shore Rupiah On-Shore 
Dollar (e) 3.4 9.0 8.1 9.3 8.5 9.2 11.0 14.6
On-shore Rupiah-LIBOR (e) 4 3 8.4 8.1 10.4 10.6 9.1 11.4 17.4
Memo Items: 
Annualized Semester 
CPI Inflation 9.7 6.4 7.8 6.1 8.3 10.0 7.4 6.2
6 Month US Dollar LIBOR 13.6 8.6 6.9 7.3 8.1 8.3 7.8 4.6
6 Month On-shore 
US Dollar Rate (f) 14.6 8.1 6.8 8.4 10.2 8.3 8.1 7.2
(a) For rupiah transactions, excluding liquidity credits. Rates shown include all outstanding loans or 
time deposits, not marginal rates.
(b) Average rate for six-month time deposits.
(c) Rate calculated using the actual annualized semester inflation as proxy for expected inflation.
(d) Average nominal rate on working capital loans. Because of long credit maturities, the average shown 
responds slowly to current rates. Thus the lending rates cannot be directly compared with the deposit 
rate.
(e) Spread calculated using Private FX bank on-shore rates.
(f) Rate on offer at Private FX banks.
Source: Bank of Indonesia and author's calculations.
In addition to the direction of credit through its extensive refinancing 
program, BI also set individual limits on credit expansion for each bank, 
thereby influencing the allocation of almost all credit (Table 5). Aggregate 
and subsector limits on credit growth had started as a means of controlling 
the money supply, since policy makers felt that relying on a fractional re­
serve system in the face of an open capital account and significant cross 
border flows would be ineffective. Of course a system of credit control 
did not protect against the effects of loose domestic monetary policy, which 
still led to periodic losses of international reserves. It did, however, insu-
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late the domestic financial system from large foreign exchange inflows (the 
main concern of policy makers during the period of oil wealth), since these 
could not be transformed into credit.
Table 5





Share of Total Bank Credit
Agriculture 8.7 8.4 7.6 34.2
Mining 16.0 1.2 0.6 17.1
Manufacturing 24.9 33.3 31.2 35.1
Trade 31.4 30.8 29.5 35.9
Services 14.2 16.5 17.7 39.8
Others 4.8 9.9 13.4 47.3
Share of GDP
Agriculture 24.1 24.1 19.3 8.8
Mining 19.5 11.6 12.4 18.5
Manufacturing 12.0 18.5 21.8 21.6
Trade 15.9 17.3 17.5 16.4
Services 24.8 24.6 25.6 17.5
Others 3.7 3.8 3.3 11.2
Memo items:
Total Credit (trillions of rupiahs) 10.3 32.8 100.4
Total GDP (trillions of rupiahs) 62.5 139.5 226.5
Source: Bank of Indonesia, Central Bureau of Statistics.
The elaborate system of credit allocation ultimately thwarted govern­
ment objectives and reduced efficiency. From the perspective of the go­
vernment, the plethora of programs and lack of prioritization makes it diffi­
cult to judge whether the allocation of credit that ensued was desirable. 
The large loan subsidies encouraged a misdirection of funds, shortchanging 
intended beneficiaries. From the standpoint of efficiency, the subsidized ra­
tes encouraged financing of low-retum projects, or ones with levels of capital 
intensity inappropriate for a low-wage, labor-surplus country. Equalization 
of the marginal efficiency of investment across sectors, a partial measure 
of allocative efficiency, was hindered by the targeted nature of directed
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credit. The existence of high percentages of rediscount and subsidized cre­
dit insurance from a State-owned insurance company weakened the incen­
tive of State banks to choose viable projects or to supervise them once 
funded. Woo and Nasution (1989) point out that State banks rarely met 
their credit goals, a result that they hypothesize may have been due to 
large bribes called for by these banks, bribes that raised the cost of State- 
bank credit above that of private banks.
For the State banks, the existence of credit ceilings together with con­
trols on deposit and lending rates weakened the incentive to aggressively 
seek deposits. Private domestic banks, operating without interest-rate res­
trictions, showed faster growth than State banks. Because of generous credit 
ceilings, private banks were able to increase assets at a real rate of over 
20 per cent per year between 1978 and 1981 (Table 2). State banks, though 
showing real growth of less than 2 per cent, were still able to collect enough 
funds to develop high levels of excess reserves. These reserves were either 
converted via foreign exchange as a hedge against devaluation or lent out 
to private banks in the interbank money market.
The combination of extensive State ownership, interest and credit con­
trols and entry barriers led to financial markets that were highly segregated 
(Harris, et al., 1992). Public enterprises banked with the State banks, whose 
extensive branch network gave them advantages in raising funds. Large 
conglomerates, fostered in the hot-house of trade protection, were also cus­
tomers of the State banks. These banks therefore provided almost all of 
industry's funding. Besides the fragmentation of internal markets, different 
groups had varying degrees of access to foreign financing. Of the private 
firms, the large conglomerates had the best access to foreign borrowing. 
Chinese-owned firms sometimes had access to foreign funds through off­
shore Chinese banking links with Hong Kong and Singapore.
4. Macroeconomic Pressures for Reform
By 1982, the worsening price of oil and world-wide recession had under­
mined Indonesia's balance of payments and fiscal balance, thus prompt­
ing a series of macroeconomic adjustments. The current-account deficit had 
reached 7.8 per cent of GDP, while oil-tax receipts had fallen 13 per cent 
in real terms during the fiscal year (April to March).
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One of the most important steps taken was a devaluation of the ru­
piah by 38 per cent in March 1983, which brought the real exchange rate 
back to its 1978 level, when the last devaluation had occurred. This was 
undertaken to spur non-oil exports, which had responded well to the 1978 
devaluation, and to increase rupiah revenues in the budget.
The devaluation was coupled with a series of fiscal adjustments to 
make it stick. These involved cuts in current expenditures and reductions 
in domestic subsidies to oil, public enterprises and food. This was reinfor­
ced by delaying or cancelling dozens of large public-sector projects, includ­
ing four multi-billion-dollar petrochemical projects planned by Pertamina. 
Efforts at increasing domestic tax collections were also undertaken.
5. The First Financial-Sector Reforms
The fall in oil revenues played havoc with the old structure of the financial 
system that had relied on significant recycling of the government's oil reve­
nues through the banking system. Policy makers began to focus on the 
need to promote the mobilization of domestic savings to maintain investment 
in face of tightening external constraint. There was also growing concern 
about the need to provide banks with more flexibility in the allocation 
of credit, with the goal of increasing the efficiency of its use.
The reform process began in August 1982 as BI cut back on the provi­
sion of directed credits for some low-priority sectors. This was followed 
in June 1983 by more substantial reductions in the utilization of directed 
credits to 14 "priority areas" and a hike in their interest rates to 12 per 
cent. BI also moved to limit its direct credit to the public, relying instead 
on refinancing. At the same time, the bank announced the elimination of 
ceilings on lending rates at State banks, except for directed credits. Interest 
rates on time deposits longer than six months were also freed3. Further 
efforts to mobilize domestic funds included the authorization of bearer CDs 
and the elimination of a 20 per cent withholding tax on domestic dollar 
deposits. Finally, and most importantly, BI eliminated all credit ceilings.
3 This was followed several months later by the elimination of limits on six-month time 
deposits, so that only savings deposits continued to have interest-rate ceilings.
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Although these bold reforms greatly increased the flexibility of exist­
ing banks in pricing and allocating credit, they stopped short of lowering 
entry barriers, either among banks or between banks and other financial 
institutions. No new foreign banks were allowed entry, nor were new li­
censes for foreign exchange operations issued. The opening of new bran­
ches continued to be severely constrained, giving State banks a clear ad­
vantage that was further solidified by their having sole possession of State 
enterprise business.
II. THE 1988-91 FINANCIAL REFORMS:
BACKGROUND AND CONTENT
1. The Macroeconomic Background
The move to lower entry barriers was to take five years. In the intervening 
time Indonesia's external environment improved in 1984-85 and then worse­
ned considerably, with the 1986 plunge of the price of oil and the appre­
ciation of the yen both pushing the current account into the red. As in 
1983, the Indonesian authorities responded with a combination of exchange- 
rate and fiscal policies to restore the balance of payments. Real current 
government expenditures were cut through a salary freeze, subsidies were 
reduced and capital spending slowed. Another sharp devaluation was 
announced in September 1986, lowering the value of the rupiah by 50 per 
cent. In response to the stabilization program, Indonesia was also able to 
step up its aid program, with large amounts of balance-of-payments support 
coming from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and Japan.
Unlike the 1983 crisis, this time stabilization efforts were coupled with 
trade-reform measures. This began in 1985 with a reduction in the dispersion 
of tariff rates. A duty-drawback system for exports was revamped in May 
1986. More reforms accompanied the 1986 devaluation, setting a pattern 
of replacing non-tariff barriers with tariffs which were subsequently lowe­
red. In an effort to attract foreign investment, licensing requirements were 
simplified in 1987. By 1991, a series of almost annual trade-reform packages 
had succeeded in sharply lowering export bias and variance in the trade 
regime and broadening the scope and ease of foreign direct investment.
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Stabilization and trade reform left the Indonesian economy in a different 
position in 1988 than it had been at the advent of financial reforms in 
1983. Inflation had been kept under 10 per cent, helped by the trade re­
form that created more effective competition from imports. Strong efforts 
to reform the domestic tax system and increase collections, coupled with 
austere spending, had helped keep the fiscal deficit below 4 per cent of 
GDP (except for 1986) despite the decline in oil revenue (Table 1). Strong 
export growth had reduced the dependence of the trade account on oil. 
Nevertheless, the debt burden had increased, both because of yen appre­
ciation and because of larger current account deficits (Table 1).
2. The 1988-91 Financial Reforms
Having confronted the stabilization challenge of 1986, attention turned once 
again to the financial sector in October 1988. The government announced 
a far-reaching set of reforms, quickly termed PAKTO (the October Package) 
that dramatically lowered entry barriers to financing:
• Banking licenses were made available to new banks that could 
meet new minimum capital requirements.
• The process for obtaining a foreign-exchange license was simpli­
fied.
• Freer branching by domestic banks was allowed so long as stan­
dards of prudential soundness were met.
• Foreign joint-venture banks were authorized, with an extended bran­
ching network.
• Limitations on the activities of banks and non-banks were lessened.
• State enterprises were allowed to hold up to 50 per cent of their 
assets in private banks.
• The right to issue CDs was extended to all banks and non-bank 
financial institutions (NBHs).
• The burden of monetary control was lowered by a reduction in 
reserve requirements from 15 per cent to 2 per cent of deposits.
Efforts to promote competition were coupled with improvements in 
prudential supervision of banks. Regulations limiting lending to persons, 
firms or groups to 20 per cent and 50 per cent of equity were phased
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in. The new capital requirements forced greater levels of equity for banks4. 
Insurance company soundness was improved by the imposition of solvency 
requirements.
Having dealt with banking, the next reform package (PAKDES, in 
December 1988), focused on stimulating the capital market and other fi­
nancial institutions. The government issued new regulations covering the 
establishment of multi-finance companies empowered to engage in leasing, 
factoring, venture capital, credit-card operations and consumer credit. The 
same activities were made available to banks. Another set of regulations 
came out governing securities trading, including prohibitions against in­
sider trading. A major limitation to the stock market was eliminated when 
domestic deposits were subjected to a 15 per cent withholding tax, the 
same tax levied on dividend payments. New regulations also opened the 
market to foreign investors.
PAKMAR, the March 1989 package, was aimed at refining the pru­
dential regulations first announced in October 1988. It contained a series 
of decrees clarifying, among other matters, the development and control 
of NBFIs, lending limits, joint-venture bank capital ownership and bank 
mergers, the definition of bank capital, reserve requirements and bank 
investment in stocks. The long-standing absolute limit on external borrow­
ing was replaced with restrictions on the net open position of banks in 
foreign exchange (25 per cent of equity). Furthermore, the requirement of 
prior BI approval of off-shore lending was eliminated. This allowed banks 
to borrow off-shore more freely so long as they lent domestically in foreign 
exchange or otherwise covered their position, thereby further freeing up 
the capital account.
PAKJAN, announced in January 1990, took on the directed credit pro­
grams that had continued to exercise a large though diminishing role in 
the banking system despite initial efforts to curtail them in 1983 (Table 
3). This time priority programs were limited to four activities (mainly fi­
nance for small farmers and foodstuffs). One important sector excluded 
from directed credit was export finance. Interest rates were moved closer
4 This equity cushion was quickly erased when lending expanded (to be discussed in the next 
section).
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to the market level and the portion of credit available for refinancing was 
lessened. Mandatory, subsidized credit insurance was abolished. All these 
measures were additional incentives for originating banks to more carefu­
lly select and monitor their borrowers. As a political compromise, the eli­
mination of directed credit programs for small businesses was replaced by 
a requirement that 20 per cent of a bank's loans be made to small bo­
rrowers.
PAKFEB, the latest set of reforms, and announced in March 1991, 
returned once again to prudential regulations. New professional standards 
were set for bank directors. Loan-loss provisioning standards were over­
hauled, now involving a financial analysis of customers rather than simply 
a check of whether their payments were current. A new, more quantita­
tive evaluation of bank soundness, based on capital, asset quality, mana­
gement, equity and liquidity, was implemented. Finally, banks were obli­
ged to adopt the risk-based capital adequacy standards (as stated in the 
Basel Agreement) by the end of 1993 (subsequently extended to the end 
of 1994).
These important reforms were followed by several important new 
pieces of basic legislation covering banks, pension funds and insurance 
companies, all issued in February and March of 1992. Immediately before­
hand, a regulation establishing the operating rules for closed-end mutual 
funds was also handed down. The Banking Law is particularly important 
since it eliminates any legal distinction between private and State banks 
or between NBFIs and commercial banks. The former must now choose 
between operating as a security house or a bank. New, stiffer penalties 
for fraud are included in the law, along with a provision for the partial 
privatization of State banks.
3. Summary of Reforms
Before moving to a discussion of the effects of financial reform, we will 
now briefly summarize the discussion so far. The pre-reform system was 
dominated by State-owned banks whose credit decisions and interest rates 
were largely controlled by the BI, itself a major commercial lender. As a 
result credit decisions were based on administrative decisions at BI with 
preference being given to public enterprises, protected domestic firms and
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agriculture. Competition between State and private banks and between banks 
and other financial intermediaries was stymied by high entry barriers and 
the ceiling on credit expansion at all banks. Nonetheless, the open capital 
account put limits on Indonesia's ability to manipulate domestic interest 
rates by offering larger depositors and borrowers an off-shore option. The 
financing of fiscal deficits through foreign borrowing put a cap on expen­
ditures that helped contain inflation and domestic demand.
The pressures of adjusting to external shocks, chiefly the oil-price de­
clines of the 1980s, and concerns over the implications of pervasive controls 
of credit, led to the 1983 reforms which removed all credit controls and 
freed interest rates on all but directed credits. The latter were streamlined 
but continued to play an important role in the system until their reform 
in early 1990. The second stage of reforms, begun in 1988, tackled the high 
entry barriers to banking and attempted to foster competition between banks 
and other financial intermediaries. This was followed in 1991 by strengthen­
ing of prudential regulation, a process that had first begun with some re­
forms in 1989.
Despite this generally market-based reform, there are still some areas 
of finance where the market is not given full play. As mentioned above, 
the most important is the ruling requiring banks to lend 20 per cent of 
their portfolio to small customers. For foreign and joint-venture banks this 
rule has been replaced with a requirement that 50 per cent of all lending 
be to exporters. The reinstitution of quantitative limits on bank external 
borrowing in November 1991 also limits the openness of the capital account.
III. EFFECTS OF THE FINANCIAL REFORMS
Having presented the macroeconomic background and the nature of the
reform process, we now turn to an evaluation of its effect both on the
financial system and the real economy.
1. Effects on the Financial System
The McKinnon-Shaw framework highlights the importance of reform of the 
financial system in promoting financial savings and improving interme-
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diation. We now review how the financial system has reacted in three key 
areas: (a) financial deepening and interest rates (b) transforming the ma­
turity of savings to match tire needs of investment projects, and (c) the 
efficiency of intermediation.
a) Financial Deepening and Interest Rates
Following reform, the financial system has deepened and broadened. Re­
form led to a rapid expansion of financial assets within the economy after 
credit and interest rates ceilings were eliminated in 1983 (Table 2). Overall 
financial asset growth in real terms more than doubled (to 13.2 per cent) 
between 1982 and 1988 compared to its rate between 1978 and 1982. Private 
foreign-exchange bank growth was the strongest in banking, surpassed on­
ly by leasing, which had a much smaller asset base. Private banks were 
particularly successful in attracting time deposits from private individuals 
and firms, despite a narrowing of their interest spread over State banks 
as the latter responded to their new freedom by boosting rates 6 to 8 per­
centage points (Table 4). This move narrowed the differential from 8.5 per­
centage points on 3-month time deposits in 1982 to 2.6 percentage points 
in 1983. The differential fell to less than 2 percentage points by 1985 and 
is currently closer to one percentage point. Initial gains in deposits at pri­
vate banks were also made despite restrictions on the number and location 
of private bank offices. Insurance companies, public enterprises and govern­
ment accounts all continued to be dominated by State banks, chiefly be­
cause of legal and regulatory restrictions. The freedom to set interest rates 
did allow State commercial banks to boost real growth to almost 12 per 
cent, after a real growth of less than 2 per cent earlier on. Interestingly, 
despite the initial attempts to curtail directed credits, BI's assets expanded 
at close to 11.8 per cent real per annum between 1982 and 1988, compared 
to only 1.4 per cent between 1978 and 1982. This growth did not slow 
down until 1988-1991.
After the lowering of entry barriers in 1988, growth expanded further, 
helped by a sharp increase in the number of firms. Assets at deposit mo­
ney banks grew by nearly 20 per cent in real terms between 1988 and 
1991, pushed by private foreign-exchange and non-foreign-exchange banks, 
whose asset growth was 41 per cent and 35 per cent, respectively. On
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the deposit side of the balance sheet, private banks in only two years have 
increased their share of deposits to over 40 per cent, while that of State 
banks has fallen to below 50 per cent. Part of this increase is due to the 
success of private banks in attracting savings accounts. Nominal growth 
of savings accounts has exceeded 40 per cent since 1988.
Overall financial savings increased dramatically as a result of the 1983 
and 1988 reform measures. M2 to GDP ratios increased sharply between 
1982 and 1991, after an increase in the previous nine years of only 4 per 
cent (Table 6). The bulk of this improvement came because of an expan­
sion of quasi-money -time and savings deposit- that went mostly to pri­
vate banks after the interest rate deregulation of 1983 (for time deposits) 
and 1988 (for savings deposits). The link between this dramatic jump in 
financial savings and domestic savings relative to national accounts is ex­
plored below. In the meantime, however, it is important to note that an 
important, though unknown, amount of the increase in M2 to GDP was 
due to the movement of deposits out of Singapore and other off-shore 
markets and into Indonesia.
An interesting impact of the reforms is evident in the figures on Ml 
to GDP, where Ml is composed of currency, C, and demand deposits, DD 
(Table 8). As Chant and Pangestu (1992) have pointed out, the 1983 re­
forms had little effect on the M l/G D P ratio, with the ratio actually falling 
in 1983 and 1984. This pattern is consistent with Ml being held chiefly 
for transactions and therefore only marginally affected by the higher ra­
tes available on quasi-money. The 1983 increase in interest rates did lower 
demand for Ml relative to income somewhat, as people turned to the more 
remunerative quasi-money. After the 1988 reforms, which allowed greater 
branching and improved service, including interest on demand deposits, 
there has been a discrete jump in the M l/G D P ratio. The effect of higher 
interest rates on demand deposits is also visible in the stagnant share of 
currency to GDP and the increase in DD/GDP.
Looking at the allocation of credit across institutions shows a diffe­
rent pattern from that noted earlier for deposits. State banks actually ex­
panded their share of total credits between 1982 and 1988 from 61.7 per 
cent to 65.1 per cent. The maintenance of State bank dominance in credit 
provision was due in large part to the continued importance of liquidity 
credits funneled principally through State banks (Table 3) and to the decli-
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ne in direct lending by BI, whose share fell from 26 per cent in 1982 to 
only 4 per cent in 1988. Because of the withdrawal of BI from direct credit 
creation, private banks also expanded their share of credit, which surged 
from 9 per cent to 23 per cent.
Lower entry barriers created a stampede of new firms into financial 
services. In banking, more than 75 new banks were opened between 1988 
and 1991 (Table 2). Not only new banks, but the number of branches sur­
ged as well, an increase of more than 1100 to 3700 between 1988 and 1991. 
The PAKDES reforms initially sparked the equity market, leading to the 
licensing of over 200 stock-brokerage firms. The market itself finally be­
gan providing equity finance to complement greater amounts of debt fi­
nance, though this slowed down in 1990 with the rise in domestic interest 
rates and institutional growing pains (see discussion below).
Tableó







1978 5.1 5.1 10.3 5.4 15.7
1982 4.7 6.7 11.4 6.3 17.7
1983 4.3 5.5 9.7 9.1 18.9
1984 4.1 5.4 9.5 10.4 20.0
1985 4.6 5.8 10.4 13.5 23.9
1986 5.2 6.2 11.4 15.6 26.9
1987 4.6 5.5 10.2 17.0 27.1
1988 4.4 5.7 10.1 19.4 29.6
1989 4.4 7.6 12.0 23.1 35.1
1990 4.6 7.5 12.1 30.9 43.0
1991 4.1 7.5 11.6 32.1 43.6
Source: Bank of Indonesia.
Not only has overall asset growth been strong, but the number of 
products available to savers and borrowers has multiplied and service im­
proved. Some of the fastest growth, for example, has occurred in leasing 
and other newer financial activities. In banking, the range of attractive sa­
vings current and time deposit accounts widened. Home mortgages and
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consumer finance are now available from a number of providers. Domes­
tic syndicated loans allow on-shore financing of large projects by smaller 
banks.
b) Maturity structure
Accompanying the rapid expansion of bank liabilities and assets was a 
lengthening of maturities (Table 7). On the liability side, this was because 
of a fall in the importance of demand as compared to time deposits. Time- 
deposit maturities shortened dramatically, but were still longer than those 
of demand deposits. For all banks, 24-month deposits shrank to only 10.5 
per cent in 1988, as compared to 45.7 per cent in 1982. The deregulation 
of savings deposits has led to a dramatic increase in their share of liabi­
lities that, combined with a shortening of the maturity structure of time 
deposits, has led to a shortening of the average deposit maturity in the 
last few years. Since 1983, credit maturities have slowly lengthened. This 
means that loan maturities are somewhat better matched to the profiles 
of investment projects. The lengthening of credit maturities has occurred 
only at private banks. State banks and development banks have shortened 
the maturity of their credits. The modest improvement in the maturity of 
credits has come at some cost to bank soundness. It implies that banks 
are more exposed to interest-rate risk due to a widening maturity mis­
match. Some of this risk is hedged by the use of variable rate loans.
Table 7
COMMERCIAL BANK M ATURITY STRUCTURE
(billions of rupiahs; end of period)
1983 1986 1988 1990 1991 Maturity Weights
months
Bank Credits
<  3 months 1,829 1,991 2,354 3,495 3,957 1.5
3-6 months 1,787 3,443 5,392 5,057 5,726 4.5
6 months-1 year 4,438 11,237 18,866 43,753 49,539 9.0
1-3 years 1,604 2,092 3,731 8,778 9,938 24.0
> 3 years 3,944 8,974 14,825 29,904 33,859 60.0
unclassified 105 56 105 191 218 1.5
Total 13,707 27,793 45,273 91,178 103,237
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Table 7  (Cont.)
1983 1986 1988 1990 1991 Maturity Weights 
months
Average Maturity
(mths) (a) 23.8 25.5 26.0 26.3 26.6
Bank Funds
Demand Deposits 6,031 8,157 10,350 19,254 22,013 1.0
Savings Deposits 584 1,387 2,174 9,662 10,595 1.0
Total Rupiah Time
Deposit 4,441 10,393 19,622 38,789 40,559
<  3 months 934 1,280 3,895 11,899 11,802 1.5
3-6 months 605 1,448 4,133 5,886 9,160 2.0
6 months-1 year 843 1,767 2,719 5,958 8358 9.0
1-3 years 1,948 5,898 8,350 13,910 9323 15.0
unclassified 111 132 525 1,136 1,716 1.5
Total All Deposits (b) 11,056 19,937 32,146 67,705 73,167
Average Maturity
(mths) (a) 5.8 8.6 7.8 7 3 5.1
(a) Calculated by weighting the share of each maturity in total credit (deposits) by the assumed matu­
rity weight (the last column of the table).
(b) This total does not include FX time deposits.
Source: Bank o f Indonesia and author's calculations.
c) Bank Cost Efficiency, Allocative Efficiency & Risk
Tobin (1984) divides banking efficiency into three categories. The most 
straightforward is cost efficiency: Do banks intermediate funds at the lowest 
possible cost for a given level of risk? This entails looking at overhead 
costs and, more generally, at the spread between borrowing and lending. 
The second measure of efficiency, allocative efficiency, tries to incorporate 
whether borrowers receive credit at a price commensurate with their risk. 
Alternatively, it can be thought of as how successful the financial system 
is in equalizing the marginal return on investment across the economy. 
The measure of efficiency disregards the cost and risk of credit to focus 
on liquidity. Since banks will necessarily have some maturity mismatch on 
their balance sheet, prudent management requires keeping enough liqui­
dity on hand to meet unexpected demands for cash. This last item can 
be seen as a way of verifying that cost efficiency has not been achieved
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through increasing risk. In general one could extend the analysis to other 
sorts of risks (foreign-exchange, interest-rate, etc.). We will now examine 
these different measures of efficiency.
i. Cost Efficiency
Indonesian banks have become more cost efficient since 1983. Non-interest 
operating expenses (NIOE), chiefly wages, rents and office supplies, have 
fallen sharply as a share of average total assets (Table S f. For all banks 
in 1982 NIOE chewed up 4.26 per cent of average assets while accounting 
for an exorbitant 7.11 per cent in non-foreign exchange banks. Interestingly, 
State banks showed lower overhead costs than private banks, implying that, 
though overstaffed, State bank wage levels were quite low. By 1988 NIOE 
figures had fallen to 3.23 per cent overall, a decline of 24 per cent, with 
private banks successfully bringing their overheads in line with those of 
State banks. As the 1988 reforms took hold, NIOE initially fell further as 
competitive pressures began to build. By 1990, however, the costs of a ra­
pidly expanding branch network and higher wage rates for skilled staff 
pushed up NIOE at all but the foreign banks6. With the slowdown in this 
network expansion, banks, faced with lower asset growth and higher loan 
losses (see below), have responded by once again reducing overhead, most 
noticeably at State banks.
ii. Bank Margins and Profitability and Efficiency
A key to sparking domestic financial intermediation is to lower the spread 
between borrowing and lending rates. For banks to be more efficient, 
though, the lowered spread should not be offset by higher risk, a point 
to which we return in the next section. There are two means of measuring 
spread (Chant and Pangestu 1992). The first is to look at spreads on an 
ex ante basis, that is, the difference between posted deposit and lending
5 The figures in Table 8 are based on unaudited balance-sheet and income statements collected 
by the Bank of Indonesia.
6 Note that foreign banks were still subject to limits on branches and had traditionally had 
higher wage bills because of more extensive use of expatriate staff.
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rates. This spread includes banks expectations as to future losses, expecta­
tions that can go very wrong. Alternatively one can judge spreads ex post 
by looking at the actual results from a bank's financial statements. Howe­
ver, one should cautiously interpret the results in this case as well, since 
losses embedded in the portfolio may not yet be fully realized.
Table 8
COST EFFICIENCY FOR BANKS
(% of average total assets)
1982 1988 1989 1990 1991
Non-Interest Operating Expense 
State Banks 4.14 3.33 3.58 3.87 1.84
Private FX Banks 6.89 3.63 3.35 3.59 3.44
Private Non-FX Banks 7.11 3.68 2.87 3.87 3.57
Foreign Banks 4.01 3.76 4.18 3.97 2.63
All Banks 4.26 3.33 3.10 3.82 2.50
Source: Bank o f Indonesia and author's estimates.
As we have seen, the attractiveness of depositing in the domestic mar­
ket improved with the increase in real interest rates (Table 4). Improved 
cost efficiency and lower reserve requirements (after 1988) should have al­
so narrowed the spread. Table 9 provides information on ex post spreads 
derived from the unaudited balance sheet and income statements of Indo­
nesian banks as supplied to BI. The presentation follows the OECD for­
mat first used for developing countries by Hanson and Rocha (1982). It 
begins with interest income and expense, the difference being the net inte­
rest margin. Adding income and expenses from fee-based business, includ­
ing foreign exchange, and subtracting non-interest operating expenses gives 
the net operating margin. Inclusion of extraordinary income and expenses, 
which include provision expenses, gives the pre-tax return on assets. The 
return on equity shown in the table is net of tax.
Both interest income and interest expenses as a share of average assets 
increased after the 1983 reforms. This is not surprising since both measu­
res reflect interest rates (the difference being that the figures in Table 9 
use assets, rather than loans as their base). As would be expected, State 
banks show the sharpest rise in interest income, from 1.4 per cent in 1982 
to 9.6 per cent in 1988. This sharp rise reflects not only freedom to deter-
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Table 9
BANK COSTS AND MARGINS
(% of average total assets)
1982 1988 1989 1990 1991
Interest Income
State Banks 1.42 9.57 10.48 11.25 13.57
Private FX Banks 1.59 15.82 14.32 16.48 20.59
Private Non-FX Banks 0.91 16.92 14.81 19.56 25.13
Foreign Banks 4.45 11.71 12.05 12.52 12.99
All Banks 1.60 11.17 11.60 13.18 16.03
Interest Expense
State Banks 4.12 7.40 7.77 8.08 11.43
Private FX Banks 7.95 11.90 10.81 12.49 16.14
Private Non-FX Banks 9.74 12.64 11.49 15.03 20.09
Foreign Banks 9.15 7.57 7.97 6.95 7.83
All Banks 4.82 8.25 8.83 9.29 12.60
Net Operating Margin
State Banks 2.55 2.45 2.63 2.84 1.31
Private FX Banks 4.00 2.89 2.37 2.26 2.24
Private Non-FX Banks 3.67 1.78 1.37 1.93 1.87
Foreign Banks 4.51 3.70 3.64 3.98 4.53
All Banks 2.99 2.64 2.57 2.91 1.98
Pre-Tax Return on Assets
State Banks 2.40 1.40 1.55 1.78 0.31
Private FX Banks 3.60 1.93 1.68 1.39 1.24
Private Non-FX Banks 3.08 1.29 0.78 0.97 0.91
Foreign Banks 4.32 1.78 2.80 3.02 3.39
All Banks 2.81 1.68 1.67 1.99 0.97
Return on Equity
State Banks 67.31 44.54 47.34 65.59 16.16
Private FX Banks 32.89 29.65 18.43 15.07 12.63
Private Non-FX Banks 18.34 15.51 7.02 5.97 5.37
Foreign Banks 119.90 48.77 18.59 17.33 25.26
All Banks 45.97 29.93 24.82 28.21 16.65
Source: Bank of Indonesia and author's calculations.
mine loan rates, but also the elimination of credit ceilings which allowed 
State and other banks to move more assets into loans. State bank inte­
rest expense, however, does not increase nearly as much as interest inco­
me -only 3.3 percentage points, as compared to 8.2 percentage points. This
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increase is smaller than that of private foreign exchange banks which were 
the State banks' closest rivals. The lower increase may be due to the con­
tinued presence of public-enterprise deposits in State banks, as well as the 
continued access of State banks to refinancing from BI. Another part of 
the difference is explained by the implicit government guarantee that State 
banks enjoy.
Lower interest costs at State banks did not translate into lower interest 
margins at these banks because of low loan income, which between 1982 
and 1988 reflected the continued importance of liquidity credits (Table 3). 
The 1983 reforms did, however, lead to sharply higher interest margins 
at all banks, going from 2 per cent to 4 per cent by 1988, somewhat exceed­
ing the 3.5 per cent interest margins earned by US banks in 19887. Such 
margins were negative at all banks in 1982, while the figure for private 
non-foreign exchange was -8.8 per cent! This is only an accounting ploy, 
however, since gross operating margins were all quite high in 1982, made 
possible because income was being recorded from fees, rather than from 
interest. It is a mystery as to why, without restrictions on interest rates, 
private and foreign banks would resort to this subterfuge.
Reductions in NIOE between 1982 and 1988 allowed net operating 
margins to fall less than gross margins for all types of banks. The opening 
of new private banks pushed down margins at these banks, especially in 
1991 when they approached international levels. State bank net operating 
margins were steady, however, until 1991 when, in the wake of reductions 
in refinancing and the loss of public-enterprise deposits, interest expenses 
grew 2.5 percentage points. All domestic bank returns on assets also declined 
between 1988 and 1991, chiefly as a result of higher provision expenses. 
This was particularly true for state banks where the combination of higher 
interest and provision expenses reduced profits to only 0.1 per cent of assets. 
Meanwhile, foreign banks, helped by low deposit costs and high income 
from foreign exchange trading, have been able to hold pre-tax profits at 
levels two to three times those of domestic banks.
Overall, the examination of ex post margins shows a banking sys­
tem that has significantly reduced its spread as measured by net operat-
7 See Duca and McLaughlin (1990) for the US figures.
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ing margin, chiefly through a reduction in fees and overhead that has out­
stripped increases in the interest margin. Pre-tax returns on assets are 
approaching levels seen in recent years in the US.
Hi. Credit Allocation and Risk
One of the central aims of financial deregulation was to improve the allo­
cative efficiency of the banking system by eliminating ceilings on credit 
and interest rates while limiting directed credits. These moves were designed 
to allow resources to be directed to high-return sectors of the economy, 
at prices that reflected the risk inherent in those sectors. As we have seen, 
the reforms were associated with lower costs of intermediation and greater 
credit flows. But was the credit better allocated? To assess the effects of 
the reforms in this area we look first at the sectoral allocation of credit, 
and then at the results of a firm level study, following this with an analysis 
of changes in the riskiness of bank lending.
The overall allocation of credit was not greatly affected by the 1983 
reforms (Table 5), though the pattern has roughly followed changes in GDP. 
In part this may have been due to the continued importance of liquidity 
credits within overall credit until very recently. Trade continued to receive 
about 30 per cent of all credit between 1982 and 1988. Manufacturing's 
share of credit rose to almost one-third at the expense of lending to mining. 
These changes mirrored movements in value added over the period, with 
the manufacturing share in GDP increasing and the mining share falling.
Since 1988 credit growth has accelerated most rapidly in services and 
"other" two areas that have not seen a corresponding increase in value 
added. This is due to expanding home mortgages, car loans and other consu­
mer finance. Part of the increase in 1990 was in response to the govern­
ment decree mandating that 20 per cent of a bank's portfolio be lent to 
small borrowers. Most consumer loans satisfy the government's criteria. Cri­
tics have charged that this consumer and property-development lending 
has spurred conspicuous consumption and unhealthy increases in land pri­
ces. Experiences in other countries would support the view that lending 
to consumers and for commercial real estate is riskier than lending to other 
sectors. Indeed, the 1990/91 tight money policy, instituted in part to slow 
overall credit growth, took the steam out of the property market and led
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to difficulties for some banks, including the bankruptcy of a newly-formed 
bank with large real-estate loans, Bank Summa.
The bankruptcy and subsequent liquidation of Bank Summa, the tenth- 
largest private bank with over US$1 billion in assets, demonstrates the pro­
blem not only of concentrating lending on real estate, but also of lending 
to related parties. A major portion of Bank Summa's loans were made to 
affiliated companies. The poor performance of these companies further 
weakened the bank. Indonesia, with all its major private banks controlled 
by conglomerates, is particularly exposed to tie  risks of related lending. 
For this reason adherence to prudential standards requiring that no more 
than 30 per cent of equity be lent to any one group is critical if financial 
soundness is to be achieved. The Bank Summa case does present a useful 
precedent in that the owners agreed to cover all losses due to lending 
to related companies, over and above the equity they held in the bank. 
The case also points out the need for further improvements in Indonesia's 
procedures for dealing with problem banks. Shortcomings in laws and 
regulations regarding bank liquidation have complicated the process of set­
tling accounts.
iv. Loan Pricing and Default Risk
Looking at the sectoral allocation of credit gives only a partial picture of 
the allocative effects of banking reform. Increased lending to sectors that 
have low returns, as measured by high loan default rates, is not an efficient 
allocation of credit. Efficient allocation thus requires that banks be allowed 
to price their loans appropriately. However, until 1990, because of the 
predominance of liquidity credits with fixed interest rates and targeted markets, 
there was little need for adequate loan pricing nor little leeway to do so. 
Credit risks could be passed off to government insurance companies at 
subsidized premiums, further lessening the incentive for banks to adequate­
ly assess and price such loans. This was particularly true of State banks 
owing to the importance of liquidity credits in their portfolios. The scaling 
back of liquidity credits, coupled with the strong growth in non-liquidity- 
credit loans, however, has allowed banks greater freedom in pricing their 
loans and in choosing sectors and borrowers to lend to. One of the first 
reforms undertaken in 1983 eliminated restrictions on deposit interest rates.
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Altering bank cost of funds and thereby bank profitability has had pro­
found effects on banks loan pricing, as can be seen in Table 9. Both these 
changes should lead, a priori, to an improvement in banks' management 
of default risk. Offsetting this, though, is the pressure on banks to build 
market share by aggressively expanding their lending portfolios at the cost 
of underpricing loans. While this has happened at some banks, margins 
in general do not seem to support this conclusion. However the sheer speed 
of the growth in credit of some 50 per cent per annum between 1988 and 
1991 must have led to a weakening of credit quality8.
Determining which effect has predominated as regards pricing and 
allocative efficiency is highly speculative. An answer requires a judgement 
about changes in the level of risk in bank portfolios and the adequacy 
of measures to cover that risk. One approach to this question is to look 
at how loan-loss reserves and provision expenses have behaved over recent 
years (Table 10). This approach, however, requires caution for several rea­
sons. First, BI portfolio examinations have traditionally focused only on 
the status of interest payments and collateral in classifying loans and deter­
mining reserve adequacy. Hence, the level of reserves needs not reflect the 
underlying financial strength of borrowers. Commercial-bank criteria have 
generally been stricter in classifying their portfolios. However, accounting 
standards as to when to declare a loan non-performing and how much 
to provision were not tightened until 1991 with a two-year phase-in. The 
standard for the treatment of accrued income when a loan becomes non­
performing was not implemented until early 1991. Prior to that, interest 
payments, for example, could be capitalized so that a loan would appear 
current although a borrower had made no payments and could conceiva­
bly be bankrupt9. Analysis is further complicated by the nature of a great 
part of bank lending. Firms generally receive lines of credit that are rolled 
over, the so-called "evergreen" loans. If the line is large enough, a company 
can easily keep current by simply drawing down the line to meet debt 
service. In a period like 1988-90, when aggregate credit growth exceeded 
the interest rate for the system on the whole, no one paid off any debt
8 See CSIS, (1990).
9 Of course, banks, wishing to prop up their balance sheet can still capitalize interest illegally.
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but instead simply borrowed more. Furthermore, the fastest rise in credit 
came in 1989 and 1990 as the overall economy grew at over 7 per cent. 
Such strong growth can reduce company loan defaults until economic 
growth slows, making it appear that current levels of reserves are adequate, 
based on recent experience, but potentially inadequate in the future. Indeed, 
as growth slowed in 1991 and 1992 problem loans increased as a share 
of bank portfolios. Finally, tax laws limit loan-loss reserve deductibility to 
3 per cent of loans for private banks and 6 per cent for State banks, limit­
ing banks' interest in exceeding these levels. All of these factors combine 
to make drawing conclusions about default risk from loan-loss reserves 
tentative.
Table 10
LOAN LO SS RESERVES AND PROVISIONS (%)
1982 1988 1989 1990 1991
Loan Loss Reserve/ 
Total Loans
State Banks 3.2 4.2 2.3 4.4 4.5
Private FX Banks 1.7 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.1
Private Non-FX Banks 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.9
Foreign Banks 0.6 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.9
All Banks 2.7 3.3 3.3 2.7 2.8
Provision Expense/ 
Total Loans
State Banks N.A. 1.2 0.6 1.3 0.9
Private FX Banks N.A. 1.0 0.7 0.8 0.7
Private Non-FX Banks N.A. 0.9 0.7 0.6 1.2
Foreign Banks N.A. 1.1 0.7 0.6 0.8
All Banks N.A. 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8
Provision Expense/ 
Interest Margin (a)
State Banks N.A. 44.9 36.0 35.5 47.3
Private FX Banks N.A. 20.7 16.3 18.1 14.9
Private Non-FX Banks N.A. 17.1 16.7 13.4 27.2
Foreign Banks N.A. 17.2 12.8 8.7 14.6
All Banks N.A. 29.2 28.2 22.3 23.4
(a) The interest margin is defined as the difference between interest loans and 
interest expense on deposits.
Source: Bank of Indonesia and author's calculations.
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With these caveats in mind, the figures in Table 10 show that loan- 
loss reserves at all banks rose as a share of loans between 1982 and 1988, 
fell in 1989, and since then have increased to levels higher than in 1982. 
Provision expenses at state banks measured as a share of the interest mar­
gin show a similar pattern since 1988. This fall and subsequent rise in 
loan loss reserves is just the opposite of the pattern of credit growth shown 
in Table 2. Taken at face value it implies that banks, particularly State 
banks, have experienced a deterioration in credit quality during the last 
two years. So long as external factors have not dramatically affected the 
conditions of borrowers between 1982 and now, this would imply that allo­
cative efficiency has worsened, at least since 1990.
One striking feature of the figures on loan-loss reserves and provision 
expenses is the sharp difference between the levels at State and private 
banks. In 1991, State banks recorded almost four times the loan-loss reser­
ves of private banks, and were placing almost half their (smaller) interest 
margin into those reserves. Part of this discrepancy reflects sounder port­
folios at private banks whose portfolio decisions were more often guided 
by profitability. However, the level of reserves at private banks is barely 
over the minimum of 1 per cent set by the Bank of Indonesia. For this 
low level to be prudent, almost the entire private bank loan portfolio would 
need to be sound! The low level of reserves, then, must also reflect attempts 
by private banks to bolster profits by foregoing needed provision expenses. 
Unfortunately the data do not allow us to compare the size of these unco­
vered losses today versus the pre-reform period. One can simply note that 
reserves are marginally higher today than in 1982, when the economy was 
slowing down sharply, so that the problem may have diminished since 
1982.
i;. Efficiency and Return on Investment at Firms
Harris, et al. (1992) tackle the question of allocative efficiency from a diffe­
rent angle, focusing on whether the financial reforms led to a equalization 
of the marginal efficiency of investment across different firms. This mea­
sure of efficiency has shortcomings since it is an equilibrium concept, while 
changes in returns in different sectors due to changing technology, prices, 
etc. could alter returns unexpectedly. Using plant level data from a sample
The Indonesian experience with financial-sector reform 183
of about 200 manufacturing firms they find that there was a more efficient 
allocation of credit between 1984 and 1988; small and large firms, which 
show the highest increases in the productivity of capital and a convergen­
ce to the absolute levels of medium-sized firms, increased their access to 
credit in the wake of the reforms. Unfortunately, the analysis by Harris, 
et al. does not include post-1988 data. Since this is the period when banks 
showed increasing loan-loss reserves, it will be important to engage in fur­
ther analysis before forming a definitive opinion on the implications of 
the financial reform for allocative efficiency.
vi. Risks from New Operations
Besides managing credit or default risk, the opening up of other areas of 
financial intermediation to banks has added to the risks they face. Severe 
exchange-trading losses by at least one Indonesian bank and commercial 
real-estate losses at another demonstrate that opening up new areas to bank 
operations can lead to inexperienced staff exposing the bank to excessive 
risks. Coping with the risks and opportunities of the new environmentis 
a major challenge for banks as well as for regulators10.
vii. Liquidity Risk
A more traditional component of risk to banks is the risk of becoming 
temporarily illiquid. Illiquid banks jeopardize the role of the banking sys­
tem in providing the means of payment for transactions in the economy 
and the gains of a smoothly functioning payments mechanism. To lessen 
this risk, a key element of the reforms has been aimed at strengthening 
the interbank money market to provide individual banks with liquidity to 
meet temporary shortfalls. Much progress has been made with the average 
weekly volume of lending increasing eight-fold since 1986. Maturities have 
lengthened to as long as one month, though the bulk of lending is still 
overnight. Despite the deepening liquidity, though, rates in the interbank
10 See section C for a fuller discussion of the need for improved risk management and 
supervision.
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market remain volatile. With the tightening of monetary policy in mid- 
1990, rates have ranged between 7 per cent and 60 per cent p. a., as major 
suppliers of funds -the five State banks- have coped with the reduction 
in liquidity credits and public-enterprise deposits.
The reduction of required reserve requirements to 2 per cent from 
15 per cent in October 1988 had important implications for the liquidity 
policies of commercial banks. At 2 per cent of deposits, required reserves 
were in some cases lower than prudential liquidity management would 
warrant. For this reason banks overall have held "excess'1 reserves since 
1988, with the bulk of the excess accounted for by State banks. Despite 
the tight money policy implemented in May 1990 (see discussion in section 
C), banks have still maintained excess reserves, though a smaller percentage 
of current liabilities. The tighter monetary policy, however, has led some 
banks to access BI’s discount windows to maintain needed liquidity when 
funds have become scarce in the interbank market.
Bank loan-to-deposit ratios also remained very high. Their level re­
mained almost unchanged from 1982 to 1990 for most groups of banks. 
Such high levels make it difficult for banks to adjust to temporary illi­
quidity, in part because loans are not as marketable as other assets. Levels 
are particularly high for the state commercial banks, complicating risk 
management. For this reason BI in March 1991 explicitly incorporated li­
quidity as an element of its quantitative evaluation of soundness, prompt­
ing banks to improve their liquidity position.
Another way of looking at financial-system risks is to judge the mar­
ket's view of subsequent reforms in the Indonesian financial system in terms 
of the spread between US dollar deposit interest rates held on-shore and 
those held off-shore. Since both assets are denominated in the same curren­
cy, any difference in the rates would reflect transactions costs and, more 
importantly, the market's perception of the riskiness of the Indonesian fin­
ancial system11. This measure goes beyond simply judging allocation effi­
ciency from looking at credit risk. It encompasses other risks such as inte­
11 One might argue that foreign-exchange deposits are not sufficiently large in a domestic 
financial system for their price to be a good reflection of their true value. In Indonesia these 
deposits have made up 10-20 per cent of time deposits and 5-10 per cent of demand depo­
sits since 1982.
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rest-rate risk, maturity and liquidity risk, as well as the risk of managing 
new operations12. Figures for 1982-1988 (Table 4) show that the first stage 
of reforms lowered the spread, though the negative number in 1985 pro­
bably reflects transaction costs and a relatively thin market. The spread 
widened in 1986-1988 as the economy went through macroeconomic ad­
justment. In the aftermath of the 1988 reforms, however, the spread again 
fell. This decline was accompanied by large increases in capital inflow, 
chiefly external borrowing. Nonetheless from 1989 on, the figures show a 
steady rise in the difference between on-shore and off-shore dollar depo­
sits. Thus, the market believes that risks have increased since 1989.
viii. Summary of Banking Efficiency and Risk
Summing up the evidence on efficiency and risk, the 1983 reforms have 
certainly lowered intermediation margins and fostered credit expansion, 
much of it going to profitable firms, including small firms that were pre­
viously rationed. Increased lending to consumers, higher provisioning and 
higher market perception of financial risk, however, point to a growing 
risk in the financial system since 1988 as both the number of banks and 
credit growth have surged.
G edit allocation is closely related to the quality and quantity of infor­
mation available in the market and the options available to bankers should 
a borrower default. Weak accounting standards and a scarcity of practicing 
public accountants, lack of registration of collateral and strict banking se­
crecy laws all limit the quantity and quality of information available. Ina­
dequate bankruptcy laws limit the ability of banks to act against delinquent 
debtors. Although steps have been taken to shore up these weaknesses, 
their existence makes it easier to understand why financial reforms would 
be less effective in improving the efficiency of credit allocation than in 
increasing the quantity.
A strong supervisory agency can help to ensure a sounder allocation 
of credit by limiting the actions of banks that engage in risky activities, 
knowingly or not. As we have noted, Indonesia moved to improve pru-
12 The latter two issues are taken up below.
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dential supervision as early as 1989. The most through-going reforms, ho­
wever, were not announced until March 1991. Furthermore, improvements 
in personnel as well as the regulatory framework are critical for effective 
supervision. The knowledge needed by a bank examiner to effectively do 
the job is only acquired over the course of five to ten years. It therefore 
should not be surprising that in a era of rapid asset growth, with a great 
inflex of new bankers, some poor credit decisions were made, thus increas­
ing risk in the financial system.
2. Real Effects of Financial Reform
a) Savings
Sparking savings, particularly by the private sector, was one of the avo­
wed goals of financial reform in Indonesia. In judging whether this goal 
was achieved we first look at data from the Indonesian flow of funds and 
then estimate a private consumption function for Indonesia, focusing on 
the effects of financial savings on domestic savings.
The Indonesian flow of funds, available from 1984-89, provides infor­
mation on savings and investment from various sectors of the economy, 
including firms, households and the government (Table 11). The figures 
on domestic savings rates show an 8.5 per cent increase, from 26.4 per 
cent to 34.9 per cent of GDP, between 1984 and 198913. This is casual evi­
dence of a positive correlation between savings and financial reform. Closer 
examination of the figures shows that 7.7 per cent of the increase comes 
from private firms which doubled their savings rates. None of the other 
sectors show rates of increase anywhere near that size. Private firm savings, 
however, include the residual left from adjusting the other sectors savings 
rates to the aggregate level taken from the standard national accounts. This 
number is probably overestimated for three reasons: first, because the size 
of the change is not reflected in other sectors, particularly households; se­
13 The figures on savings and investment used in this section rely on official estimates. Other 
estimates, prepared by the World Bank, show a similar pattern of savings and investment 
but at much lower shares in GDP (see Table 1 for the World Bank estimates).
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cond, because the aggregate rate of investment, 37 per cent, is one of the 
highest in the world; and, third, because inventories make up nearly 10 
per cent of the aggregate investment number.
Even if the aggregate domestic savings figures are correct, they only 
show a coincidence between financial reforms and increases in savings. To 
get a better understanding, we estimated a private consumption function 
that controls for other effects. Private consumption was chosen rather than 
private savings to reduce the impact of measurement errors on the esti­
mation, while taking advantage of the accounting identity that links pri­
vate disposable income, consumption and savings. Private, rather than gross 
domestic savings, was estimated because of the independence of public sa­
vings and financial reform14.
Table 11
STRUCTURE OF SECTORAL GROSS SAVING, 1984-1989
(% of GDP)
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Non-Finandal 25.38 25.44 23.65 26.81 30.33 33.18
Government 5.84 5.64 5.38 4.30 4.55 6.20
Firms 9.87 9.98 8.23 11.85 14.61 16.14
Public 2.18 1.96 1.49 2.07 1.41 0.71
Private 7.69 8.02 6.74 9.78 13.2 15.43
Households 9.67 9.82 10.04 10.66 11.17 10.84
Financial 1.06 1.49 0.85 3.03 0.58 1.68
Banks (a) 0.89 0.95 0.53 2.30 0.20 1.24
Non-banks 0.17 0.54 0.32 0.73 0.38 0.44
Foreign 1.04 2.31 4.96 3.10 2.22 2.13
Total 27.48 29.24 29.46 32.94 33.13 3.99
Memo Item:
GDP (billions of Rp.) 85,702 93,056 98,490 118,795 135,099 159,336
(a) Including the Central Bank.
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, R ow  of Funds 1984-1989, p. 39.
14 One could argue that a substantial reform which increased demand for M l would increase 
government seignorage and, ceteris paribus, increase public savings. As we have seen above, 
M l/G D P  did increase after 1988. Nonetheless, treating expenditures or tax revenues as 
given is not realistic since they are both instruments of fiscal policy and therefore their 
movements will reflect both policy changes and exogenous factors.
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Before presenting the results we will briefly highlight the choice of 
variables used in estimating private consumption by drawing on issues dis­
cussed in the literature15. All work on consumption focuses on some measu­
re of income as the chief determinant. Early empirical studies used current 
income, later replaced by permanent income or wealth as theory began 
to look at consumption in an intertemporal setting. Under the life-cycle 
or permanent income approach, consumption was only increased in response 
to permanent changes in income, while transitory increases were saved. 
Current income continued to play a role, however, if liquidity constraints 
inhibited consumers from maintaining consumption levels consistent with 
their permanent income.
The role of real interest rates in private consumption is another conten­
tious issue. In theory the sign of the impact is indeterminate a priori since 
it depends on which predominates: the substitution effect (consume less 
today to have more tomorrow when higher interest has increased your 
wealth), or the income effect (increase consumption today and tomorrow 
because the higher interest rate has increased your wealth). Schmidt-Hebbel 
and Webb (1992) note that changes in real interest rates can cause shifts 
between various assets -out of physical assets and into financial assets- which 
could affect measurement of private savings, because of difficulties in treat­
ing the purchase of consumer durables, for example, but without affect­
ing the overall level of private savings (see discussion below). Empirical 
results differ as to the sign of the real interest rate, but the effect is usually 
quite small (Fry, 1988).
Ricardians include public savings as a determinant of private consump­
tion, arguing that expectations of future taxes lead consumers to reduce 
spending one-for-one with public dissaving (Barro, 1974). Some studies have 
included inflation as an explanatory variable though its sign is indetermi­
nate a priori. Inflation increases uncertainty about the value of future earn­
ings and could potentially reduce savings because of the lower return, or 
increase them for precautionary motives. Foreign savings are also assumed 
to affect private savings, usually with the argument that access to foreign
15 For reviews of savings in developing countries see Schmidt-Hebbel and Webb (1992), Deaton 
(1989) and Fry (1988).
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savings reduces domestic savings since the former do not solely finance 
additional investment.
Finally and most importantly for this paper, the amount of financial 
wealth has been posited as a determinant of private savings. The argument 
is that greater levels of financial wealth imply fewer liquidity constraints 
on borrowers and therefore higher consumption levels. Note that this pre­
mise runs opposite to the usual argument that financial reform, by increas­
ing interest rates, will increase savings.
Using the independent variables just discussed -permanent income, 
liquidity, foreign and public savings, the real interest rate and inflation- 
we estimated a private consumption function using annual data from 1970 
through 1991. The data were taken from a database maintained by BI. All 
variables were logs of current values, except for the real interest rate and 
foreign savings, the latter appearing as a share of private disposable in­
come. Permanent income was calculated as a three-year moving average 
of private disposable income (Schmidt-Hebbel and Webb, 1992). Public sa­
vings were taken from national accounts and exclude public enterprises. 
The real interest rate was calculated using the three-month average time 
deposit rate and actual consumer price inflation for the year in question.
The results of the least squares regression of private consumption on 
the five variables and a constant shown in Table 12 show an excellent 
fit and no sign of first-order autocorrelation. Since several variables were 
not stationary, an Engle-Granger test for unit roots in the estimated equa­
tion was done using the first difference of private consumption. As expected, 
the sign of logged private consumption was negative. However, due to 
a fairly small sample size the non-stationary hypothesis cannot be rejec­
ted. There is a large and significant correlation between private consumption 
and permanent income, with an elasticity of .93, very dose to the theoretical 
life-cyde value of one. Government savings come in with a unexpectedly 
positive and significant sign. This could be the result of the high correlation 
between oil prices and government savings, meaning that higher savings 
did not result from increased taxes with their contractionary effect on pri­
vate consumption, but rather from additional income from abroad. This 
conjecture is consistent with the negative, though insignificant, coeffident 
on the foreign saving rate. The real interest rate and inflation have negative 
and insignificant coeffidents.
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Table 12
DETERMINANTS OF PRIVATE CONSUMPTION, 1970-1991
Variable Coefficient STD. Error T-Stat. 2-Tail Sign.
Constant 0.403 0.127 3.181 0.006
Permanent Income 0.935 0.026 36.641 0.000
Real Interest Rate -0.001 0.002 -0.455 0.656
Inflation -0.001 0.002 -0.840 0.414
Liquidity -0.026 0.012 -2.103 0.053
Foreign Saving -0.254 0.143 -1.782 0.095
Government Saving 0.031 0.015 2.137 0.049
R-squared 0.9998 Mean of dependent var 10.028
Adjusted R-squared 0.9998 S.D. of dependent var 1.243
S.E. of regression 0.017 Sum of squared resid 0.005
Durbin-Watson stat 2.003 F-statistic 17,758.000
Log likelihood 62.066 ADF t statistic -3.830
Note: Coefficients estimated using OLS.
Source: Author's calculations with data from bi.
Rerunning the equation without the inflation and interest-rate varia­
bles further confirmed the above results. The permanent income coefficient 
increased to .95. Public savings were still positively correlated with con­
sumption, though the significance level rose to 68 per cent and foreign 
savings remained negatively corrected with private consumption.
From the standpoint of financial reform, the most interesting finding 
is the negative effect of liquidity (M2) on private consumption, which im­
plies that increases in financial savings increase domestic savings. Since the 
permanent income coefficient is close to one, the two results indicate that 
liquidity constraints on private consumption were not a significant factor. 
The question remains as to why financial savings and domestic savings 
would be positively correlated when real interest rates are not statistically 
significant. A possible explanation is that increases in financial savings are 
associated with shifts in domestic savings away from hoarding goods. If 
this is associated with higher measured domestic savings, because of sta­
tistical problems in the treatment of durable goods, a positive correlation 
will result. Properly specified domestic savings and financial savings will 
therefore not be positively correlated. Still, even if this is the explanation, 
if greater financial intermediation allows more efficient, cheaper investment, 
there will still be benefits to higher financial savings.
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b) Investment
Increasing the quantity and efficiency of investment was a primary aim 
of the Indonesian reform efforts. As we have just seen, the reforms are 
correlated with higher domestic savings, which in turn boosts investment. 
Harris, et al. (1992) present evidence that the marginal efficiency of in­
vestment improved between 1984-1988, though, as noted earlier, the mea­
sure they use -equalization of rates of return across sectors- has flaws. They 
go on to estimate an investment equation as a function of sales, cash flow 
and leverage. Cash flow has been included to capture the effects of liqui­
dity constraints, while leverage has been included to test whether higher 
levels reduced credit access and depressed investment. Their results show 
a significant reduction in the importance of cash flow to small firms follow­
ing the 1983 deregulation and a reduction in overall market segmentation. 
The discussion in section IV A. of efficiency of credit allocation and hence 
investment, however, means that these improvements did not necessarily 
persist into the second stage of financial reform when entry barriers were 
lowered, though the effect on the quantity of investment has clearly per­
sisted.
Indonesian financial reform involved freeing interest rates and led, 
ex post, to high real rates. This could be construed as retarding investment. 
Such an argument would be dubious for two reasons. First, from a theore­
tical standpoint, firms base investment decisions on ex ante rates, not ex 
post ones. If expectations of inflation consistently outpaced actual inflation, 
ex post rates would overstate ex ante ones. There is evidence that this 
has been the case in Indonesia. Table 4 shows the spread between on­
shore dollar and on-shore rupiah deposit rates. The spread has consistently 
overstated the actual depreciation of the rupiah (with exception of the two 
maxi-devaluations). With fairly open goods markets linking domestic and 
international prices and an explicit exchange rate policy rule of maintain­
ing the real exchange rate (at least in the post-1986 period), this overesti­
mation on devaluation can be linked to an overestimation of internal infla­
tion. Second, from an empirical standpoint, the work of Harris, et al. (1992) 
shows that measured returns on capital in manufacturing far outstripped 
the 10-15 per cent ex post lending interest rates prevailing since financial 
reforms began. Given this fact, the increased access to credit that the fi-
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nanáal reforms stimulated were probably much more important in spark­
ing investment than the somewhat higher measured price. It should be 
recalled that prior to the 1983 reforms credit was rationed so that for many 
firms, the price was effectively infinite.
3. Macroeconomic Conditions and Financial Reform
Most prescriptions for financial reform call for stable macroeconomic con­
ditions on the eve of financial reform (e.g. Caprio and Atiyàs, 1992). Prefe­
rence is generally given to opening the financial system after the current 
account and before the capital account (Hanson, 1992), and the references 
dted therein). The Indonesian experience with finandal reform shows that 
within limits neither a stable economy nor a dosed capital account is ne­
cessary for successful finandal reform. As was discussed in section II, In­
donesia in 1983 was in the midst of a serious stabilization program to 
adjust to the effects of deteriorating external conditions. Inflation, though 
relatively low at just over 10 per cent, was accelerating. A yawning current 
account defidt of 7.4 per cent of GDP needed to be financed. The capital 
account had been open for over a decade, while a web of trade and invest­
ment regulations restricted the current account. Nonetheless, the freeing of 
interest rates and elimination of credit ceilings successfully boosted finan­
cial and domestic savings.
Rather than condudve external conditions, the Indonesia experience 
spotlights the need for macroeconomic management that recognizes and 
adjusts to the constraints imposed by the external environment and the 
government's own budget limitations. Adjustment to the external environ­
ment was the thrust of the 1982-83 stabilization program with its major 
devaluation and extensive fiscal adjustment. The fiscal balance moved from 
a deficit of 24 per cent of GDP in 1983 to a surplus of 1.4 per cent. Deva­
luation provided the real depreciation needed to reach external balance, 
while fiscal adjustment made the real depreciation stick. In these efforts, 
the open capital account and the government's commitment to avoid fi­
nancing the fiscal deficit from domestic sources played a critical role in 
conditioning the response of the economy. Commitment to the open capi­
tal account with a quasi-fixed exchange rate meant that attempts to soften 
the external blow by loose monetary policy would lead to capital outflows
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and a quick reversal of policy. Expansionary fiscal policies were limited 
by access to official external finance, itself difficult to attract without a cre­
dible adjustment program. As a result, in the presence of lower oil prices 
expansionary policies were severely restricted. By releasing interest rates 
in this environment, there was little risk of currency substitution. Weak 
domestic demand also meant that releasing credit ceilings was unlikely to 
lead to excessive increases in domestic credit.
The importance of macroeconomic management, the role of the capi­
tal account and the absence of domestic debt finance is further reinforced 
by Indonesia's experience with the second stage of its reforms in 1988. By 
that year Indonesia had already applied a second round of adjustments 
in view of the sharp decline of oil revenues in 1986. Trade and investment 
restrictions had been relaxed. The economy was poised for growth a much 
more propitious time for financial reform. Nonetheless, the 1988 reforms, 
though successful in spurring further improvements in cost efficiency, com­
petition and growth in the financial sector, also led to a growing problem 
of poor credits. This was the result of a combination of circunstances that 
macroeconomic policy failed to adjust to initially. Unlike in 1983, trade re­
forms opened the door to new profit opportunities within the Indonesian 
economy, spurring a rise in investment demand. Banks moved aggressively 
to finance these investment plans, spurred by competition from new en­
trants. Thus a private sector imbalance between savings and investment 
developed against which the prohibition against domestic deficit finance 
did not protect. This rise in demand was initially validated by the govern­
ment's attempts to lower interest rates through a combination of loose mo­
netary policy and tightening in late 1989 and early 1990. Only when the 
open capital account led to a US$1 billion loss in reserves in April 1990 
did the government move to tighten monetary policy. This immediately 
dealt with the interest-rate problem, by raising rates to levels consistent 
with international parity. The private-sector savings-investment gap, howe­
ver, was little affected by the adjustment in monetary policy. Only in 1991, 
when fiscal policy tightened, was internal balance restored. In the interim 
a significant amount of new credit had been extended by banks, credits 
that became more difficult to service in 1991 as interest rates remained 
high and activity slowed somewhat.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
This paper began by looking at the theoretical links between financial 
growth, savings and economic growth. Discussion focused on four impor­
tant aspects of the financial system and growth:
• the depth and breadth of financial savings;
• the ability of the financial system to alter maturities to suit the 
needs of investors;
• the efficiency of the financial system, both in terms of cost and 
in allocation of credit;
• the ability of the financial system to deal with informational asym­
metries and incentive problems.
To promote these aspects of the financial system prescriptions for fi­
nancial reform have frequently called for reform during periods of macro- 
economic stability and under the protection of a closed capital account. 
What do phased reforms in Indonesia -the removal of ceilings on interest 
rates and credit expansion, then the lowering of barriers to entry, M ow ed  
closely by a reduction of the direct role of the central bank in favour of 
a stronger supervisory presence- show about this set of prescriptions/effects?
The reforms have led to a large and sustained increase in financial 
depth and breadth in the economy, with the M2 to GDP ratio rising from 
18 per cent in 1982 to over 44 per cent in 1991. What is more, econometric 
work on private savings in Indonesia shows that this increase in financial 
savings has not hampered domestic saving independent of any effect from 
higher incomes, lower inflation or the real interest rate. The maturity of 
bank loans has also been extended over the period of the reforms, better 
meshing with the investment needs of the economy. Cost efficiency has 
improved with a reduction in overhead. Spreads between deposit and lend­
ing rates have come down at all banks and have moved closer to one 
another at different types of banks.
In the area of credit allocation and financial-system risk there is less 
certainty about the positive benefits of the reforms, particularly the lower­
ing of entry barriers in 1988. Evidence from manufacturing firms shows 
improved access to credit and a movement toward equalization of returns 
on investment across firms. Data on loan losses, the broader allocation of 
credit outside of manufacturing and an empirical estimate of tinandal-system
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risk all point to increasing risk since 1988. Given the difficulties in allo­
cating credit because of information and incentive problems, it is not 
surprising that efficiency gains are more elusive. These information and 
incentive problems highlight the need for improvements in the legal ac­
counting and prudential systems that support efficient financial systems.
Indonesia's reform efforts were generally successful despite several 
factors that differed from standard prescriptions. First, Indonesia's capital 
account was open at the time of reforms; second, reform began in a time 
of serious macroeconomic adjustment. Indonesia's experience highlights the 
need for macroeconomic management that recognizes the limitations im­
posed by the external budget constraint and that of the government rather 
than macroeconomic stability per se, and responds quickly to those cons­
traints. Indeed the open capital account aided macroeconomic management 
by providing quick feed-back when domestic policies moved out of line 
and limiting the inflationary consequences of excessive demand stimulus. 
The absence of domestic finance for fiscal deficits removed an important 
source of pressure on domestic financial markets. Quick response to exter­
nal imbalance, backed by strong fiscal adjustment, aided the successful re­
forms in 1983. Overly stimulatory monetary policy, and a private-sector 
savings-investment gap which was not sufficiently offset by fiscal policy, 
exacerbated the credit expansion of 1989-90. Furthermore, the slow respon­
se of fiscal policy put more of the burden of adjustment on monetary po­
licy, keeping interest rates high and thereby prolonging the problem of 
non-performing loans within the banking system. Adroit macroeconomic 
management can thus promote successful financial reform even in periods 
of macroeconomic adjustment with a economy open to speculative capital 
flows.
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LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES 
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO CHILE1
Andras W. U thofP
1 This paper is based on national case studies carried out under ECLAC/UNDP projects 
RLA/90/001 and RLA/192/003, "Finandal Policies for Development". These case studies 
have been published by ECLAC in separate edited volumes (Uthoff and Szalachman, 1991 
and 1993 (forthcoming), and Iglesias and Acuña, 1991).
2 The author wishes to thank Gunther Held for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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3 The views expressed in this study, which has been reproduced without formal editing by 
ECLAC, are those of its author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the organizations.
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INTRODUCTION
Pension systems in Latin American and Caribbean countries have been 
developed since early this century on the basis of compulsory contributions 
by workers. The systems have alternative built-in mechanisms to transform 
these contributions into savings for old-age security and other contingency 
income benefits. Thus the performance of the system can be evaluated in 
terms of the implicit returns estimated from relationships between future 
benefits and current contributions. Such evaluations show that the systems 
are not providing significant returns to contributors4.
In addition, the systems also face operational problems and most 
governments are seriously assessing and considering feasible reform alter­
natives. This is due to the unsustainability of their current financial and 
actuarial deficits, especially in light of their effect on public-sector account 
balances, and hence on macroeconomic policy management. This last issue 
is becoming increasingly important in evaluating pension-system reform in 
the region.
4 Uthoff and Szalachman 1991, Sistemas de Pensiones en America Latina. Diagnóstico y 
alternativas de reforma. Costa Rica, Ecuador, Uruguay, Venezuela. CEPAL, Proyecto Regio­
nal Políticas Financieras para el Desarrollo. Santiago de Chile. Uthoff and Szalachmann, 
1993, Sistemas de Pensiones en América Latina. Diagnóstico y alternativas de Reforma. 
Volumen 2. Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, México, Colombia. CEPAL, Proyecto Regional 
Políticas Financieras para el Desarrollo. Santiago de Chile. Iglesias and Acuña, 1991. Sistemas 
de Pensiones en América Latina. Chile: Experiencia con un Régimen de Capitalización 
1981-1991. CEPAL. Proyecto Políticas Financieras para el Desarrollo. Santiago de Chile.
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Although most systems were created as mechanisms for accumulating 
savings to finance pension benefits, the systems have been merged with 
other components of social security and their funds used for redistributive 
purposes by financing the increase in both population and other social se­
curity contingencies coverage. Today, the alternative effects of the system 
design on savings and the development o f capital markets are also being 
considered.
The objectives of this paper are four: to briefly describe ECLAC's find­
ings from case studies on the evaluation and reform alternatives to pension 
systems in Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC5, 1992); to discuss 
factors that define the return on alternative pension systems financing sche­
mes; to indicate institutional and market factors needed to improve pen­
sion system performance; and to assess, in light of the above, the last ten 
years of Chile's experience with a large-scale and unique system based on 
individual capitalization of contributions.
I. CURRENT STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF PENSION SYSTEMS
Previous research by ECLAC indicates that it is not enough for financial 
policy to rely exclusively on the response of voluntary savings to market 
forces. The evidence shows that the response of personal savings to interest 
rates is poor, reflecting a strong correlation between the substitution effect 
(higher interest rates raises the cost of present versus future consumption) 
and the income effect (with higher interest rates the same amount of sa­
vings allows for greater purchasing power). In turn, private firms are net 
borrowers and thus higher interest rates negatively affect their savings. The 
studies undertaken conclude that there is a need to develop policy instru­
ments to promote compulsory saving but within the context of regulated 
and supervised institutions. The role of institutional savings through pen­
5 See ECLAC, 1992, "Pension Systems in Latin America: Diagnosis and Reform Alternatives". 
Case Studies in Latin America and the Caribbean. Conclusions and Recommendations. 
Santiago, 3-5 December 1990 and 22-23 August 1991. ECLAC, Santiago de Chile, September 
1992.
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sion schemes is of considerable importance here (Massad and Eyzaguirre,
1990)6.
Currently, alternative mechanisms involve the financing of pension 
schemes to overcome a short-sighted attitude among people towards their 
own voluntary saving for old-age security purposes. These alternative pen­
sion schemes have been developed within a continuous process and/or 
combinations of two extreme cases. One is the "pay-as-you-go" system, whe­
re an inter generational solidarity mechanism operates, through which those per­
sons now in the labour force are obliged to contribute to the financing 
of defined pension benefits for those presently retired and/or to the financ­
ing of reserve funds for future contingencies. The other is an "individual 
capitalization" system where an intragenerational solidarity mechanism opera­
tes, by which each person's compulsory contribution is saved and invested 
for future pension benefits in an individual account.
Alternative systems include the following: a mixture of a basic social 
pay-as-you-go scheme, complemented by voluntary private capitalization 
alternatives (e.g., Brazil); or a social pay-as-you-go scheme with capitaliza­
tion of reserve funds (like most countries in the region). There are several 
implications of these multiple alternatives, such as the difficulties in enfor­
cing social-security legislation; the variety of programme benefits being im­
plemented; the need for periodical revision of contribution rates and their 
relation to defined benefits; the regulation of the pension system market 
and its enforcement; the need for regulating the portfolio investment of 
social pension systems reserve funds and their enforcement, and so forth.
Perhaps what best summarizes the challenges of pension systems is 
their need to provide relatively high returns on contributions when the 
latter are considered as savings for old-age security purposes. Table 1 illus­
trates this point. Based on a hypothetical exercise, the table reflects the 
amount of savings accumulated by a contributor to the system had he/ 
she experienced a flat life-eamings profile equivalent to 100 pesos in real 
terms, contributing with 10 per cent of net earnings to the system every
6 See Massad, C. y Eyzaguirre, N. (eds.) 1990, Ahorro y formación de capital. Experiencias 
latinoamericanas. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador México. CEPAL/PNUD Proyecto 
Regional Conjunto "Políticas Financieras para el desarrollo". Grupo Editor Latinoamerica­
no. CEPAL, Santiago, Chile.
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month for the number of years given in each column (30, 35, 40 and 45), 
with contributions capitalized at the real rates of returns given in each 
row (-5, -3, 0, 3, 5).
The amount of savings obtained after this person retires (Part 1 of 
the Table), and its equivalent in pensionable years with a pension equal 
to constant real salary (100 pesos) (part 2 of the Table), indicates that un­
less real capitalization rates are set at around 5 per cent, the system will 
provide pension benefits far below the average real level of earnings (given 
the 10 per cent contribution rate). Thus, with low capitalization rates the 
system would need higher contribution rates to achieve the goal of pension 
benefits equal to the earnings of the last working years, and/or the exten­
sion of the working lifespan (increased retirement age). Quite to the con­
trary, higher capitalization rates would allow for better pension benefits 
and/or extension of life expectancy at the age of retirement (earlier reti­
rement), and/or lower contribution rates.
Returns on systems based on capitalization schemes depend on the 
composition of the investment portfolio of the funds and capital-market 
performance. In turn, returns on simple pay-as-you-go schemes are set equal 
to the rate of change of real wages plus that of the number of contribu­
tors minus the rate of growth of life expectancy at the age of retire­
ment. Systems combining both schemes have a return which results from 
a weighted average of the two above.
Table 1
SIMULATION OF INDIVIDUAL PENSION BENEFITS:
IMPORTANCE OF CAPITALIZATION IN DEALING 
WITH SHORT-SIGHTED ATTITUDESf*)
1. Amount Accumulated at Age of Retirement according to 




0% 3,600 4,200 4,800 5,400
3% 5,842 7,434 9,284 11,432
5% 8,357 11,408 15,324 20,349
-5% 1,858 1,976 2,068 2,139
-3% 2,370 2,596 2,790 2,957
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Table 1 (Conl.)
2. Number of Years in which Participant Can Receive a Pen­
sion Equal to 100 % of monthly Earnings according to 




0% 3 3.5 4.0 4.5
3% 5.3 6.9 8.8 11.3
5% 8.6 12.9 20.3 37.3
-5% 1.5 1.7 1.7 1.8
-3% 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4
(*) Calculations are for an individual earning 100 pesos a month in 
real terms throughout his complete working life and with 10 
per cent contribution tax.
Despite the original design, pension systems have been merged with 
other social-security contingency systems (e.g., job-related accidents and 
professional sickness, non-job-related accidents and non-professional health 
and maternity care and leave for the working mother, maternity and health 
care for dependents, dependent allowances, national health systems or pu­
blic health programmes). It has been very common practice, on the basis 
of arguments in favour of redistributing income by creating a social-securi­
ty net, to use pension system reserve funds to expand the population and 
contingency coverage under social security. This practice has been mentio­
ned as one of the main factors contributing to the financial and actuarial 
deficits of the pension system. Use of reserve funds to cover temporary 
fiscal deficits, which are not repaid by the State, and use of funds for 
social-security purposes other than defined pensions, have been justified 
on the grounds of improving equity and the result of joint management 
of all social security schemes (Uthoff and Szalachman, 1991 and 1993)7.
7 See for details, Uthoff, Andras and Raquel Szalachman 1991 Sistemas de Pensiones en 
America Latina. Diagnóstico y alternativas de reforma. Costa Rica, Ecuador, Uruguay, 
Venezuela. CEPAL, Proyecto Regional Políticas Financieras para el Desarrollo. Santiago de 
Chile, and Uthoff Andras and Raquel Szalachman 1993 Sistemas de Pensiones en América 
Latina. Diagnóstico y alternativas de reforma. Volumen 2. Bolivia, Brazil, Guatemala, 
México, Colombia. CEPAL, Proyecto Regional Políticas Financieras para el Desarrollo. 
Santiago de Chile.
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Once those systems started facing difficulties in providing reasona­
ble pension benefits and in achieving financial and actuarial equilibria, the 
trend in Latin America has been to develop them into a compulsory, pu­
blic-sector-managed, simple "pay-as-you-go system". This trend is not a 
definitive solution. Aside from the problems pointed out in the previous 
paragraph, a simple pay-as-you-go system is subject to additional sources 
of financial disequilibria: rapid changes in the demographic structure of 
the population covered by the system; effects of the economic cycle on 
the labour market, and therefore on potential contributors; evasion and 
corruption; poor returns on the investment portfolio; under-declaration of 
earnings while accumulating seniority in the system; and defined benefits 
which bear no relation to changes in contributions and returns on invest­
ment.
Table 2 summarizes the main objectives, problems and alternative ad­
justments to improve current pay-as-you-go systems operating in the re­
gion. It can be noted that no simple solution is at hand. These systems 
require quite sophisticated adjustments involving an overall reform not on­
ly of social-security schemes, but also on macroeconomic and financial 
management grounds.
Based on such an assessment, pension system reforms should also 
consider their implications vis-à-vis capital market developments and sa­
vings investment processes. The region needs to increase its investment 
rates from 16 to 22 per cent to grow at 5 per cent and improve the per­
formance of regional economies in the world economy. Such investment 
rates should allow for technological improvements, to redistribute income 
through human capital investment opportunities, and to make development 
enviromentally sustainable. In the absence of significant and permanent ca­
pital inflows from abroad, domestic savings both public and private should 
be increased. Institutional savings may promote these efforts by contribu­
ting both directly and indirectly to savings (CEPAL, 1990)8.
8 See CEPAL, 1990 Transformación productiva con equidad. La tarea prioritaria del desa­
rrollo de América Latina y el Caribe en la década del noventa. Naciones Unidas, Santiago 
de Chile.
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Table 2




To improve collection 
of funds
Investment of reserve 
funds





Evasion and/or delays 
in payment of social 
security taxes, debt 
from the state as an 
employer, lack of con­
tributions from inde­
pendent workers.
Low returns on re­
serve fund investment 
portfolio; use of funds 
for other government 
executed programmes; 
lack of indexed ins­
truments to cope with 
inflation.
Systems cover only a 
small share of the la­
bour force and its de­
pendents; there are 
large population 




nomic policy towards 
generation of produc­
tive employment.
To create incentives 
for punctual payment 
of social security con­
tribution taxes, to crea­
te mechanisms to ne­
gotiate employer debt.
Regulation and super­
vision of investment 
portfolio; development 




Development of mixed 
systems with a basic 
minimum pension and 
supplements based on 
individual savings ef­
forts; development of 
incentives to promote
Instruments




kets for domestic 
goods, technological 
development.
Creation of unique list 
of contributors and 
dependen ts;creation of 
individual accounts; 
inspection of payments 
and indexed instru­
ments to charge real 
interestrates to debtors 









tion; periodic and pu­
blic balances of social 
security accounts; se­
paration of fiscal ac­
counts by social secu­
rity and other govern­
ment programmes.
Use of funds in indivi­
dual accounts as co­





212 A n d r a s  W. U t h o f f
Table 2 (Cont.)
Objective Particular problem Proposal Instruments
saving among inde- benefits; separation of
pendent workers. pension programme
accounts from the ge­
neral budget.
To make pension be- Individual pension be- Relate pensions to mi- Age at retirement and
nefits bear relation to nefits bear no relation nimums determined pension benefit set
contributions. to changes in life-time by law and comple- according toabalanced
contributions; exis- ment them with addi- formula taking into
tence of non-eligible tional benefits accord- account life expectancy
beneficiaries; indexa- ing to life-time addi- at retirement and pre-
tion of pension be- tional voluntary con- vious contributions;
nefits which bear no tributions and their flexibilization of age at
relation to indexation capitalization. retirement on the basis
of financing sources of of adjustment of pen-
the system. sion to similar formula
as above; implement a 
basic minimum pen­
sion anda self-financed 
supplement; develop­
ment of life insurance 
schemes; development 
of indexed instruments 
to be used in the ope­
ration of the system; 
regulation and super­





Improvement of sys- Excessive administra- Administrative re- Rationalization; sepa-
tem administration five expenses and ine- form. ration of programme
fficiency administrations; legis­
lation; computeriza­
tion of system admi­
nistration; training; 
human resources poli­
cy; normalization; role 
________________________________________________________________ of private sector.
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ECLAC findings based on case studies of pension system evaluation 
and reform alternatives show that some countries already have incorpora­
ted capitalization schemes in the design of their pension-system reforms 
or are studying the idea. These schemes may assume two forms: a compul­
sory private scheme administered by private corporations created separate­
ly from the public scheme, but regulated and supervised by the State, as 
is the current system in Chile (Iglesias and Acuña, 1991)9; or private pension 
schemes as a supplement to the public scheme. A mixture of these two 
alternatives seems to be the basis for recent reform project proposals in 
Colombia and Argentina (Ayala, 1992 and Schulthess, 1992)10. Several other 
countries have historically encouraged voluntary private saving schemes to 
supplement the public scheme (e.g., Brazil, Camargo, 1991)11.
The ECLAC findings, however, also recognize limitations arising from 
characteristics of the regional economies. Government authorities are faced 
with very strong political pressures as the result of a large share of fami­
lies living below the poverty line and whose income is thus limited when 
it comes to financing their basic consumption needs. The fact that these 
segments work in the informal sector, where enforcement of social legis­
lation is weak, is a major reason for their sparse sodal-security coverage. 
Under such circumstances government authorities have difficulties in 
accumulating reserve funds coming from contributions by the labour force 
and contributors to the system. They are under pressure to redistribute 
such funds among the poor and politically powerful groups eligible for 
social-security defined benefits.
9 For details see Augusto Iglesias and Rodrigo Acuña, 1991. Sistema de Pensiones en Amé­
rica Latina. Chile: Experiencia con un Régimen de Capitalización 1981-1991. CEPAL. Pro­
yecto Políticas Financieras para el Desarrollo. Santiago, Octubre 1991.
10 For details see Ayala, Ulpiano 1992 Un Sistema Pensionai de Capitalización Individual pa­
ra Colombia. Documento para el Proyecto Regional CEPAL/PNUD "Políticas Financieras 
para el Desarrollo". CEPAL, Santiago, Chile Noviembre de 1992. And also Schulthess, Wal­
ter, 1992 "Sistema Nacional de Previsión Social de la Argentina y Propuesta de Reforma" 
Documento para el Seminario Regulación y Supervisión de la Banca" y "Reforma al Sistema 
de Pensiones y Ahorro Institucional" en América Latina. CEPAL, Santiago de Chile, 
Noviembre 1992.
11 Camargo, J. M. 1991, Pensión Funds in Brazil. Paper prepared for the Seminar on "Pension 
Systems in Latin America: Diagnosis and Reform Alternatives" ECLAC Joint ECLAC/UNDP 
Regional Project" Financial Policies for Development. Santiago de Chile.
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In order to avoid such problems, the question of ownership rights 
relative to the accumulated fund is critical in the design of a pension system. 
Reforms promoting the accumulation of a fund and avoidance of political 
pressures on its allocation also endeavour to replace the public intergene- 
rational transfer of contributions (from those in the labour force to those 
who are retired) with some sort of life cycle private (common or individual) 
savings and investment account of contributions for pension benefit pur­
poses. There is undoubtedly a trade-off between the objectives for which 
the pension system can be used. Public funds can be used discretionally 
by the State for redistributive purposes in the first case, whereas such goals 
must be pursued through the allocation of resources in the capital market 
and/or through a subsidiary role of the State in the second case.
Social security in Latin America in the context of economic adjustment 
and restructuring must be carefully studied. Future perspectives and trends 
need to be discussed within various contexts: (a) the redefinition of the 
role of principal actors - mainly the private sector in providing health care 
and pensions; (b) rethinking of ways to extend social protection in both 
population and contingency coverage; and (c) the appraisal of financing 
and cost efficiency alternatives (McGreevey, 1990, Mesa-Lago, 1991)12. Any 
such discussion must bear in mind that in Latin America the private sector 
has been traditionally isolated from these areas of public concern; in several 
countries there is still very low population and contingency coverage by 
current social security schemes, and the sparse capital markets are in their 
initial stages of development.
Because pension systems are an individual policy instrument, they 
cannot simultaneously contribute to the provision of reasonable pension be­
nefits in relation to previous contributions, the redistribution of income by 
increasing population and social-security contingency coverage, and the im­
provement of domestic savings. The Latin American and Caribbean exper­
ience shows that the answer to this policy dilemma is to keep the pension
12 For further details see, William Me. Greevey. Social Security in Latin America. Issues and 
Options for the World Bank World Bank Discussion Papers 110. The World Bank, 
Washington D.C. November 1990 and Carmelo Mesa-Lago 1991. "Social Security and Eco­
nomic Adjustment-Restructuring in Latin America and the Caribbean. A Study for the 
International Labour Office. University of Pittsburgh, December 1991.
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system financially and actuarially sound and separated from other govern­
ment redistributive programmes. The conditions to achieve this goal are 
given in the next section.
II. POPULATION, EMPLOYMENT AND RETURNS 
TO PENSION SYSTEM FUNDS
The simulation in Table 3 is based on demographic and national account 
statistics. It reports on the contribution rate in the hypothetical case of a 
pension system designed to pay those over 65 a universal pension benefit 
equal to per capita GDP. Die given parameters are the population share 
of those over 65 and the formal wage sector earnings as a percentage of
Table 3
EARNINGS PROFILES AND SIMULATIONS. SIMULATIONS OF CONDITIONS 
















Contrib. Years needed 
Rate to achieve si­
milar pension
(%)
Latin America 1,872 4.7 - - -
Colombia 1,379 4.1 37.9(88) 10.8 37
Chile 2,526 6.0 33.0(85) 18.2 30
Panama 1,461 4.8 50.6(89) 9.5 40
Uruguay 2,254 11.6 33.4 (88) 34.7 20
Brazil 2,020 4.7 34.8 (80) 13.5 34
Costa Rica 1,460 4.3 48.3 (89) 8.9 41
Ecuador 1,363 3.8 14.1 (89) 27.0 24
Mexico 2,280 3.9 25.9 (88) 15.1 33
Peru 896 3.8 24.4(89) 15.6 31
Venezuela 2,736 3.7 33.5 (89) 11.0 37
Bolivia 601 3.2 24.1 (86) 13.3 32
Guatemala 797 3.2 28.4(89) 11.3 37
Honduras 608 3.3 43.3 (89) 7.6 42
Paraguay 1,296 3.6 27.4(89) 13.1 34
Source: Estimates by the author on basic of demographic and national account statistics.
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GDP. By definition, the population share of those over 65 shown in column 
(2) corresponds to the percentage of GDP needed to achieve the defined 
pension benefit goal and is directly proportional to the ageing of the popu­
lation. The maximum requirement is in the case of Uruguay where such 
a defined pension benefit goal would necessitate the allocation of a 11.6 
per cent of GDP for such purposes. The lowest requirements correspond 
to those countries which are still well behind in their demographic transi­
tion (Bolivia, Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay).
A common feature of Latin American and Caribbean pension systems 
is that their population coverage is limited to formal sector workers. Formal 
sector wage-eamings as a share of total GDP is given in column 3. Column 
4 shows the hypothetical average contribution rate were the entire cost of 
providing the universal pension (equal to per capita GDP) to be financed 
by contributors from the formal-sector workers system. This contribution 
rate would range from a minimum of 7.6 per cent in Honduras (where 
those aged 65 and above are only a small fraction of the population and 
the wage-earning share of GDP is large), to a maximum of 34.7 per cent 
in Uruguay (where there is a high percentage of elderly and, according 
to Latin American standards, the wage-earning share of total GDP is at 
an intermediate level).
If the same pension were to be offered to individual workers in a 
capitalization scheme, with a yearly 5 per cent capitalization rate in real 
terms (estimated as that needed for reasonable pension benefits in Table 
1) column 5 indicates the number of years an individual worker would 
have to contribute to the pension plan prior to the age of retirement, had 
he earned a wage equivalent to per capita GDP during that period. There 
is no doubt that the larger the contribution rate, the less convenient it 
is for an individual to participate in a pay-as-you-go system and the more 
convenient to participate in a capitalization scheme.
In spite of its simplicity and perhaps questionable assumptions, the 
above exercise calls our attention to the parameters that determine the returns 
derived from contributions to one scheme or another. In the pay-as-you- 
go system, the returns on a given contribution rate can be approximated 
by the sum of the rate of growth of contributors (those in the labour for­
ce, employed and contributing to the system -most likely the rate of growth 
of formal sector employment) plus the rate of growth of average net ear­
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nings in real terms, less the rate of increase in life expectancy at the age 
of retirement (e.g., 65 for males and 60 for females)13. That is why actua­
rial studies of such systems often recommend, as some of the suggestions 
in Table 2 do, either increasing contribution rates, reducing pension bene­
fits (both in terms of coverage and the level of the benefit), increasing 
the age at retirement, or a combination of all three.
These parameters are particularly relevant to Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Demographic transition varies both between and within countries 
according to the socio-economic level, affecting basic demographic para­
meters which in turn influence pension system performance. On the average, 
in 1950 the total population of the region (some 89 million) grew at a 
rate above that of the 15 to 64 age group (the potential labour force parti­
cipants). Statistics showed 78 persons at passive ages (below 15 and above 
65 years old) per 100 persons at active ages. These elderly (above 65) repre­
sented only 8 per cent of the total passive population, or one elderly per­
son per 17 persons at active ages. From 1960 onwards, the total fertility 
rate in Latin America declined sharply and the trends in the above indica­
tors changed dramatically. In 1990, the total population was estimated at 
260 million, more than triple the 1950 figures. The dependency ratio fell 
to 69 persons at passive ages per 100 persons at active ages (after rising 
to a maximum of 87 in 1970). One out of eight passive persons is elderly 
and there are less than 13 persons at working ages per each person over 
65 (CELADE, 1990)14.
These characteristics are far less important in terms of ageing than 
has been the case in Western Europe. In that region, those aged 60 and 
above currently represent 20 per cent of the total population and two-thirds 
of the total passive population (Chesnais, 1989)15. However, as a distinctive 
feature of Latin America, ageing is taking place together with relatively 
high population growth rates in all age groups: those in need of education,
13 Larrain, Felipe and Gert Wagner 1982 Previsión Social, Algunas Consideraciones. Instituto 
de Economía, Universidad Católica de Chile, Documento de Trabajo N2 84.
14 For further details, see CELADE, 1990 America Latina. Proyecciones de Población. Boletín 
Demográfico. Año XXII, Ns 45, Santiago de Chile.
15 See Chesnais, J. C. 1989 L'inversion de la pyramide des ages en Europe: perspectives et
problems. "Congres International de la Population, N23. New Delhi.
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those in need of jobs, and those in need of pension benefits. This brings 
us to the important issue of the allocation of investment resources for growth 
with equity and environmental sustainability. The investment in human ca­
pital throughout the different stages of a person's life becomes a crucial 
element which also strongly encourages political pressures on the alloca­
tion of pension system reserve funds.
Another important feature of the region is the extremely heteroge­
neous nature of the relationship between potential contributors and bene­
ficiaries within each system. This is the result of a highly segmented labour 
market. The poorer segments do not participate in formal pension fund 
systems but instead are organized through intrafamiliar solidarity schemes, 
operating via extended families in which those in the labour force contri­
bute with their income to satisfy the needs of all the young and the aged 
and those of working age, although well below the standards of any rea­
sonable poverty line. Elsewhere, workers employed in the modem sectors 
contribute to compulsory public pay-as-you-go schemes, whereby those in 
the labour force finance the pension benefits of the retired with the expec­
tation that future generations will in turn pay for them. At present, some 
formal-sector workers have access to private capitalization schemes, in which 
each generation contributes savings and investment needed to supplement 
its pension benefits. The coexistence of all these formal and informal pen­
sion systems is the result of the structure of the labour market in Latin 
America. It is hard to believe that population coverage of formal systems 
will increase without radical changes in labour market structures and/or 
the creation of very particular and innovative incentives to join the formal 
compulsory institutional schemes. None of these events is likely to take 
place in the near future.
In fact, between 1950 and 1980 Latin America's share of modem or 
formal employment, to which an institution pension-fund scheme is more 
suitable, increased by only 5 percentage points (from 52 to 57 per cent) 
of the total labour force. The rest of the employed pertained to traditional 
agricultural activities (self-employed, peasants and non-remunerated family 
workers) or to informal non-agricultural activities and/or domestic service, 
where control of compliance with labour legislation and the collection of 
compulsory taxes for social security purposes is more difficult. This posi­
tive trend in formal/modern employment creation was halted during the
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eighties as a consequence of the debt crisis and overall recession. Among 
non-agricultural activities, formal employment lost ground against informal 
employment and occasionally unemployment (PREALC, 1982 and 1990)16. 
Recent studies have shown that the low level of formal employment is 
a major barrier to improving social security population coverage in general, 
and that of pension systems in particular (CEPAL, 1985; ECLAC, 1989; Mesa 
Lago, 1990)17.
This brings us back to the relevant issue of understanding the com­
plex interrelations between demographic, employment, financial and 
developmental variables. The core element is the provision of the necessary 
savings to invest for redistribution and growth through a combination of 
human and physical capital investment projects. Although investment in 
human and physical capital is an important mechanism for the redistri­
bution of income, it can also contribute widely to perpetuating inequality. 
To the extend that an individual's access to capital markets determines his 
opportunity for human and physical capital investment and his chances 
for upward mobility as part of the work force, then capital-market segmen­
tation will constitute a mechanism for the perpetuation of inequality.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITAL MARKETS AND
RETURNS ON PENSION SYSTEM FUNDS
Development of capital markets becomes an important issue in the dis­
cussion of alternative designs for pension systems. If the objective of pro­
viding good pension benefits is important, then financial markets must 
warrant returns sufficiently to make it profitable to have invested in them 
by the time the contributor is eligible for pension benefits. In accordance 
with earlier estimates, Table 4 shows that for both males and females with
16 For further details on these trends see PREALC, 1982 Mercado de Trabajo en cifras 1959- 
1980 PREALC-OIT Santiago de Chile, and also PREALC, 1990 Empleo y equidad, el desafío 
de los 90 PREALC-OIT Santiago de Chile.
17 See CEPAL, 1985. El desafío de la seguridad social en América Latina Estudios e informes 
de la CEPAL, Santiago de Chile. ECLAC, 1989 The Elderly in Latin America: A strategic 
Sector for Social Policy in the 1990s LC/R 833 December 1989, and Mesa-Lago 1990 La se­
guridad social y el sector informal Investigaciones sobre empleo 32. PREALC, Santiago.
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similar age-eamings profiles, unless portfolio investment real returns exceed 
5 per cent on the average during one's entire working life, neither men 
nor women will obtain pension benefits equal to their last year's real ear­
nings in the work force.
Table 4
ESTIMATED OLD-AGE PENSION BENEFITS:
ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES
(As percentage of net earnings from last 10 working years,)
Initial net Real benefits (5%) Real benefits (6%)
earnings Male Female Male Female
25,000 101.7 63.9 143.6 102.5
40,000 104.8 65.9 148.1 105.7
100,000 108.0 67.9 152.6 109.0
200,000 109.0 68.5 154.1 110.1
360,000 109.5 68.8 154.6 110.6
Based on the following assumptions:
(1) Fixed commisson of 250 real monetary units.
(2) Net earning grow 2% per annum until contributor is 50 years old, and stabi­
lizes thereafter.
(3) Working period starts at age 22.
(4) Males retire at 65 and by then have a life expectancy of 16.
(5) Females retire at 60 and by then have a life expectancy of 21.
(6) Percentage is estimated over the average net earnings of the last 10 years.
For different initial net earnings brackets, Table 4 computes the pension 
benefit an individual worker starting his/her working life at the age of 
22 would receive had his/her net life earnings profile increased by 2 per 
cent per annum in real terms up to age 50 and remained stable thereafter. 
The difference by gender is due to the earlier retirement of women (at 
age 60) as compared to men (at age 65). This means that the former con­
tribute during a shorter period and need pension benefits for a longer pe­
riod (due to their greater life expectancy at the age of retirement). This 
explains why the relation between the monthly pension benefit for wo­
men, compared to the average last ten years net earnings, is significantly 
below that for men. But the table also shows that fixed commissions imple­
mented to bear the cost of administrating individual accounts are regressi­
ve, in the sense that they lead to lower returns for those in the lower 
net earnings brackets.
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Capitalization of contributions has three basic inputs for increasing 
an individual's pension fund every year: the contribution itself, the interest 
paid on that contribution during that year, and the returns on the portfolio 
in which the fund is invested. Under stable real rates of return on portfolio 
investment over a period of time, in the earlier stages the largest addition 
to the fund comes from contributions. From the very start, however, both 
the fund and the returns from its investment grow exponentially. After 
approximately 15 years at a 5 per cent rate of return on portfolio invest­
ment, these returns constitute a larger input to the individual workers' fund 
than do the contributions themselves. This is the advantage of a capitali­
zation scheme in contrast to a pay-as-you-go system governed by reaso­
nable parameters (positive growth rates in formal employment and in real 
wages, and slight increases in life expectancy at age of retirement). This 
also necessitates an awareness of the impact that pension funds may have 
on an expanding financial market.
If reasonable returns from portfolio investments in domestic capital 
markets are to be warranted, a twofold set of conditions must be met, 
one dealing with the macroeconomic and the other the financial environ­
ment.
In fact, and due to the interperiodical character of decisions involved 
in institutional savings and resource allocation for future growth, autho­
rities should take care to obtain a policy mix intended to maintain low 
and controlled inflation rates, positive in real terms but moderate interest 
rates and a credible exchange rate policy. In Latin America such policy 
mixes should satisfy at least three conditions: (a) they should be aimed 
at strengthening a financially balanced public sector; (b) they should be 
aimed at reforming the banking system; and (c) they should be aimed at 
developing the capital and insurance markets.
1. Public sector reforms
Three changes have been pointed out as the most important in order to 
balance public-sector accounts: the financing of social-security system defi­
cits, the autonomy and solvency of the Central Bank, and the elimination 
and reduction of all quasi-fiscal deficits in the financial system.
In relation to the topic of this paper, the first change is straightforward.
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Mechanisms need to be created to finance past deficits while avoiding fu­
ture ones. Transition to any alternative system different from the one in 
operation should consider its public finance costs. The most common way 
out has been by issuing government compensation bonds for those alrea­
dy participating in the old system and not yet retired, and drawing from 
general public tax revenues for financing those presently retired. The public 
sector must make provisions for these payments in their current budge­
tary exercises.
2. Banking regulation and supervision
A second set of conditions deals with reforms to the banking system (Held 
and Szalachmann, 1991 and 1992, ECLAC, 1992)18. These can be presented 
in two stages. First, macroeconomic adjustment needs to be complemented 
by intermediation through the financial system in order to allow an efficient 
allocation of resources. A precondition is the financial solvency of banks 
and firms. Otherwise, financial liberalization and international competition 
through gradual opening of the capital account may prove inimical to heal­
thy development of the domestic financial sector. The steps taken to libera­
lize the capital market in order to achieve monetary autonomy, free ca­
pital flows and exchange rate management must start with a reasonably 
solvent domestic banking system.
Regulatory structures through which the State may establish bank 
and financial-institution "rules of the game" for deposits and loans is a 
second stage. These include prudential regulation, to control banking risks, 
financial insolvency and illiquidity; financial regulation, oriented towards 
interest and exchange rates, currency denomination, instrument maturity
18 For further details on the regulation and supervision of banks and financial institutions, see 
Held and Szalachman 1991, Regulación y Supervision de la Banca. Experiencias de América la ­
tina y el Caribe. Argentina, Costa Rica, Chile, República Dominicana. CEPAL, PNUD. Proyecto 
Regional Políticas Financieras para el Desarrollo, Santiago de Chile; also Held and Szalachman, 
1992, Regulación y Supervisión de la Banca. Experiencias de América Latina y el Caribe. Volumen 2. 
Guatemala, México, Paraguay, Perú, Venezuela. CEPAL, PNUD. Proyecto Regional Políticas 
Financieras para el Desarrollo, Santiago de Chile, and ECLAC, 1992, "Regulation and Super­
vision of Banks and Financial Institutions. Case Studies in Latin América and the Caribbean. Serie 
Financiamiento del Desarrollo N2 8. Santiago dc Chile.
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periods, and other conditions related to the price and value of both do­
mestic and foreign assets and liabilities; and finally, organizational regu­
lation, to seek bank and financial institutional operational efficiency 
through economies of scale, the integration of economic activities and the 
promotion of competition among financial institutions.
Supervision of banks and financial institutions entails verification of 
compliance with the prudential, financial and organizational rules and 
regulations which govern their activities as financial intermediaries. (See 
the chapter by Held in this volume.)
3. Security and insurance market regulation and supervision
Last but not least are the reforms needed to promote the development 
of securities and insurance markets. Competition in these markets also re­
quires three regulations: regulations for entry into the particular market; 
prudential regulation for those operating in the market; and motivational 
regulation for expanding the financial market.
Entrants into these markets must demonstrate financial solvency by 
fulfilling legal and financial requirements as an intermediary, and provide 
information about all financial instruments and conditions that will keep 
the market transparent. This includes registration of instruments to be issued 
and intermediated in the stock market, with the commitment to provide 
public and periodical information on their financial status, and secondly, 
registration of intermediaries in the stock market that will accept regula­
tory norms and supervision of their activities by independent institutions 
in order to maintain a minimum level of professional conduct, thus wa­
rranting a competitive and equitative intermediation of securities.
Prudential regulation of these markets is mainly concerned with three 
factors: market entry conditions -minimum capital and property require­
ments; an investment insurance guarantee scheme; and portfolio quality 
control standards and risk limitations. Two separate institutional develop­
ments in this area are the Deposit or Custody of Securities and the Risk 
Classification Commission. The first keeps track of all deposits, liquidations 
and other transactions, in accounts which also perform multilateral elec­
tronic balancing. The classification of risks is a service provided by spe­
cialized agencies, in order to carry out ongoing evaluation of firms offering
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instruments and to determine their financial capacity. The final objective 
is to allow the public to take informed investment decisions. These agencies 
must be registered and must follow very strict procedures and methods 
in performing their duties.
Motivational regulation refers to the incentives needed to expand the 
market in order to attract new businesses, intermediaries, and investors, 
along with the emission of new stocks and securities. The purpose is to 
improve the role of these markets in channeling savings into productive 
investments. These incentives can assist in providing non-bank financing, 
especially that which comes from institutional savings.
IV. THE CHILEAN EXPERIENCE WITH AN INDIVIDUAL 
CAPITALIZATION SCHEME
The reform in Chile has drawn a great deal of attention due to its radical 
transition from a pay-as-you-go public system to an individual capitalization 
scheme, and also due to its relative success during its first ten years. This 
experience has been described in ECLAC's case study (Iglesias and Acuña,
1991) and elsewhere (Arrau, 1992; and Montt 1992)19.
1. Main characteristics o f the new system
The system is based on mandatory contributions of 10 per cent of base 
salary paid by the employee to a personal retirement account. This fund 
continues to build until the age of 65, in the case of males, and 60 for 
females. Funds belong to the worker and there are no defined benefits. 
The latter will depend on past contributions and their corresponding ca­
19 An exhaustive description of the reform is given by Iglesias, Augusto and R. Acuña. 1991 
Sistema de Pensiones en América Latina. Chile: Experiencia con un Régimen de Capitalización 1981- 
1991. Proyecto Políticas Financieras para el Desarrollo, CEPAL/PNUD Santiago de Chile. 
Summary reviews of the reform are given by Arrau, Patricio. 1992 El Nuevo Régimen previsio- 
nd Chileno Seminario Internacional de Reformas al Régimen Pensionai, Bogota, Colombia, 
Mayo 20-21 de 1992; and Montt, Diego, in The Chilean Private Pension Fund System Superinten­
dencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensión-Chile presented at Workshop on "Emerging 
Markets, Current Issues", Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires, 23,24 November 1992.
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pitalization. Management of these accounts for capitalization purposes is 
handled by private pension fund managers, thus being firms incorporated 
into the private pension fund system and which compete for the funds 
on the basis of quality of service and commissions. The latter are set at 
about 3.25 per cent of reported salary and covers account administration, 
overhead, marketing, a group insurance policy of approximately 1 per cent 
of that salary for invalidity and survivor's benefits, and profits, if any.
The Pension fund managers have but one duty: to manage pension 
funds. The State is responsible for regulating their firms and supervising 
their market. The State also sets conditions to guarantee adequate returns 
according to average market conditions and a minimum pension for those 
participants unable to accumulate sufficient funds.
The reform sets benefits depending on past contributions and capi­
talization returns. Employees withdraw the fund upon retirement and pur­
chase a life-insurance policy that guarantees a minimum family retirement 
revenue. Any surplus above the present value of the legal minimum may 
be withdrawn from individual accounts under a specially-managed retire­
ment program. In addition, the contribution to a group insurance policy 
provides for resources in the event of other contingencies related to pension 
benefits: invalidity, survivor's coverage, and severance allowances.
Separation of social security programmes is also warranted by the 
reform. Sickness, maternity, work injury, unemployment benefits and fami­
ly allowances are carried under separate national security or social insu­
rance schemes that are normally government-sponsored but with varying 
degrees of private-sector involvement.
2. Prudential regulation o f pension fund investments
The system operates under very strict regulations which can be summari­
zed as follows:
1- Pension funds can only be invested in financial instruments authorized 
by law.
2 - Pension funds are subject to very strict regulations for portfolio diversifi­
cation by financial instrumens and by issuers.
3 - All financial instruments subject to investment by pension funds must be
evaluated and approved by the national risk commission.
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4.- The value of all pension-fund instruments is adjusted daily in accordance 
with prices established by the supervisory authority: (85 per cent of portfo­
lios are valued at current stock exchange prices).
5 - The management of pension funds is subject to a minimum level beneath 
which profitability may not drop.
6.- Custody of pension fund investment securities: at least 90 per cent of 
financial instruments must be in custody at the Central Bank.
Table 5 indicates the limits of pension fund investments, according 
to different instruments. These limits are set by law, and pension fund 
managers must obey very strict norms for diversification of their portfolio 
according to both investment instruments and issuers. The selected instru­
ments are evaluated by the Risk Classification Commission, and must be 
intermediated in well-established stock and secondary markets. The value 
of the fund is adjusted daily according to market prices reported by the 
Superintendency of pension fund managers, and periodical reports must 
be given to contributors. Eighty-five per cent of the portfolio is evaluated 
at current stockmarket prices, but the overall value of the fund also varies 
in relation to changes in the market interest rate when estimating its cu­
rrent present worth.
In order to eliminate solvency risks due to bad investment mana­
gement, pension fund managers are subject to a requirement concerning 
minimum profitability. To bear relation with market conditions such mini­
mum is set at a level equal to the lower bound between the average profi­
tability of all PFMs less 2 percentage points and half the average profita­
bility of all PFMs. In the event of a cease of activities PFMs must make 
use of their reserve fund and legal capital requirements.
3. Pension system results and financial market developments
The effects of the pension system reform will now be analyzed in terms 
of four important results: population coverage; level of pension benefits; 
financial market developments; and national savings and investment.
In general, these types of evaluations are very hard to perform, largely 
due to the difficulty in identifying the standard of comparison. If, as is 
often done, the results of the new systems are compared to those of the 
old system, this is said to be unfair since it is precisely due to its poor
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results that the latter is being replaced. If, quite to the contrary, the system 
is assessed on absolute terms, then supporters claim unfairness because it 
ignores the starting conditions. On the whole, as will be made clear, no 
definite evaluations have been made, and further research is under way 
on these matters.
Table 5
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF PENSION FUND INVESTMENTS: 
CHILEAN LIMITS SET BY LAW ACCORDING TO INSTRUMENTS
Instrument Limits (% of Fund)
1. Government instruments 45
(Treasury and Central Bank)
2. Mortgages 80
3. Long-term savings, other securities
from approved financial institutions 50
Short-term (less than one year) 30
4. Public and private sector bonds 50
5. Shares from other pension funds 20
6. Corporate shares
a. non-concentrated property 30
b. real state corporations 10
c. concentrated property 10
7. Shares of investment funds 10
8. Commerce 10
9. Finandal instruments from abroad 10(a)
(a) From October 1996 onwards 
Source: Iglesias y Acuña 1991, op. cit.
a) Pension system population coverage
Social security population coverage in Latin America in general, and that 
of pension systems in particular, has historically been very low. As discussed 
earlier, this is due to the structure of labour markets, with large segments 
of the labour force outside the formal sectors of the economy where so­
cial security legislation is easily enforced. The Chilean case has often been 
quoted as relatively successful in terms of population coverage (Messa Lago, 
op cit.). With the reform, lower social security taxes and increases in net 
earnings were considered important incentives to induce independent wor­
kers to contribute voluntarily to the system. Nevertheless, workers in infor-
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mal sectors who had not contributed to the old system were ineligible for 
the main incentive, that being a compensation bonus.
As given in Table 6, population coverage measured by share of the 
labour force shows that whereas affiliates have come to represent 86 per 
cent of the labour force, those actually contributing to the system have 
never increased above 55 per cent. The causes of this poor result should 
be eliminated in order for coverage to increase. As mentioned before, this 
responds to the labour market structure in Chile, still with a high share 
of independent informal workers, together with a large incidence of po­
verty (Uthoff and Pollack 1990)20. Other authors have also mentioned that 
the situation results from loss of jobs; lack of incentive for independent 
workers to contribute; delays in contributions by employers; people for­
merly in the labour force who are retired and do not qualify; and partici­
pants in the old system (estimated below 10 per cent of the labour force) 
(Arrau, op. cit.).
Tableó
POPULATION COVERAGE UNDER THE NEW PENSION SYSTEM
(as a porcentage of total labour force)
Affiliates Contributors In old system
1981 39.0 - -
1982 39.3 24.8 -
1983 43.0 28.0 -
1984 49.6 29.3 -
1985 56.8 32.9 11.3
1986 60.7 35.0 10.4
1987 66.4 38.5 10.0
1988 69.9 38.9 9.3
1989 74.4 41.0 8.8
1990 79.1 41.5 8.5
1991 85.6 51.8 -
Source: Iglesias and Acuña 1990, Chile: Experiencia con un Régimen de 
Capitalización 1981-1991, ECLAC, Políticas Financieras para el Desa­
rrollo, and updated with figures from Boletín Estadístico de AFP.
20 Uthoff, Andras and Molly Pollack. 1989. Poverty and the Labour Market: Greater Santiago, 1969- 
85 in Rodgers Gerry, ed. Urban Poverty and the Labour Market. Access to Jobs and Incomes 
in Asian and Latin American Cities. ILO, Geneva.
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b) Pension benefits, now and then
It has not been possible to make a definite and general comparison bet­
ween the amount of pension benefits received in the old and new system. 
The problem lies in the difficulties in estimating the pension benefit after 
full maturity of the new system. Such an exercise involves an estimate 
of the expected active life-cycle income (which in turn requires assumptions 
concerning labour productivity increases according to human capital en­
dowments to estimate longitudinal earning profiles). It also involves an es­
timate of returns during the capitalization period and standarization proce­
dures with respect to age and life expectancy at retirement.
Table 7
FINANCING AND CHARACTERISTICS OF PENSIONS
1. Financing for the following benefits
Old-age Pension Benefits Disability and survivors pension benefits
A. Accumulated capital
1. (+) Contributions (compulsory and vo­
luntary)
2. (+) Investment returns
3. (-) Commission on individual account
B. Compensation bonus
C. Transfers from voluntary savings account 
(if worker so wishes)
D. Government contribution if required to 
achieve minimum pension
2. Number of pension benefits paid up to 1990
A. Accumulated capital
1. (+) Contributions (compulsory and vo­
luntary)
2. (+) Investment returns
3. (-) Commission on individual account
B. Compensation bonus
C. Transfers from voluntary savings account 
(if worker so wishes)
D. Additional contributions (funded with in­
surance)
E. Government contribution if required to 
achieve minimum pension
Old age % Contri- Disabi- % Contri­ Survi­ % Contri­
butors lity butors vors butors
1989 19,953 0.57 14,388 0.42 35,094 1.01
1990 29,666 0.79 15,777 0.42 41,618 1.11
3. Average pensions (Thousands of pesos at December 1990; US$ 1 = $300)
Old age Disabi­ Widow­ Survivors Average
lity hood Child Other earnings
1989 37.4 65.2 28.5 9.2 15.8 81.2
1990 39.4 63.9 27.8 9.5 16.8 84.4
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Part 1 of Table 7 shows that results from comparisons of pension 
benefits provided by the two systems are highly sensitive to the transition 
period. This, is due to the importance of the compensation bonus and the 
way it was calculated relative to the overall result of the new system pen­
sion benefit. In turn, such a comparison is also sensitive to the amount 
of subsidies that pension benefits in the old system received as compared 
to those in the new system. Finally, we must also bear in mind the beha­
viour of the capital market during the capitalization period and its repli­
cability in the future.
Parts 2 and 3 of Table 7 show that the system is still too new to 
make valid comparisons. In part 2 of the table we can see that so far 
less than 2 per cent of contributors have received benefits from the fund 
so as provided by the system (old-age pension benefits, disability benefits 
or survivors benefits). In turn, the income level of benefits that are being 
provided at present are quite below the average net earnings reported by
contributors to the systems (Part 3 of the table).
The best one can do is recall the results in Tables 1, 3 and 4, to 
a large extent attributing the success of the system to returns above 5 per 
cent on the pension-fund investment portfolio. The role of the government 
is to enforce prudential regulation to try to reach such a goal based on 
market conditions.
c) Pension Funds and Financial market developments
Table 8 indicates the amount of the cumulated fund and its portfolio invest­
ment composition. Only after 1985 were pension fund managers authori­
zed to invest in the stock market. But it was not until 4 years later, in 
1989, that these firms decided to go about it professionally. Between 1989 
and 1992, the market value of common stock in pension fund portfolios 
multiplied by 10, from US$ 350 to US$ 3.3 billion. A note of caution must 
be sounded before extrapolating this behaviour. Again it is hard to isolate 
the impact of the pension-fund purchasing power from that of at least three 
other phenomena that can also help to explain the same figures: first, dur­
ing the same period, capital flows from abroad increased significantly and 
currency revalued in United States dollars by about 20 per cent; second, 
Chile has witnessed seven years of strong economic growth that started
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in 1985, just when pension funds were authorized to invest in the stock 
market, and has averaged above 6 per cent per year; and third, since 1985 
the real average price index of shares (i.e., after allowing for inflation) has 
recorded a 500 per cent increase, of which half occurred after 1989 (see 
Table 9).
An important conclusion with respect to the relationship between pen- 
sion-fund developments and financial market behavior is their contributions 
to expanding the financial system. This is the result of a relatively young 
system, which, together with the exponential accumulation of investment 
income in the individual funds of those of contributing age, justifies a lar­
ge share of resources to be intermediated in financial markets.
The last column in Table 8 contains one indicator of financial expan­
sion in Chile. Pension funds as a percentage of GDP grew from less than 
one per cent in 1981 to above 38 in 1992. Projections show that this share 
will level out at above 100 per cent of GDP by the year 2020 and before 
the system has completely matured.
The portfolio investment composition in Table 8 also shows extensive 
diversification and changes as the result of very strict regulations which ha­
ve subsequently been modified. Highly concentrated on bank deposits and 
bonds (62 per cent) in the earlier stages, it is now more heavily weighted 
toward Central Bank and Treasury bonds (37 per cent) and common stocks 
(28 per cent).
Despite conservative regulations to avoid risks to institutional inves­
tors, returns on these investments have averaged, during the first 12 years 
of existence of the system, well above real interest rates in the financial 
system for the same period (see Table 10). Nevertheless a note of caution 
is also needed here. When analysing the results for 1992, one must obser­
ve that returns in real terms have dropped to 4 per cent, which contrasts 
with the excellent performance of Chile's economy during that same year, 
considered to be the best in the last 30 years (CEPAL, 1992)21.
21 CEPAL, 1992. Panorama Económico de América Latina y el Caribe Santiago de Chile.
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Table 8
PORTFOLIO COMPOSITION OF PENSION FUNDS IN % (CHILE)
Central Bank Bank Firm Funds Funds
Year and Treasury deposits Mortgage bonds and Common millions USS %
bonds and bonds Securities debentures stock equivalent GDP
1981 28 62 9 1 0 219 0.9
1983 44 3 51 2 0 1,223 6.4
1985 43 23 36 2 0 2,228 10.9
1987 42 28 21 3 6 3,570 15.5
1988 35 30 21 6 8 4370 16.5
1989 42 21 18 9 10 5388 19.7
1990 44 17 16 11 11 7,136 26.5
1991 38 12 13 13 24 10,078 34.4





Source: Iglesias y Acuña, 1991. op. cit., and updated with data from the Superintendency reports.
Table 9
STOCK MARKET AND PENSION FUND PORTFOLIO
Common Stock Pension Funds
Volume Market
Year Price traded value (US$ Common stock
index index millions) (US$ millions)
1981 105 592 5,000 -
1983 70 369 2,783 -
1985 100 100 2,919 -
1987 313 908 6,852 223
1988 425 1,094 8,438 354
1989 581 1372 11,375 545
1990 750 1,155 14,564 806
1991 1,682 2,651 27,706 2,406
1992 (Jun) 2,122 3,117 34,444 3347
Source: Montt, Diego 1992. The Chilean Private Pension Fund System. Superintendencia 
de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones. Workshop on "Emerging Markets, 
Current Issues", Bolsa de Comercio de Buenos Aires, 23-24 November.
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Table 10 
PENSION FUNDS: CHILE 
Real Rate of Return on Fund Investments (%)
Year Pension Fund (a) 
System













(a) Average of Pension Funds
(b) Real rates of interest of 90-360 days deposits.
Source: Iglesias y  Acuña, 1990. op. cit. and updates by the author.
In summary, there has been a joint and significant increase in the 
volume and value of stock-market operations and pension-fund stock invest­
ments. The 300 per cent increase in pension-fund holdings matches the 
pattern of transactions, volume and prices on the Santiago Stock Exchange. 
However, there is room for believing in significant repercussions in the 
real economy. For example, sixty per cent of all mortgage securities are 
financed from pension funds, the same as with firm bonds and debentures. 
Nevertheless, due to the fact that this period has been accompanied by 
high and stable GDP growth rates, together with important incentives for 
arbitrage of international interest rates causing large capital inflows and 
currency appreciation, we are unable to draw any direct causal effect bet­
ween pension funds and stock-market developments. Further research is 
also needed here. Relative to financial expansion, pension funds represent 
38 per cent of total GDP and are distributed among different instruments 
according to very strict regulations. It is worth mentioning that high re­
turns from capital markets will benefit workers to the extent that during 
their working lifetime these returns exceed 5 to 6 per cent on the average 
in real terms. During the last 12 years, returns have exceeded 15 per cent.
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This result, however, is not sustainable in the long run, as would seem from 
the fact that for 1992 real returns on such investments fell to four per cent.
d) Pension Funds, savings and investment
The effect on savings and investment is very hard to decipher. As expected 
from figures on labour earnings as a percentage of GDP (Table 2), and 
a contributory tax of 10 per cent, sodal-security savings increased to above 
3 per cent of GDP during the last three years for which we have records. 
At the same time, total savings also increased to around 20 per cent of 
GDP (22 per cent is estimated for 1992). There is no dear relationship 
between these two trends. Given the significant increase in sodal-security 
savings, national savings would have increased were no other forms of 
savings to have changed during the same period. Strong economic growth 
during this period also interacted with the increase in savings and capital 
formation. There are no specific studies regarding these events.
Figures in Tables 11 and 12 show the most recent official estimates 
on savings. There is a twofold trend on the issue of the relationship between 
sodal-security and other forms of savings. The first is that, together with 
private sodal-security savings, other forms of private savings have also in-
Table 11





















(5) = (3)+ (4)
1980 0 2.8 2.8 1 1 . 0 13.8 7.1 21.0
1981 0.9 -1.8 -0.8 8.6 7.8 14.3 22.0
1983 1.7 8.2 9.9 4 .5 5.4 5.7 1 1 . 0
1985 1.8 8.6 10.3 CO 9.5 7.8 17.3
1987 2.1 6.4 8.5 4.1 12.6 4.3 16.9
1988 2.7 6.0 8.7 7.6 16.3 0.8 17.0
1989 3.1 6.3 9.4 7.9 17.3 3.0 20.3
1990 3.3 8.5 11.8 5.5 17.3 3.0 20.2
1991 3.3 10.9 14.3 4.9 19.2 -0.3 18.8
Source: National accounts and Ministry of Finance
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creased quite significantly. The second is that despite the unusually high 
public-sector savings figures for 1980-81, what really happened is that pu- 
blic-sector savings capacity was affected, reverting to its more traditional 
figures. This is^xiue l o  large increases in social-security deficits resulting 
from the transition from one^system to another. This deficit is estimated 
to have reached close to 5 per cent of GDP during 1989-91.
Table 12
SOCIAL-SECURITY DEFICIT ASSOCIATED WITH REFORM
(% GDP)




1981 0.01 1.19 1.20
1983 0.17 3.53 3.70
1985 0.24 3.36 3.60
1987 0.38 3.42 3.80
1988 0.36 3.04 3.40
1989 0.53 4.17 4.70
1990 0.63 4.13 4.76
1991 0.71 4.08 4.79
Projections
1995 0.71 3.84 4.55
2000 0.95 3.18 4.13
2005 1.11 2.28 3.39
2010 0.94 1.47 2.41
Source: P. Arrau, op. cit.
In summary, specialists have reached no final conclusions concerning 
the effect of social-security savings over national savings. This is because 
such an effect can not be easily isolated from others resulting from changes 
in income distribution, economic policy management and the composition 
of savings. Further research is needed on this issue.
4. Other problems pending
Aside from the above issues related to the financial market, there still are 
some challenges linked to its current structure and functioning. There are 
also problems of a different nature.
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a) Challenges related to financial markets
In relation to financial markets, we can identify a twofold challenge. First, 
that of the vulnerability of an individual worker's pension benefits to fi­
nancial market shocks immediately before retirement. "Positive" shocks can 
substantially increase personal pension-fund benefits whereas "negative" 
shocks can substantially reduce them. Steps should thus be taken in order 
to make funds less vulnerable to sudden shocks in financial markets. The 
idea of a stabilization fund to render average returns compatible with nor­
mal financial market conditions during a worker's lifetime should be given 
some thought.
The second challenge concerns the potential control over firms and 
economic activity that pension-fund management firms can achieve based 
on financial capital markets conditions and operations. As things now stand, 
although these firms are not owners of the fund, they can gain considerable 
economic power by placing some of their members on corporate boards 
of directors. New regulations must be developed to avoid control over firms 
and economic sectors by economic groups linked to these pension-fund 
management firms. Estimates show that out of 15 firms the 3 largest account 
for about 70 per cent of all contributors, and the 5 largest for about 85 
per cent of all contributors. Thus concentration of pension-fund management 
firms in the market may very well be a potential source for control over 
the economy; further regulations must be created to avoid this situation. 
In addition, and with a positive outlook for capital-market developments, 
mechanisms should be created to have fund management improve the link 
between financial savings and capital formation, especially that which is 
needed to improve redistribution and growth.
b) Other challenges
Concerning challenges indirectly linked to the structure and functioning of 
financial markets there is one of great importance: the market conditions 
for pension-fund managers.
Market conditions for pension-fund management firms are also in need 
of further regulations to correct various factors affecting the system's cost 
efficiency and redistribution goal: concentration of contributors in the hands
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of a small group of firms is common and responds to important econo­
mies of scale; marketing costs are very high as the result of product com­
petition and of the high returns on commissions; there is very poor trans­
parency and participants lack all the necessary information for rational 
decision-making with regard to market opportunities. Lastly, due to the 
existance of fixed commissions, the system operates regressively in the allo­
cation of returns based on the net-eamings brackets of participants.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Pension systems operate in an interrelated manner with other important 
sectors of the economy: the labour market, the public sector, the financial 
market, the securities and insurance markets, and so forth. Reforms must 
be sought via an integrated approach. Both new and old pension-system 
designs can be perfectly operational under ideal conditions. Regulation and 
supervision mechanisms must be developed to meet them. The later in­
volve not only those needed for the structure and functioning of the pen­
sion system itself but also those concerning other sectors and markets with 
which the system interacts.
The Latin American and Caribbean experience shows that regardless 
of their original design, most systems have developed into pay-as-you-go 
schemes. This has been a consequence of inadequate returns on portfolio 
investment due to inflation and its concentration on government non-in- 
dexed paper. Pay-as-you-go systems are facing, or will face, actuarial im­
balances as the result of demographic changes, poor performance of la­
bour markets and bad administration in terms of both the provision of 
pensionable benefits (which bear no relation to the individual's contribu­
tion) and an excess of overhead expenditures. The non-credibility of current 
systems have further deteriorated their financial situation by causing contri­
butors to avoid their obligations and beneficiaries to claim benefits unre­
lated to past contributions. The impact of pension-system deficits on public- 
sector finance and macroeconomic imbalances close a sort of vicious circle 
by creating a negative environment for adequate investment decisions.
Reforms are being sought with expectations of breaking such a vi­
cious circle. The key is to develop capital markets where compulsory sa-
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vings can contribute to three objectives: accumulating funds for better 
pension benefits, contributing to capital formation for sustainable growth, 
and eliminating capital market segmentation in the access to investment 
funds. Other redistributive goals must be sought through general taxes on 
other sources of income.
The most radical reform has been undertaken in Chile, where a pay- 
as-you-go system has been replaced by an individual capitalization scheme. 
The fundamental change is from public management of tax collecting for 
pensionable purposes to private pension-fund management by firms who 
compete for individual accounts. Another change is from a pay-as-you-go 
scheme, where the rate of return depends on employment and real-wage 
growth and the rate of change in life expectancy at age of retirement, to 
a capitalization scheme, where the rate of return depends on the portfolio 
investment composition of the fund and the financial market results du­
ring the working lifetime as well as on the life expectancy at age of re­
tirement.
The effect on savings of such a reform is not easy to discern. On 
the one hand, the transition implies sizeable obligations from the public 
sector with respect to those already retired within the old system (opera­
tional deficit) as well as those active and transferred to the new system 
(recognition bonus). Estimates of such a burden show that if will increase 
to as much as 4.8 per cent of GDP by 1991 and then gradually decrea­
se to figures of 2.4 per cent of GDP by the year 2010. This undoubtedly 
affects public-sector savings capacity. With regard to the private sector, little 
research has been done with respect to the switch from compulsory insti­
tutional savings to other voluntary forms of savings. Social-security savings 
have increased up to 3.3 per cent of GDP from 1980 to 1991, but other 
forms of savings have also increased considerably in that same period. The 
definite causal rela-tionship between changes in saving rates and all events 
(e.g., changes in the redistribution of income, balance of payments dere­
gulation, financial liberalization, labour market reforms) occurring simulta­
neously with pension-system reforms makes it impossible to draw a defi­
nite conclusion.
Definite conclusions, however, can be drawn with respect to financial 
expansion. The fact that the new system is based on accumulation (capitali­
zation) of pensionable funds, together with the relatively young age of
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participants, explains the rapid growth of the total fund to be interme­
diated in the financial sector as a share of GDP. This share increased from 
zero to 34 per cent in 12 years and is expected to exceed 100 per cent 
by the year 2020. The speed at which the financial market expands as a 
consequence of pension-funds accumulation, and the responsibility of the 
State to justify rates of return that will bring about significant improve­
ments in pension benefits (for which purpose real rates of return should 
be above 5 per cent) puts a lot of pressure on financial market perfor­
mance. Macroeconomic stability, together with regulation and supervision 
of both pension-fund management and the financial markets, become im­
portant components of such reform. But they should be limited in order 
to allow markets to play their proper role in allocating resources efficient-
!y-
Despite some impressive advances, other challenges still remain un­
solved: the vulnerability of an individual worker's pension benefits to fi­
nancial fluctuations at the time of retirement; the risks that economic power 
will become concentrated in the hands of one or two pension-fund Mana­
gement firms; and the difficulties of increasing population coverage by 
system despite large and important individual incentives. Finally, there is 
the industrial organization of the pension fund managers' market in order 
to reduce its concentration on two or three firms, reduce marketing costs, 
improve the transparency of its operations, and avoid fixed commissions 
so as to improve the distribution of returns among participants at different 
income levels.
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INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-1970s financial liberalization has been part of structural re­
form in Latin American and Caribbean countries. Liberalization of bank 
credit and of interest rates and related measures on funding and on the 
structure of the banking system have characterized policy measures. Only 
recently have security markets and stock exchanges in some of the more 
developed countries of the region become important to financial develop­
ment.
Solvency and efficiency are closely interrelated criteria of bank per­
formance. A solvent bank is able to pay its deposits and other liabilities 
without drawing on its capital or own funds1. Bank efficiency can be apprai­
sed at two levels: operational efficiency in carrying out financial and servi­
ces transactions at minimum cost, that is, at a minimum "spread" between 
lending and deposit rates of interest; and allocational efficiency when mak­
ing loans and granting credit to socially profitable projects. Allocational 
efficiency includes operational or cost efficiency as well as the capacity of 
banks to attract deposits and make loans at competitive interest rates2.
This paper seeks to highlight the factors which determined the out­
come of financial liberalization experiences in Latin American and Caribbean
1 Solvency is taken up when dealing with prudential regulation.
2 A bank which is perceived as solvent by depositors can attract funds and lend at lower 
interest rates than otherwise, while attracting high-quality borrowers; a cost-efficient or low- 
spread bank is also able to lend at lower interest rates than otherwise and attract low-risk 
borrowers.
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countries in the 1970s and 1980s. Emphasis is given to country cases where 
these experiences led to solvency problems or severe financial crises.
The performance of banks as regards solvency and efficiency depends 
mainly on the following:
a) Macroeconomic factors and policies determining output variability
growth and relative price changes. These factors affect the level and 
variability of profit and income, i.e., the "first" loan repayment sour­
ces of firms and households; they thus also affect risks of loss in 
bank loan and asset portfolios.
b) Regulations and norms which set the "rules of the game” of banking
and the supervision of their compliance.
c) Internal bank management of loans, credit and financial investments 
in terms of "safe and sound" portfolio practices.
Macroeconomic conditions and policies can have a major effect on
bank solvency and efficiency. Here, only a brief outline of such conditions 
and policies will be provided as part of the environment in which finan­
cial liberalization experiences took place. Bank management also ranks high 
in determining bank performance. However, it will not be taken up except 
for noting that loan, credit and financial-investment practices depend signi­
ficantly on bank regulation and supervision.
The main issues of this paper refer to bank regulation and supervi­
sion and their relations to liberalization and financial instability. The paper 
consists of three sections. The first provides an account of the different 
types of regulations which shape the framework of banking activities. It 
deals with financial liberalization, prudential regulation and alternative 
arrangements for controlling bank solvency. The second section looks at 
the financial liberalization of the Chilean banking system. This experience 
is of particular interest since it has gone full circle -from swift liberaliza­
tion in the 1970s, to a heavy financial crisis at the beginning of the 1980s, 
a far-reaching bank reform in the mid-1980s, and since then, to renewed 
financial liberalization and proposed additional reforms to the banking 
structure. The third section contains an overview of a large sample of fi­
nancial liberalization experiences in Latin American and Caribbean countries 
during the 1970s and 1980s which resulted in solvency problems and fi­
nancial instability. This section seeks to highlight common factors behind 
this outcome. The paper ends with a summary of conclusions.
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I. BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION
Banking activities are usually subject to considerable regulations or norms 
governing authorized financial transactions and services, financial flows and 
stocks, the legal and accounting framework of banks, and other aspects. 
Based on Marshall, three types of regulations will be distinguished: finan­
cial, organizational, and prudential3.
1. Financial regulation
Norms seeking to control the flow and intermediation of funds are mainly 
geared to price stability and efficient allocation of resources. The Central 
Bank (or other financial regulator) may set norms on interest rates and 
the exchange rate, taking into account macroeconomic conditions and the 
competitiveness of domestic financial instruments (the latter should be able 
to attract and keep funds denominated in domestic currency). It may also 
regulate bank reserve requirements and foreign-capital flows to control the 
growth of the supply of money, the channelling of credit in certain directions 
(deemed socially profitable), and other aspects related to the pricing and 
availability of financial resources.
Financial regulations may set interest rates and/or the exchange rate 
too low, or below equilibrium levels. They may impose heavy reserve 
requirements, low-yield public-sector financial investments and other "quasi­
fiscal" burdens on banks, and put other restrictions on raising and allocat­
ing funds, all of which reduce the real rate of growth and the real size 
of funds in relation to GDP or other non-finandal magnitudes. According 
to the financial liberalization approach, in this case, regulations cause fi­
nancial "repression" and lead to a backward or "shallow" financial system, 
represented typically by a few oligopolistic banks and a fragmented finan­
cial system. Furthermore, in real terms, regulations on interest rates and 
exchange rates would discourage savings and hence capital formation, ex­
ports and the production of tradeables4.
3 E. Marshall, "El Banco Central como Regulador y Supervisor del Sistema Financiero", Reu­
nión de Gobernadores de Bancos Centrales, Santiago, October 1991.
4 E. Shaw, Financial Deepening in Economic Development, (Oxford University Press, 1973).
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The financial liberalization approach interprets financial repression as 
typical of inflationary economies with weak public finances and heavy 
government "interventionism". On the basis of a sufficiently stabilized eco­
nomy and strengthened public finances5, this approach advocates a policy 
of financial deregulation or liberalization of interest rates and exchange ra­
tes, as well as the abolition of directed credit allocation and other norms 
hampering market forces (as part of a wider shift toward market oriented 
policies)6.
High real interest rates and competitive rates of exchange are expec­
ted to lead to financial "deepening", as the ratio of financial assets to GDP 
increases. To sustain this process, financial and organizational regulations 
have to lay the legal and institutional framework for new financial ins­
truments and institutions able to pool and diversify funds on the savings 
and investment sides of capital accumulation. Accordingly, the real effects 
of financial liberalization are expected to show up as an increase in the 
ratio of private savings (and hence of investment) and exports to GDP, 
thus "reviving" growth7. As the financial and real effects of financial libera­
lization become visible, market-determined interest rates and the rate of 
exchange are expected to come down gradually and fall in line with the 
reference standards for these macro-prices in an orderly managed economy: 
positive but moderate real interest rates, and credible and sustainable ex­
change rates (as approximations to their equilibrium prices in the medium 
to long term).
5 A low and controlled rate of inflation is an important condition of bank performance and 
financial liberalization. High and variable inflation rates change relative prices and profits in 
ways which are difficult to predict. They foster higher credit risks, higher interest rates and 
a shortening of the period of financial transactions.
A public sector with a financial surplus is also important to bank performance and financial 
liberalization. A frequent policy to provide resources to an inadequately funded public 
sector involves imposing high reserve requirements and other "quasifiscal" charges on banks. 
The latter increase the spread through higher lending or active rates of interest and lower 
deposit or passive interest rates. Strong public finances therefore mean both lower interest 
rates and a greater availability of funds to the banking system.
6 R. Me Kinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development, Washington D.C., (The Brookings 
Institution, 1973).
7 E. Shaw, op. cit., pp 3-14.
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2. Organizational regulation
Norms concerning the "industrial" structure of banking are aimed at cost 
or operational efficiency of banks8 and fortifying the banking system as 
a whole relative to financial stability.
Cost efficiency calls for norms promoting competition through entry 
barriers which allow a sufficient number of banks in order to prevent mo­
nopolistic practices, as well as banks of a sufficient size in order to take 
advantage of economies of scale. Cost efficiency also depends on norms 
defining the range of financial services, beyond granting loans and credit, 
which are open to banks. These norms aim at broader defined banking 
activities while taking advantage of scope economies in complementary fi­
nancial services.
The large-scale capacity of banks to handle information and the in­
creasing range of financial services in conjunction with financial develop­
ment have fostered the expansion of specialized short-term commercial 
banking into "multibanking" and even into "universal” banking services9. 
This expansion exposes traditional commercial banks to the risks of a wi­
dening range of activities as well as to conflicts of interest stemming from 
a "principal agent" problem in so far as better results of the latter may 
affect the results of the former10. Arguments on behalf of prudential regu­
lation set out below emphasize that commercial banks are financially fra­
gile. Therefore, when they move into multibanking or into universal bank­
ing, norms regarding the structure of banking have to seek ways to "shield" 
the capital and results of core banking activities from the performance of 
parent firms offering other financial services11.
8 Cost efficiency translates into low spreads or margins between lending or active interest 
rates and deposit or passive interest rates.
9 Universal banks are able to offer a full range of financial services.
10 Consider for instance a commercial bank which sets up a wholly owned mutual fund. If the 
bank issues bonds which are bought up by the mutual fund at above market interest rates, 
the profits of the bank will be lower and the profits of the mutual fund will be higher than 
otherwise.
11 F. Morandé and J. M. Sánchez, "La Expansión del Giro Bancario Tradicional a los Negocios 
No Bancarios", in La Banca Ante Nuevo Negocios y Mercados, (Santiago, Asociación de Bancos 
e Instituciones Financieras de Chile, December 1992).
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3. Prudential regulation
For the most part, prudential norms aim at preserving the solvency of 
banks. The latter are financially fragile for two main reasons. First, a dis­
tinctive feature of banks as firms is that payment of deposit or passive 
interest rates and the stock value of deposits and liabilities are contracted 
as fixed with the public, although lending or active interest rates and the 
recovery of loans and financial investments (at currency denominations 
which may partly differ from those pertaining to deposit and liabilities) 
are subject to risk of loss, and are thus variable in nature. Second, the 
financial structure of banks is highly leveraged12. Thus, the loss of a small 
proportion of assets can wipe out all capital13 unless other of the bank's 
own funds are at hand.
The (accounting) capital of banks represents an effective capital or 
patrimony, provided all expected losses in assets (stemming from risk tak­
ing) have been properly measured and fully provisioned (out of profits). 
In this case, capital is an indicator of solvency and a measure of the abili­
ty to withstand unexpected losses. As long as effective capital is positive, 
a bank is able to pay all its deposits and liabilities out of its loans and 
financial investments (without having to draw on its own funds)14. De Juan 
has remarked that in the case of banks, insolvency invariably comes be­
fore illiquidity (while in the case of firms located in the real sector, illi­
quidity usually precedes insolvency)15. Thus non-payment of deposits and 
other liabilities by a bank is a clear sign that it is fully insolvent.
12 The ratio of deposits and liabilities, or else their counterpart of loans and finandal invest­
ments, usually exceeds capital by ten times or more.
13 If loans and finandal investments are equal to deposits and liabilities, this loss is equal to 
the inverse of the leverage ratio.
14 Capital is the difference between correctly-valued assets and liabilities. If capital is positive, 
assets exceed liabilities.
15 Banks are able to raise funds from the public and to sell finandal instruments out of thrir 
portfolio to make cash. This allows them to meet their obligations though they may face 
acute insolvency. See Aristóbulo de Juan, "From Good Bankers to Bad Bankers: "Ineffective 
Supervision and Management Deterioration as Major Elements in Banking Crises", World 
Bank, Washington, Country Economic Department, 1987, mimeo.
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Non-payment of deposits and other obligations by some banks, parti­
cularly the larger ones, runs the risk of causing major external negative 
repercussions of a macroeconomic nature. It may lead to a "run" on banks 
and a massive deposit withdrawal, or a contraction of liquidity and credit 
in domestic financial markets as the public loses confidence in the banking 
system. In foreign markets, it can undermine the credit-worthiness of the 
country as a whole, and not only of insolvent banks. Similarly, a banking 
system which exhibits a strong solvency position produces positive macro- 
economic external repercussions. It boosts public confidence in the payment 
system facilitating economic transactions; it diminishes the risks faced by 
agents and firms located in the real sector enhancing financial transac­
tions; it mobilizes domestic financial savings which may otherwise remain 
idle, and allows access to foreign financial resources and the financing of 
projects which may not be undertaken otherwise. The above positive and 
negative external considerations are strong arguments in favour of con­
trolling bank solvency.
Bank solvency problems can be dealt with via two principal mea­
sures. The first deals with causes of insolvency which can be prevented 
through "prudential" regulations and norms. The second refers mainly to 
measures avoiding the risk of bank runs or large-scale deposit withdrawals 
(which may result from non-deposit payment by some insolvent banks). 
The latter measures will be considered first.
a) State guarantee on deposits
The State can provide a guarantee on deposits to limit the risk of bank 
runs. However, insolvency risks increase due to the fact that a State gua­
rantee "distorts" the retum-risk relation by diminishing or eliminating the 
risk of losses to depositors and by stimulating banks to take on larger 
risks.
The return-risk relation calls for depositors and savers to make their 
decisions considering both the deposit interest rates offered by banks and 
the repayment prospects of their funds (as determined by the riskiness of 
banks' asset portfolios). However, as State guarantee coverage expands, de­
posit interest rates offered by banks have an increasingly greater influence 
on savers' and depositors' decisions as to which bank to choose. Evidently,
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when there is a full State guarantee on deposits there is no asset risk for 
depositors; the only variable guiding depositors and savers is the level of 
the interest rate offered by different banks. The State guarantee on de­
posits also distorts the retum-risk relation in bank portfolio management. 
A broad State guarantee allows banks to assume greater risks when mak­
ing loans and financial investments without being exposed to deposit 
withdrawals themselves. Banks are therefore tempted to relax their credit 
and investment allocation processes. They are also able to enter more risky 
market segments without having to increase their deposit interest rates. Thus 
the larger the guarantee, the greater the probability that the Central Bank, 
as "lender of last resort", will have to cover the deposits of insolvent banks 
and assume bank losses.
A very important characteristic of the State guarantee on deposits is 
that it can be explicit or implicit. In the first case, there are written norms 
which set out the terms of the guarantee. In the second case, the public 
clearly understands that the Central Bank (or other public sector institu­
tion) will stand behind the deposits of insolvent banks. While the explicit 
State guarantee may be partial (leaving an element of risk in savings and 
deposit decisions), the implicit guarantee is distinguished by the fact that 
depositors and savers behave as if their funds are fully protected (that 
is, their decisions will depend only on the level of deposit interest rates 
offered by banks)16.
b) Deposit insurance
Deposit insurance has an important conceptual advantage in comparison 
to the State guarantee on deposits. Insurance premiums payable by banks, 
and eventually by depositors themselves, could be differentiated accord­
16 Various factors can shape one's perception of an implicit State guarantee on deposits. The 
following are all important; lack of bank liquidations in the past due to the rescue of banks 
with solvency problems; the existence of public banks and large private banks in relation to 
the size of the domestic credit market, and foreign banks, which depositors believe will not 
be allowed to go under; introduction of a partial guarantee on certain deposits; and lack of 
transparency of bank solvency. In the latter case, economic agents are unable to distinguish 
among banks according to their risks. The State thus assumes somewhat of a moral duty to 
protect the savings and deposits of banks which become insolvent.
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ing to the risk of banks losing their assets. However it is very difficult 
to make practical use of this advantage. So far, measurement of the va­
rious risks faced by banks does not rely on generally accepted procedures, 
nor are accepted methods at hand to sum up these risks in an overall 
index. For these reasons, insurance funds are generally built up on the 
basis of uniform premiums charged on all banks, to cover listed deposits 
up to certain amounts in cases of insolvency. Hus type of insurance has 
similar effects as a partial guarantee on deposits17.
c) Norms controlling solvency
These norms seek to limit risks and control bank solvency mainly by re­
lying on "self regulation" by market participants. They aim to encourage 
bank directors and bank managers (in representation of shareholders) to 
adopt "safe and sound" loan and financial investment portfolio policies and 
decisions (taking on risks compatible with the high leverage of banks). At 
the same time, they seek to encourage depositors to exert market disci­
pline on banks by taking into account both deposit (or passive) interest 
rates and the risk of loss of their funds at different banks when making 
their decisions.
Table 1 shows the objectives and content of a typical set of pruden­
tial norms intended for self-regulation of bank solvency. These norms 
address the main factors acting in favour of the financial stability of banks 
taking into account the macroeconomic external repercussions related to 
bank solvency and insolvency.
First, strict norms for entering the banking system. These norms re­
quire the "screening" of entrants and a barrier of minimum capital18.
Second, norms maintaining a solid capital base, net of expected risk 
of loss, for established banks. Accordingly, solvency norms aim at:
• Limiting the risks which banks are able to take on when making
17 Depositors and savers tend to overvalue the deposit rate of interest banks in their decisions; 
banks can allocate funds to more risky market segments without fearing a withdrawal of 
deposits.
18 Entry conditions for solvency reasons may be more demanding than the barriers on account 
of organizational regulations promoting competition.
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Table 1
PRUDENTIAL REGULATION OF BANK SOLVENCY








of measured risks 





bank solvency to 
depositors and 
to the public
Orderly exit from the 
banking system
- Fairly high minimum entry capital
■ Standards of main shareholders, directors, and the head manager
• Ample loan and financial investment portfolio diversification (to 
control risks arising from fund concentration in economic agents, 
in economic sectors and in financial instrument)
• Written norms on loans and collaterals (to control individual cre­
dit risks, particularly, of "related" loans (a)
■ Limits on active/passive funds with maturity mismatching accor­
ding to their time profile (to control interest rate risks)
• Limits on active/passive funds with currency mismatching accor­
ding to their currency denomination (to control exchange rate 
risks)
■ Limits on fixed or immobilized assets and requirements of liquid 
financial instruments (to control liquidity risks)
■ Control of other risks affecting banks (b)
Accurate measurement of risks or expected losses in asset portfo­
lio
Full risk provisioning or built up of reserves (out of profit) 
Suspension of interest accruals on very risky loans
Speedy replacement of capital losses
Minimum capital requirements according to the risks of different
assets
Periodic information to depositors and to the public on the sol­
vency position of banks (including measured risks in their assets, 
amounts of provisions or reserves to cover expected losses, and 
effective capitals)
Orderly liquidation of insolvent banks 
Clear rules on preferential payment of certain deposits and obliga­
tions (such as checking account, small-scale savings, and Central- 
Bank credits)
(a) Loans "related" to shareholders, director, and bank managers
(b) Mainly refers to off-balance sheet transactions.
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loans and financial investments, particularly credit risks (or the risk 
of loan default), foreign-exchange risks (derived from lending or 
investing in a currency denomination which differs from the one 
pertaining to deposits and liabilities), and interest-rate risks (arising 
from lending or investment at fixed interest rates at longer terms 
than those for deposit and liabilities).
• An accurate measurement and full provisioning of all risks of loss 
in the asset portfolio of banks, and the suspension of interest 
accruals on high-risk loans.
• Building up the capital base of banks according to the risk profi­
le of their loan and financial asset portfolio19.
The effectiveness of these norms in preserving the solvency of banks 
depends significantly on the timely and periodic furnishing of reliable 
information to depositors and the public concerning risk and capital in­
dicators of banks, as well as how depositors and bank shareholders per­
ceive their funds as being subject to losses depending on the riskiness of 
bank assets.
Third, norms dealing systematically with financial instabilities of dif­
ferent magnitudes, including timely recapitalization of banks with emer­
ging solvency problems and orderly liquidation of insolvent banks. In the 
latter case, norms must clearly indicate the precedence of payments of de­
posits and liabilities out of the liquidation of assets, in favour of small- 
scale savers and of the Central Bank as "lender of last resort".
4. Bank supervision
Bank supervision involves the activities of a public sector financial authori­
ty (usually a Bank Superintendency or possibly the Central Bank) geared 
to ensuring compliance with financial, organizational, and prudential re­
gulations.
The efficacy of supervision in seeing that banks effectively comply 
with the prevailing norms depends mainly on the following factors:
1. A strong supervisory authority endowed with legal and financial
19 Like the capital requirements agreed in the Basle Accord.
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autonomy, capable of basing its activities on technical criteria and 
of fending off political interests and pressure groups.
The supervisory authority should be sufficiently endowed with 
highly qualified personnel in legal, accounting, financial, and in­
formation processing matters, in order to provide technical sup­
port for banking norms and their fulfillment. The cornerstone of 
solvency supervision is a periodic assessment of the risks of loan 
losses in the finandal-asset portfolios of banks, on the basis of a 
reliable and uniform procedure.
2. A clear division of tasks among supervisory authorities of the fi­
nancial system, once banks expand towards multibanking or uni­
versal banking, in order to cover all financial transactions and ser­
vices and to avoid the overlapping of supervision20. If a deposit 
insurance fund is in operation, it is also important to separate its 
tasks from those of the supervisory authority of the banking sys­
tem in cases of bank insolvency.
3. Clearly-specified banking norms and well-defined and calibrated 
sanctions to discourage non-compliance.
5. Arrangements for the regulation of bank solvency
The regime pertaining to State guarantee or insurance on deposits (and 
other bank liabilities) together with the set of "prudential" controls or 
norms with regard to solvency, are the two main components of a sys­
tem of bank solvency regulation21. According to Feller, the combination of 
these two components yields the four institutional arrangements on regu­
lation of bank solvency shown in Table 2.
20 This is easier to achieve by organizing supervision according to functions or financial ser­
vices, i.e. credit, loans, insurance and others, instead of financial institutions, i.e. banks, 
insurance companies, and so on.
21 This section admits that if deposit insurance is available, premiums, are uniform, and thus 
insurance is similar to a partial guarantee on deposits.
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a) Free or non-regulated banking (as regards solvency)22
In a system of free or non-regulated banking, there is no State guarantee 
on deposits nor rules controlling bank solvency. Depositors and savers 
assume substantial risks when placing their funds. Accordingly, they are 
expected to exercise great precaution when choosing a bank. Macroecono­
mic externalities of banking activities in developed or formal financial 
markets appear to have turned free banking into a theoretical alternative.
b) Public-sector controlled banking
A large, explicit State guarantee on deposits, or an implicit State guaran­
tee, induces savers and depositors to fully ignore the insolvency risks of 
banks. They are motivated only by the highest deposit interest rates 
offered by banks for their funds. Thus, maintaining bank solvency de­
pends entirely on prudential regulation controls (and on its supervision). 
This task calls for a rigorous definition of the set of norms mentioned 
in table 1.
c) Bicontrolled banking
The absence of an explicit or implicit State guarantee, or of deposit in­
surance, encourages depositors and savers, especially those handling large 
amounts, to assume an active market-disciplining role by assessing banks 
according to their risks and deposit interest rates23. To perform this func­
tion, depositors and savers must be informed about bank solvency indi­
cators. At the same time, prudential regulation norms limit bank risks and 
establish risk provisioning and capital requirements. Since both depositors 
and a public-sector financial authority assume solvency control functions, 
this arrangement is tantamount to "bicontrolled" banking24.
22 Free banking differs from non-regulated banking as regards solvency, in that the former is 
not subject to financial and organizational norms nor to prudential norms.
23 Banks carrying larger risks in their asset portfolios will have to pay higher deposit rates of 
interest.
24 In this arrangement prudential norms should be gauged taking into account the market dis-
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Table 2
INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR BANK SOLVENCY REGULATION (a)
Solvency controls
Deposit Without solvency With prudential
Guarantee controls regulation controls
Without deposit Free or non­ Bicontrolled banking
guarantee regulated Banking Banks subject both to the
Banks subject to the control of depositors and
control of depositors of a public-sector financial
authority
With deposit Uncontrolled Banking Public-sector controlled
guarantee (explicit or Banks not subject to banking
implicit) controls of depositors Banks subject to the control
nor of a public-sector of a public-sector financial
financial authority authority
(a) Adapted from A. Feller, "Supervisión, Regulación y Riesgos Bancarios", Superintendencia de Bancos 
e  Instituciones Financieras, Información Financiera (Santiago, Chile, May 1985), pp. ix-xi.
d) Uncontrolled banking
A total explicit or implicit State guarantee on deposits leads depositors and 
savers to take into account only interest rates when making their deci­
sions, fully ignoring bank solvency risks. At the same time, there is no 
prudential bank regulation. Banking norms refer mainly to accounting 
procedures and financial norms concerning reserve requirements, directed 
credit allocations, and financial investment in public-sector instruments. In 
this arrangement neither depositors nor a public-sector financial authori­
ty are concerned with bank solvency risks, thus representing a situation 
of "uncontrolled" banking as regards solvency.
Deregulating or liberalizing credit in this context can easily lead to
dpline role of depositors and savers. Too rigorous norms can lead banks to adopt highly 
conservative loan and financial policies, taking on less risks than are socially desirable. 
Loans for small -and medium- scale firms, especially agents wishing to start an economic 
activity, may get little credit since prudential norms may consider that they are too risky. 
Thus bank solvency indicators may be very good, although the establishment may not 
finance socially profitable investment projects.
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excessive high risk credit due to the lack of "filters" or restrictions on de­
mand for bank funds. At the level of firms and banks, this translates into 
a significant number of high-risk projects, uncollectable loans and large ex­
pected bank losses. The counterpart at the macroeconomic level is excessi­
ve aggregate expenditure, high real interest rates (and inflationary pressu­
re). This process can be accumulative as very high real interest rates drag 
down solvent bank debtors25.
II. BANK REGULATION IN THE CHILEAN FINANCIAL
LIBERALIZATION EXPERIENCE
The Chilean financial liberalization of the mid-1970s resulted from an eva­
luation of economic policies which had "repressed" bank credit, savings and 
exports owing to import substitution and interventionism in previous de­
cades26. These reforms also envisaged opening the economy up to foreign 
trade and capital, and shifting resources and decision-making to the priva­
te sector. Since the economy was faced with triple-digit inflation between 
1974 and 1975, stabilization measures were implemented simultaneously 
with structural reforms27.
The banking system which prevailed in 1974-75 was made up of spe­
cialized banks, mainly commercial banks, limited to short-term transactions.
25 As Feller points out, there comes a point when the government perceives that the situation 
is unsustainable. But at this stage, the restoration of solvency of both banks and debtors 
invariably means large financial losses for the State. (A. Feller, 'Supervisión, Regulación y 
Riesgo Bancario”, Información Financiera, Santiago, Superintendencia de Bancos e Institucio­
nes Financieras, May 1985).
26 The setting of (nominal) interest rates and the rate of exchange in inflationary conditions 
frequently led to negative real rates of interest and, most of the time, to a substantially 
overvalued domestic currency. At the outset of liberalization policies in 1975-76, bank loans 
averaged only 9.3 per cent of GDP, national savings 11.2 per cent of GDP (though 14 per 
cent represented historical levels), and exports of goods and services 25.2 per cent of GDP 
(though 20 per cent were closer to historical levels).
27 For short but forceful statement regarding the evaluation and changes in the economic 
policy régime see S. de Castro, "Exposición sobre el Estado de la Hacienda Pública”, Boletín 
Mensual, Banco Central de Chile, January 1978, and P. Barahona and M. Gómez, "Esfuerzos 
de Estabilización en Chile", Boletín Mensual, Banco Central de Chile, October 1975.
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Virtually all banks had also been taken over by the State in 1970-73. The 
banking reform thus had two main components. First, financial liberaliza­
tion of credit and interest rates and related measures concerning reserve 
requirements, a broader funding base and access to foreign capital. Second, 
organizational measures aimed at a private and competitive banking sys­
tem and the first steps toward multibanking by authorizing banks to un­
dertake longer term transactions and mortgage operations.
1. Measures and financial consequences of bank reform
Bank privatization proceeded swiftly after September 1975. Virtually all 
banks had been sold to the private sector by the end of 1978, with the 
exception of the State Bank. Banks were privatized at the same time as 
a large number of firms in the real sector, which had also been taken 
over by the State in 1970-73. This procedure soon led to economic "groups", 
as bank owners used their banks' credit to purchase firms offered for sale. 
Interlocking ownership and management of banks and firms in the real 
sector would enhance the meaning of "related" loans in credit liberaliza­
tion.
Administrative and legal barriers to the banking system were lifted 
with the aim of fostering competition. Foreign banks could enter the do­
mestic market at the end of 1974 while foreign investment in banking be­
came possible in January 1977. At the end of 1974 the Superintendency 
of Banks regulated the activities of financial establishments28. Between 1974 
and 1981, the number of banks increased from twenty-one to forty-five, 
foreign banks went from one to eighteen, while seventeen financial esta­
blishments were in operation at the end of 1981.
Quantitative credit allocations were lifted at the end of 1973. In June 
1977, the authority of the Central Bank to establish credit guidelines was 
severely limited. After partial deregulation of interest rates in 1974-75, they 
could be freely negotiated starting in December 1975. Taking account of 
ongoing inflation, all debt transactions due in more than ninety days
28 Financial establishments are unable to offer checking accounts and to finance foreign trade 
transactions. They devote themselves mainly to financing household purchases of durable 
consumer goods.
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could be indexed to the CPI after July 1976. Reserve requirements for sight 
and time deposits were reduced starting in 1975 and 1976, and levelled 
out at 10 per cent and 4 per cent respectively in 1980. Restrictions on the 
acquirement of foreign debt by banks were gradually removed after De­
cember 1977 and virtually abolished in April 1980. However, controls were 
kept on outflows of capital. These were instrumental in maintaining foreign 
funds in the banking system and in increasing the financing role of the 
latter. In 1981 all loan and finandal-asset portfolio growth of the banking 
system was due to foreign debt financing.
The financial liberalization measures were soon followed by abnor­
mally high rates of growth of the banking system's loan (and finandal- 
asset) portfolio and of interest-rate levels, as well as by extremely large 
interest spreads29. Column 1, Table 3 shows these figures for 1978-80, four 
years after financial liberalization got under way in order to dampen the 
effects of inherited financial "repression" on the behaviour of banking va­
riables. Loan (and finandal-asset) portfolios grew on the average at almost 
40 per cent a year in real terms (equivalent to five times the GDP growth 
rate), while average real rates of interest on the outstanding stock of loans 
(and finandal assets) stood at around 20 per cent a year (equivalent to 
two and a half times the GDP growth rate). Gross spreads were almost 
10 per cent a year. They covered provisions and write offs of risk-prone 
loans of 1.7 per cent a year (indicating an apparently sound portfolio growth), 
and hefty administrative and other current expenses of 5.2 per cent a year 
(suggesting operational ineffidendes). Gross spreads also provided for a 
substantial profit rate of 22 per cent on capital (achieved with an average 
asset ratio of nine). The above indicators reflected a booming banking sys­
tem which looked profitable and safe.
Yet a solvency crisis of unexpected magnitude erupted in 1981, lead­
ing to large-scale intervention of the banking system. Between 1981 and 
1984 the Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions intervened 
in fourteen private domestic banks, induding the two largest private banks 
in 1983, and eight finandal establishments, out of twenty-six domestic pri-
29 On the behaviour of interest rates see R. Zahler "Las tasas de interés en Chile: 1975-82", El De­
sarrollo Financiero de América Latina y el Caribe 1985, (Caracas, Instituto Interamericano de 
Mercados de Capital, 1985).
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Table 3 
CHILE
Bank Behaviour at the Peak of Financial Liberalization (1978-80) and after 
the Recovery of Solvency and Prudential Regulation Reform (1986-91)
(in %, with the exception of the asset leverage ratio)
1978-80 1986-88 1991-92
Real rate of growth per year (%)
a) Loan and financial-asset portfolio 38.7 -3.1 6.5
b) Deposits and liabilities 39.8 4 .9 7.5
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 8.1 6.2 8.2
Real average rates of interest per year (%)
a) Loan and financial-asset portfolio 19.6 8.2 8.7
b) Deposits and liabilities 13.0 5.9 6.1
Yearly spread as % of assets (a)
a) Interest rate spread 6.9 2.6 3.0
b) Gross spread 9.8 5.0 6.1
Yearly expenditure as % of assets (a)
a) Provisions and loan write offs 1.7 1.0 1.0
b) Administration expenses 5.2 2.2 3.5
Results before tax as % (a)
a) Assets (a) 2.4 1.5 1.5
b) Capital and reserves 21.7 21.3 19.2
c) Asset leverage ratio =  (b/a) 9.0 14.2 12.8
(a) Total bank assets.
Source Información Financiera, Superintendencia de Bancos e  Instituciones Financieras 
Santiago, December issues of 1978 to 1991
vate banks and seventeen finandal establishments which were in operation 
in 1981. Banks and financial establishments which had grown at specta­
cular rates before the crisis virtually all underwent intervention and liqui­
dation. Eight banks and all finandal establishments affected by interven­
tion were dosed down.
The generalized financial crisis among domestic banking institutions 
and debtors called for large-scale recovery measures. Bad loans which had 
been sold to Central Banks by the end of 1985 were equivalent to 28 per 
cent of the outstanding loan portfolio, 18 per cent of GDP, and on the 
average over three times the capital of banks and of finandal establish­
ments which made use of this alternative. But if one takes into account 
bad loans made by dosed banks and finandal establishments, and interest
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rate and exchange rate subsidies involved in large-scale debt reprogram­
ming, the estmated financial losses of the Central Bank were around 40 
per cent of GDP of 198930.
In seeking to explain these extraordinary losses under financial libera­
lization, two main factors stand out: unfavourable macroeconomic condi­
tions and the widespread failure of prudential regulation and supervision.
a) Unfavourable macroeconomic conditions
The simultaneous implementation of structural reforms and stabilization 
policies (and occasionally inconsistent economic policies, economic shocks, 
overly ambitious growth expectations, and other events), frequently led to 
sharp changes in relative prices and profitabilities among firms and econo­
mic sectors, with subsequently erroneous profit and risk signals31. Excessi­
ve bank lending, along with high credit risks and interest rates, are thus 
interpreted as "transmission mechanisms" of macroeconomic factors.
The following macroeconomic policies led to large relative price and 
profit shifts between economic activities, and consequently to substantial 
credit risks and solvency problems among banks and debtors:
• In 1974-77, a foreign-trade reform which lowered nominal tariffs 
from an average of 105 per cent in 1974 to 10 per cent in 1977, 
amid macroeconomic adjustment which reduced GDP by 13 per 
cent in 1975 and a stabilization policy which brought inflation 
down from the triple-digit level in 1974-76 to around 60 per cent 
in 1977.
• In 1978-82, the effects of the adoption in February 1978 of the no­
minal exchange rate as a stabilizing factor in the form of fixed, 
preannounced and diminishing rates of devaluation, in the presence 
of high domestic interest rates and wage indexation clauses. This 
policy brought inflation down, but a rate comparable to that of 
industrialized countries was not achieved until early 1982. In the
30 N. Eyzaguirre and O. Larrañaga, Macroeconomia de las operaciones cuasífiscales en Chile, (Santia­
go, SECLAC/UNDP, August 1990).
31 S. Edwards, Stabilization with Liberalization: An Evolution of Ten Years of Chile's Experiment 
with Free Market Policies 1973-83, (EDCC, University of Chicago Press, January 1985).
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meantime, the virtual elimination of foreign-exchange risk had pro­
duced a wide gap between real lending rates in domestic currency 
and in foreign currency (of ex-post 13 per cent in 1980 and 40 
per cent in 1981), and stimulated large foreign-debt-financed capital 
inflows. The latter led to yearly domestic expenditure increases of 
over 10 per cent in real terms between 1978-81, and in conjunction 
with wage indexation, to an accumulated drop in the real exchan­
ge rate of 33 per cent by mid-1982. The profitability and solvency 
of export and import competing sectors had gone aground, while 
real estate and other non-tradeables were getting a larger share of 
bank credit32.
• In 1982-1983, the effects of a drastic balance of payments adjust­
ment, on account of the abrupt interruption of foreign capital flows 
following the Mexican debt moratorium of March 1982. GDP fell 
15 per cent, and after the exchange rate started to float in June 
1992, its real value increased around 70 per cent by the end of 
1983. These adjustments caused solvency problems for debtors lo­
cated in non-tradeable activities and in other sectors.
The above macroeconomic conditions are certainly important in ex­
plaining the large-scale financial crisis of the early 1980s. However, for the 
following reasons they are also quite insufficient. The banking-system loan 
portfolio had grown by around 38 per cent in 1980 (as compared to 9 
per cent in 1975-76), suggesting that credit "repression" was no longer im­
portant. Yet, the loan portfolio was growing at 46 per cent in real terms 
in that year and real lending rates of interest still stood above 18 per cent, 
both quite out of line with GDP growth or other macroeconomic activity 
indicators. Then, the financial crisis started in 1981, after five years of strong 
growth, while the economy was growing at 5.5 per cent a year, and befo­
re the severe macroeconomic adjustment of 1982.
32 J.A. Fontaine, "Crecimiento, recesión y mercado", Estudios Públicos (Santiago), Ne 11,1983; V. 
Cortx), J. de Meló and J. Tybout, "What went wrong with the recent reforms in the Southern 
Cone", (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1985, Report DRD128).
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b) Prudential regulation failures
Vigorous prudential regulation and supervision were particularly required 
in a rapidly liberalized banking system with insufficient loan management 
experience, and which started extending credit to firms very short of funds 
following the economic and political turbulence of 1970-73. However, the 
only noticeable measure in favor of bank solvency which was taken dur­
ing financial liberalization was the increase, on various occasions between 
1974 and 1980, of minimum capital requirements for banks and financial 
establishments33.
By 1977, the distinctive features of "uncontrolled" banking as regards 
solvency (discussed in section I) can clearly be seen: lack of prudential 
norms controlling solvency and a full State guarantee on deposits. Under 
these conditions, banks were not merely recipients of high-risk loans due 
to macroeconomic imbalances and distorted macroeconomic prices. They 
were able to put in place a high-growth high-risk credit "mechanism" 
which generated solvency problems as soon as credit and interest rates 
had been liberalized. Thus excessive loan-portfolio growth reflected both 
defective norms controlling the demand for bank credit, as well as an inabi­
lity to regulate the supply of funds due to the State guarantee on deposits. 
Public-sector financial authorities exerted no prudential regulation and 
supervision, nor did depositors play a role in disciplining the market.
i. Defective noms controlling solvency
Essential aspects of the credit process were at fault: guarantees or colla­
terals as a second source of loan repayment, limits on individual credit 
to avoid risk concentration, and the handling of high-risk overdue loans.
Very weak collaterals are evident in "goods received in payment" for 
bad loans. Of the loans which banks and financial establishments sold to 
the Central Bank in 1981-83 as part of measures to rescue troubled insti-
33 The minimum capital of banks went up from US$ 2.5 million to around US$ 10 million; that 
of financial societies from US$ 0,4 million to around US$ 5 million. The financial crisis of the 
early 1980s demonstrated the pitfalls of attempting to face solvency problems by merely 
strengthening capital bases. The latter proved totally insufficient to cover accumulated losses.
266 G ü n t h e r  H e l d  Y .
tutions, only 4 per cent were backed up by such goods at the end of 
1985. Limits on individual credit were amply exceeded in the case of "re­
lated" loans by lending to fictitious firms and other practices. It is estima­
ted that up to 50 per cent of bad loans which banks undergoing inter­
vention in 1981-83 sold to the Central Bank were "related" (and had vir­
tually no collateral). Indirect evidence regarding interest capitalization and 
the rolling over of overdue loans is provided by the fact that while loans 
were growing at abnormal rates, interest-income accruals by banks were 
very high; after they had sold their large stock of bad loans to the Central 
Bank, both the growth rate of their loan portfolio and the lending rates 
dropped sharply (see second and third column of Table 3).
Not until 1980 did the Superintendency of banks introduce a method 
to classify loans according to risk categories. The public was evidently not 
informed of expected losses; however, these losses led to intervention in 
the banking system starting in 1981, in order to gauge the magnitude of 
the recovery measures. Therefore, neither the Superintendency nor depo­
sitors and shareholders had access to reliable information on portfolio qua­
lity -and consequently on effective results and capital figures of bank and 
financial establishments- in the course of financial liberalization. The high 
profitability shown in column 1 of Table 3 was fictitious as it followed 
mainly from accounting as income interest accruals on high-risk loans and 
from insufficient provisioning of these risks.
ii. State guarantee on deposits
Lack of public information on portfolio risks and veritable solvency indi­
cators of banks and financial establishments opened the door to an implicit 
State guarantee on deposits (and other liabilities). An unmistakable step 
in this direction had already been taken in 1975-76 when an emerging fi­
nancial crisis led to intervention in and recovery of a medium-sized com­
mercial bank, and to the introduction in January 1977 of a State guarantee 
on deposits denominated in domestic currency equivalent to around US$ 
3,000 (at the current rate of exchange). In January 1991, this guarantee was 
complemented by a voluntary deposit insurance covering additional depo­
sits in domestic currency up to the equivalent of around US$ 3,500. De­
positors completely overlooked this option, in the belief that the State was 
fully protecting their funds.
B a n k  r e g u l a t io n ,  u b e r a u z a t io n  a n d  f in a n c ia l  in s t a b il it y  in . 267
c) Loan-portfolio growth and financial crises as an outcome of
"uncontrolled" banking
The mechanism of abnormal loan-portfolio growth contained large flows 
of "related" and other non-collateralized credit, the capitalization of high 
accrued lending rates of interest and the rolling over of loans subject to 
risk. The process leading to a credit "bubble" can be described by dividing 
the real rate of growth of bank loan portfolios into two components: the 
rate of growth of normal-risk or "legitimate" credit (1), and the rate of growth 
of high-risk or "false" credit (f), defining both rates in the outstanding port­
folio and when granting or renewing loans. False credit may in turn be 
split up into the rate of growth of new "false" credit (fl) and capitalized 
interests stemming from the rolling over of high-risk credit (f2). If "a" is 
the proportion of interest accruals which is paid and "r" is the real interest 
rate on the loan portfolio, f2 = (1 - a)r stands for capitalized high-risk 
interest accruals. The real rate of growth of the loan portfolio (p) can thus 
be written:
p = 1 + f = 1 + fj + (1 - a)r (1)
The annex contains a rough simulation with a breakdown of the 39 
per cent yearly growth rate of the loan and financial asset portfolio of 
the banking system in 1978-80. "Legitimate" credit would have expanded 
at around 22 per cent in real terms a year, or at three times the GDP 
growth rate, while "false" or very high-risk credit would have grown at 
17 per cent in real terms a year, or at twice the speed of GDP. Of the 
latter, about 10 per cent may stand for the capitalization of interest rates 
and 7 per cent for the granting of new "false" credit.
The implicit State guarantee on deposits and liabilities stands out 
when one seeks to explain the behaviour of debtors and bankers as regards 
agreeing on "false" credits, and of depositors and lenders to the banks as 
regards providing finance. Once the former perceived that insolvency pro­
blems were becoming widespread, collusion on rolling over bad loans, 
capitalizing interest, and extending related credit became profitable in the 
belief that the State would provide a large-scale bail-out34. Once the latter 
perceived that they could count on a State guarantee, depositors and even 
foreign banks were willing to provide funds.
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2. The bank reform of 1986
The bank reform of November 1986 aimed at an institutional arrangement 
of "bicontrolled" banking as regards solvency regulation (as set out in Ta­
ble 2 above), and at multibanking vis-à-vis the structure of the banking 
system.
The reform introduced all the prudential solvency norms mentioned 
in Table 1. At the same time, it withdrew the State guarantee on deposits, 
excluding only sight deposits which earned no interest and small-scale sa­
vings35, with a view to incentivating the market-disciplining role of depo­
sitors. Multibanking was extended by authorizing complementary finan­
cial services to grant loans and credit (leasing, administration of mutual 
funds, securities dealings and investment bank activities). The provision of 
these services require affiliated but independent establishments with their 
own capital, and are subject to limits as regards bank lending, so as to 
fully shield the banks' own capital and results.
The prudential regulation framework contained novel features which 
provided transparency concerning risk and capital among banking institu­
tions, set up self-regulating measures to recover solvency, and relied on 
the level of deposit rates of interest as an indicator of solvency problems.
a) Transparency vis-à-vis credit risk and effective capital
Table 4 defines credit risk categories for the loan portfolio and an example 
of credit risk assessment of two banks starting in May 1987. The lower 
part of this table shows the "effective" capital position of the same two 
banks also starting May 1987, when the above information was made pu­
blic for the first time by the Superintendency of Banks. The capital po­
sition is shown by means of a coefficient where the numerator is "effec­
tive" capital, the denominator accounting capital, and with the following 
variables:
34 N. Eyzaguirre, "Crisis Financiera, Reforma y Estabilización: La experiencia Chilena", Banco 
Central de Chile, Santiago, 1992, mimeo.
35 The State guarantee covers time deposits by natural persons equivalent to around US$ 2,400 
(at the rate of exchange at the beginning of 1993), with a limit of 90 per cent of this amount.
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C = Accounting capital and reserves (excluding provisions for assets 
subject to risk)
Prov = Provisions on risks of loss of loans and financial assets
R = Current result (profit or loss)
L = Expected risk of loss in loan and financial-asset portfolio
The effective capital coefficient (ecc) is36:
ecc = ((C + Prov + R - U /Q 100  (2)
Table 4
CHILEAN PRUDENTIAL REGULATION BANK REFORM OF 1986 TRANSPARENCY 
OF CREDIT RISK AND OF EFFECTIVE CAPITAL OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS
1. Credit risk categories Category Expected losses in %
Normal risk A 0
Potential risk higher than normal B 1
With expected losses B- 20
With substantial expected losses C 60
Non-recoverable D 90
2. Expected losses as percentage of loan portfolio
Bank May 1987 May 1990 February 1993
American Express 3.51 3.36 1.98
Concepción 3.51 3.58 3.24
Average for banking system 6.58 4.18 2.43
3. Effective capital coefficient, ecc =  (Effective capital/Accounting capital) 100
Bank May 1987 May 1990 February 1993
American Express 105.7 106.9 102.6
Concepción 108.8 129.5 116.3
Average for banking system 107.0 116.9 106.4
Source: Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras, Información Financiera, Santiago, diffe­
rent issues.
36 Thus, if ecc > 100 or if ecc < 100, effective capital exceeds or falls short of accounting capital 
by the percentage difference to hundred.
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b) Assumptions regarding financial stability and self-regulating
solvency measures
Assumed financial problems are defined on the basis of the "percentage 
of capital at risk" (per), which is the complement of the effective capital 
coefficient when the latter is less than 100 per cent (that is, when effective 
capital falls below accounting capital):
per = (100 - ecc)%, ecc < 100 (3)
If the percentage of capital at risk is approximately between 20 per 
cent and 40 per cent, that is, when expected asset losses (not covered by 
provisions) threaten 20 per cent to 40 cent of the accounting capital37, pru­
dential regulation presumes "financial instability". To overcome this situa­
tion, shareholders are required to supply fresh capital on short notice38. 
If on the other hand, the percentage of capital risk reaches 60 per cent 
or more, that is, if expected asset losses (not covered by provisions) threa­
ten that percentage of accounting capital, or more, prudential regulation 
presumes "severe solvency problems". In this case, in addition to fresh ca­
pital supplied by shareholders, a committee of bank creditors can trans­
form deposits into capital and take other measures to reduce deposits and 
liabilities in order to re-establish the solvency of the bank or financial so­
ciety39.
37 The precise percentage of capital at risk depends on the leverage ratio of the bank of 
financial establishment. The higher the leverage ratio, the lower the admitted percentage of 
capital at risk.
38 If this capital is not forthcoming or deemed insufficient by the Superintendency, the bank or 
financial establishment in question is not permitted to expand its loan and financial-asset 
portfolio, with the exception of the purchase of financial instruments issued by the Central 
Bank.
39 Full insolvency is not defined, but banks and financial establishments assumed to incur 
"severe solvency problems" run the risk of being liquidated if no corrective measures are 
forthcoming. If the Superin tendency of Banks decides to liquidate, sight deposits and small 
savings are protected by the State guarantee, while the Central Bank enjoys priority in 
recovering both its loans to the affected financial establishment and its disbursements to 
cover protected deposits.
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c) Control of deposit interest rates
The link between high growth of non-performing loans and pressure on 
deposit interest rates (as the former do not provide a cash flow and hen­
ce require the raising of funds) led to a further assumption of financial 
instability. Banks or financial establishments which paid interest rates ex­
ceeding the average rate paid by the same kind of financial institution in 
three or more months of a same year by a fifth or more are also presumed 
unstable. Consequently, these banks and financial establishments are not 
allowed to increase their loan and financial-asset portfolio (with the excep­
tion of financial instruments issued by the Central Bank), until their share­
holders supply fresh capital deemed adequate by the Superintendency of 
Banks.
3. Bank reform, bank performance and financial liberalization
The vigorous prudential regulation reform implemented at the end of 1986, 
the related measures to restore the solvency of banks and debtors between 
1982-86, and the orderly macroeconomic conditions prevailing since 1985- 
86 led to a structural change in the performance of banks and to a new 
environment for financial liberalization.
The change in bank performance took place while fully maintaining 
credit and interest-rate liberalization40. All banking institutions have remai­
ned solvent since 1986. At the same time, as the second and third columns 
of Table 3 show, after initially falling, the rate of growth of the banking 
system's loan and financial-asset portfolio has recently kept in line with 
the rate of growth of GDP. Lending (or active) and deposit (or passive) 
interest rates dropped by half, although the latter have remained attractive 
in real terms; spreads also dropped by half on account of similar reductions 
in portfolio expenditures, approaching international standards.
National savings increased from 10 per cent of GDP in 1985-86 to 22 
per cent in 1990-92, an increase made up mainly of private savings (of
40 The Central Bank "suggested" short-term deposit interest rates between 1982-86, while the 
financial crisis was overcome.
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which around 3 per cent is due to the pension-fund reform of 1981); exports 
of goods and services reached a peak of 35 per cent GDP in 1990-92, backed 
by record high real export rates of exchange in 1988-91; inflation has been 
kept at nearly 20 per cent or less a year (in a highly indexed economy)41 
and GDP has been expanding at above 6 per cent a year, both since 1986. 
The "revival" of growth and the behaviour of financial and real variables, 
quite akin to the results predicted by the financial liberalization approach, 
merit close attention under this policy and relative to the interrelationship 
among these variables42.
In the meantime, the highly successful bank reform of 1986 created 
new issues. It only partially achieved the objective of establishing a regime 
of "bicontrolled" banking as regards solvency. Although pension funds, 
insurance companies and other institutional investors follow closely the sol­
vency indicators of banking institutions shown in Table 4, there is evidence 
that a large proportion of depositors still behave as if their funds were 
fully protected by the State43. What was achieved may be closer to public- 
sector-controlled banking. This has led to proposals which enlarge the role 
of the private sector in evaluating the risk of the loan and financial-asset 
portfolio pertaining to banking institutions, and which render the risk of 
deposit capitalization and of deposit losses in cases of insolvency feasi­
ble44. Rapid development of the capital market since the mid-1980s brought 
about by the pension fund reform of 1981 has also led the banking sys­
41 The CPI measured inflation was 27 per cent in 1990 but approached one digit rates at the 
end of 1992.
42 While the real rate of exchange appears as essential in explaining the expansion of exports 
and tradeables; it can be argued that a further fall in interest rates requires more national 
savings (instead of attempting to rely on higher rates to incentívate household savings).
43 The following factors may have contributed to this result: the explicit guarantee on sight 
deposits and on small scale deposits, the preponderant role of the Superintendency of Banks 
in measuring risks and in controlling solvency, and the requisite that banks and financial 
societies have to repurchase the bad loans which they sold to the Central Bank and are thus 
hardly expected to break down.
44 Since Institutional investors keep themselves informed on the solvency position of banks 
and financial societies, they will withdraw their deposits before the "capital at risk" of a 
bank reaches the critical ratio of 60 per cent, that is, when deposit capitalization under a 
creditors committee is to take place.
B a n k  r e g u l a t io n ,  l ib e r a l iz a t io n  a n d  f in a n c ia l  in s t a b il it y  in . 273
tem to seek further expansion of its activities including insurance, pension- 
fund management, and a wider array of international financial transac­
tions45.
III. OVERVIEW OF RECENT FINANCIAL INSTABILITIES IN
LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN COUNTRIES
1. Sample of countries exhibiting financial instability
Table 5 provides an overview of countries in the region where banks and 
other credit institutions have faced solvency problems in the last two de­
cades.
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay make up the well-studied "Southern 
Cone" experiences of the 1970s dealing with stabilization, economic reform 
and financial liberalization46. On account of the entrenched import-substi- 
tution industry in Argentina and Uruguay, financial liberalization took place 
before commercial reform. Between 1974 and 1979 in both countries a num­
ber of measures liberalized interest rates and bank credit, the exchange 
rate and foreign-exchange operations, as well as reducing reserve require­
ments and other quasi-fiscal charges on banks. In 1974 both countries libe­
ralized private inflows and outflows of capital.
Argentina and Uruguay followed Chile's lead in carrying out financial 
liberalization amidst a very unstable macroeconomic environment and se­
vere shortcomings in prudential regulation and/or supervision.
Yearly inflation rates of 170 per cent in Argentina and 50 per cent 
in Uruguay in 1977-78 led both countries to adopt the nominal rate of 
exchange as an anchor of stabilization at the end of 1978. Annualized in­
flation rates still stood at 70 per cent in Argentina and 25 per cent in 
Uruguay at the beginning of 1981, while the real rate of exchange had 
dropped to half in both countries. Contributing to this situation were pre-
45 La Banca ante Nuevos Negocios y Mercados, Santiago, Asociación de Bancos e Instituciones 
Financieras de Chile, 1992.
46 ECLAC, Estabilización y Liberación Económica en el Cono Sur, Santiago, Estudios e Informes 
CEPAL, 1984, Na 38.
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vailing public-sector deficits -particularly in Argentina- tariff reductions ca­
rried out at this stage of economic reform, and very large foreign-debt- 
financed capital inflows. The latter resulted from the huge differential in 
the real lending rates of interest in domestic currency and in foreign currency 
(of expost 50 per cent a year in Argentina and 20 per cent a year in Uruguay 
in 1979-80), and from an exchange-rate policy which had virtually elimi­
nated foreign-exchange risk.47
Real domestic lending rates of interest also declined while fluctuating 
drastically due to high and variable inflation rates. However, they started 
to climb in Argentina in 1980 and in Uruguay in 1981, when it became 
clear that current exchange rates were unsustainable (and also because 
international interest rates increased to unusually high levels). Domestic 
lending rates of interest rose to 40 per cent a year in real terms in the 
second half of 1980 and the beginning of 1981 in Argentina, and in 1982 
in Uruguay. Nevertheless between 1979 and 1983 capital flight equivalent 
to more than 90 per cent of the foreign debt of the former and to more 
than 60 per cent of the foreign debt of the latter took place.48
Banking regulations provided and implicit State guarantee on depo­
sits in Uruguay and an explicit State guarantee in Argentina.49 In Uruguay 
there were also no "minimum" rules controlling bank solvency as regards 
entry conditions, credit limits, provisioning, and bank information for de­
positors.50 In Argentina the banking law of 1977 set out very general norms 
on solvency and liquidity, referring mainly to credit limits, constitution of 
guarantees, restrictions on fixed assets, relations between active and passi­
ve funds, and minimum capital requirements. However, it was not until 
1985-90, after the financial crisis had surfaced, that rules on related credit
47 V. Corbo, J. de Melo and J. Tybout, "What Went Wrong with the Recent Reforms in the 
Southern Cone", Washington D.C., World Bank, 1985, Report DRD128.
48 Ibid.
49 A full State guarantee on deposits was reintroduced in Argentina in 1973. The guarantee on 
deposits of firms became negotiable with the Central Bank in 1977. However, all deposits in 
banks which had undergone intervention up to the beginning of 1982 were paid. The im­
plicit State guarantee on deposits in Uruguay stemmed mainly from full payment of de­
posits during the financial crisis of 1971.
50 A. Banda, "Regulación Bancaria, Crisis Financiera y Políticas Consecuentes. El Caso 
Uruguayo", in G. Held and R. Szalachman eds., Ahorro y Asignación de Recursos Financieros, 
(Buenos Aires, GEL, 1990).
B a n k  r e g u l a t io n ,  u b e r a u z a t io n  a n d  f in a n c ia l  in st a b il it y  i n . 277
were tightened. Now loans had to be classified according to risk category, 
and stricter rules on provisions were implemented. Norms prevailing in 
the 1970s were considerably weakened by the virtual absence of bank 
supervision. While each bank had the chance of being inspected once every 
two years in 1976-77, this frequency dropped to once every six years in 
1978-82.51 Thus in both countries, as in Chile, financial deregulation took 
place under conditions of "uncontrolled" banking as regards solvency.
In Argentina private-sector bank credit grew in real terms at an avera­
ge of 10 per cent a year in 1976-78 and 20 per cent a year in 1979-81, 
with a stagnant economy. In Uruguay private-sector bank credit expanded 
at average yearly rates of 20 per cent in real terms in 1976-81 while GDP 
was growing at 3.5 per cent a year on the average. The sharp decline 
in the real exchange rate as of 1979, and the subsequent increases in the 
real rates of interest, which took place in both countries, soon eroded the 
profitability and solvency of import competing and export sectors. Loan 
rollovers and interest capitalization became an increasingly larger compo­
nent of bank credit, as did speculative loans channelled at the time into 
profitable real estate and other non-tradeable activities.
The financial crisis exploded in Argentina in March 1980 with inter­
vention in three fast-growing commercial banks, including the largest de­
posit holding bank. An impeding balance-of-payment crisis (fueled by 
large-scale capital flight) and the abandonment of the nominal rate of ex­
change as a stabilization device in the second quarter of 1981 exacerbated 
the financial crisis. An immediate increase of 60 per cent in the real ex­
change rate and an accumulated GDP drop of 11 per cent 1981-82 caused 
severe solvency problems for debtors located in non-tradeable activities and 
in the economy at large. In December 1988, the Central Bank of Argen­
tina was still liquidating 206 financial institutions, of which 84 had under­
gone intervention before the end of 1982.52
51 E. Salama, "Regulación y Supervision de la Banca e Instituciones Financieras en Argentina", 
in G. Held and R. Szalachman eds., Regulación y Supervision de la Banca. Experiencias en Améri­
ca Latina y el Caribe, (Santiago, ECLAC/UNDP, 1991).
52 L. A. Giorgo, "Crisis Financieras, Reestructuración Bancaria e Hiperinflación en Argentina", 
(México, CEMLA, August 1991, working paper.
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Bank solvency problems had also surfaced in Uruguay in 1980-81. They 
developed into a financial crises in 1982, when the Latin American debt 
crises, capital flight, and a large public-sector deficit forced a drastic balan­
ce of payment adjustment. GDP dropped 11 per cent in 1982 and another 
6 per cent in 1983-84. Banks attempted to protect themselves from the fo- 
reign-exhange risk by denominating loans in dollars, only to find that cre­
dit risk had become unmanageable once the nominal real rate of exchange 
was abandoned as an anchor of stabilization in November 1982. Floating 
led to a 100 per cent rise of that rate in a few days. In -1982-85, severe 
solvency problems of banks and debtors led to large-scale domestic debt 
refinancing and to the purchase of bad-debt portfolios of smaller banking 
institutions by the Central Bank. A group of private banks, including the 
three largest commercial banks, which had shown growing solvency pro­
blems since the beginning of the 1980s, underwent intervention in 1985.53
The solvency problems faced by the banking systems of Colombia, 
El Salvador and the Dominican Republic at the end of the periods men­
tioned in Table 5, took place in different macroeconomic conditions and 
financial policies. But in every case, they are mainly the result of short­
comings in prudential regulation and/or supervision.
Annual inflation in Colombia during the second half of the 1970s sta­
bilized in the 20-25 per cent range, with average GDP growth rate of around 
5 per cent a year. A conservative foreign debt policy also protected Co­
lombia from the Latin American debt crisis in 1982. The latter contributed 
to a recession, although GDP still grew 1 per cent in that year.
In the 1970s private-sector bank credit in Colombia expanded in keep­
ing with GDP. However, the country experienced a "bubble" in 1980-81 
when bank credit grew 41 per cent in real terms over the two years. The 
large-scale banking intervention unitiated in 1982 demostrated that the cre­
dit bubble consisted mainly of high-risk "related" loans to economic and 
financial groups, including the use of bank credit to buy up common stock 
of firms in the real sector. Unsafe loan practices had overstepped establi­
shed credit norms and limits. At the same time, Supervisory authorities 
had failed to verify the quality of bank loan portfolios. After the interven­
53 A Banda, op. cit.
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tion, there were eight "official" banks, administered by the public sector, 
as compared to three in 1982, and nine private banks as compared to sixteen 
in 1982. By 1989, the former accounted for 70 per cent of the assets of 
the banking system.54
The commercial banking system of El Salvador had accumulated losses 
equivalent to 3.4 times its capital at the end of 1989. Overdue and refinanced 
loans representing 39 per cent and 26 per cent of the loan portfolio signalled 
further outstanding losses. Three factors are particularly noteworthy when 
seking to explain the financial crises amidst a stagnant economic activity 
and die severe political turbulence of the 1980s: public-sector interference 
in the credit process, financial repression and shortcomings in the regula­
tion and supervision of banks.55
The nationalization of commercial banks in March 1980 and a large 
Central Government deficit (equivalent to 15 per cent of CDP in the mid- 
1980s) facilitated financial repression and made bank credit prone to politi­
cal influence and sectoral pressure groups. The Central Bank set both de­
posit and lending rates of interest, and banks had to meet a reserve requi­
rement of 20 per cent on deposits while investing 10 por cent of their 
asset portfolios in low-yield public-sector financial instruments. In the 1980s, 
yearly inflation rates averaging 20 per cent led to negative real deposit 
interest of 6 per cent a year on average. While deposits stagnated, bank 
credit dropped by 35 per cent in real terms between 1980-81 and 1988-89.
Public-sector and Central Bank authorities took on an increasing role 
in the management of banks and the allocation of credit through appoint­
ment of personnel and credit directives. Under such conditions, the bulk 
of bank regulation and supervision fell to financial norms and their com­
pliance. Prudential regulation and supervision were sidestepped. Individual 
credit limits were bypassed, credit risks inadequately assessed, provisions 
on risk-prone loans delayed, bad loans rolled over and overdue loans not 
collected. Since deposits enjoyed an implicit State guarantee after the na­
tionalization of banks, financial repression in El Salvador took place in a
54 L. A. Zuleta, "Estructura del Proyecto de Crédito para Inversion en Colombia", in C. Massad 
and G. Held eds., Sistema Financiero y Asignación de Recursos. Experiencias Latinoamericanas y 
del Caribe, (Buenos Aires, GEL, 1990).
55 J. A. Belloso, "Regulación y Supervision de la Banca en El Salvador" (Santiago ECLAC/ 
UNDP, 1992), working paper.
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climate of "uncontrolled" banking as regards solvency. Thus, once overdue 
loans had to be recorded, their share of the loan portfolio increased from 
14 per cent in 1988 to 39 per cent in 1989.56
Financial "repression" became important in the Dominican Republic 
in the 1980s. The Central Bank maintained financial regulations that set 
nominal interest rates, sectoral credit limits, and credit-linked reserve re­
quirements, while inflation rates increased until reaching 100 per cent a 
year in 1980. Frequent negative real deposit rates of interest in the bank­
ing sector led to a decline in private-sector bank funding.57 Banks "own 
credits" diminished around 7 per cent in real terms in the decade (while 
GDP increased by around 20 per cent).
Financial repression plus a lax prudential regulation and supervision 
fostered a flourishing free financial sector. The latter was made up of fi­
nancial establishments, financial groups, real-estate financiers, leasing firms, 
credit-card firms and other agents. The number of these agents increased 
from around 300 in 1979 to 650 in 1987, at which time their financial acti­
vities involved a quarter of the credit and a third of the deposits in the 
regulated banking sector.
In 1983 the Central Bank tightened limits on related credit and set 
out provisioning norms taking into account overdue loans and guarantees. 
In an attempt to counter the high credit risks which non-regulated finan­
cial agents were assuming in 1987 the Central Bank instituted credit limits, 
reserve and minimum capital requirements. However, even regulated bardes 
have fallen far short of complying with credit limits and reserve require­
ments. Nor do available procedures and the capacity of Supervisory au­
thorities allow for evaluating credit risks and establishing the solvency po­
sition of banks and financial institutions. The shortcomings of prudential 
regulation and supervision at the end of the 1980s were singled out as 
the main problem facing public-sector financial authorities in the current 
drive to modernize the financial system of the Dominican Republic.58
58 J. A. Belloso, op. dt.
57 A. Veloz, "Sistema Finandero Dominicano y Asígnadón Selectiva del Crédito", en C. Massad 
and G. Held eds., Sistema Financiero y Asignación de Recursos, (Buenos Aires, GEL, 1990).
58 H. Guilliani and J. Aristy, "Regulation y Supervisión del Sistema Finandero en la República 
Dominicana" in G. Held and R. Szalachman eds., Regulación y Supervision de la Banca. 
Experiencias de América latina y el Caribe, (Santiago, ECLAC/UNDP, 1991).
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A financial crisis exploded in 1989, when dozens of previously non- 
regulated financial agents failed and when some banks in the regulated 
sector also became insolvent. Yet interest rates (and the exchange rate) 
were liberalized at the beginning of 1991, as part of a stabilization policy, 
under conditions of undetermined bank solvency and very weak pruden­
tial regulation and supervision. Real lending rates of interest among com­
mercial banks immediately jumped to an equivalent of 50 per cent a year, 
but then declined as inflation dropped from 100 per cent in 1980 to around 
5 per cent a year in 1991-92. Central Bank interest rates pointed to real 
annualized lending rates above 25 per cent a year at the end of 1991 and 
above 20 per cent a year at the end of 1992.59 These rates have raised 
doubts as to the solvency of certain banks and financial agents.
Costa Rica stands for noteworthy macroeconomic and financial po­
licies in the eighties, but also for varying solvency results depending 
upon prudential regulation and supervision. It adopted stabilization and 
structural reforms in 1983, in the aftermath of a severe macroeconomic cri­
sis at the beginning of the 1980s and its foreign-debt moratorium in 1981 
(one year before that of Mexico). Financial reform led to an expansion of 
private-sector banking, liberalization and devolution of credit decisions to 
banks,60 and positive real rates of interest and their gradual deregulation.61 
At the same time, prudential regulation and supervision were strengthened 
on the basis of a uniform classification of the loan portfolio of banks ac­
cording to risk categories, stricter rules on risk provisioning,62 and a set
59 Banco Central de la República Dominicana, Boletín Mensuâ, Santo Domingo, October-Decem- 
ber 1991 and 1992, Annex.
60 The Central Bank reintroduced some sectoral credit limits in favor of primary and export 
sectors along the way.
61 Interest rates were deregulated in three stages. In the first two, the interest-rate structure 
privoted around a 'basic" interest rate set by the Central Bank. In the first stage, interest-rate 
dispersion was reduced and the interest-rate structure became flexible through movements 
of the basic rate. In the second stage, commercial banks could set their deposit rates freely 
within limits, while the interest spread (and thus their lending rates) were set in relation to 
their deposit rates. In the last stage, commercial banks were free to negotiate their deposit 
and lending rates of interest, with the exception of subsidized credit lines in favour of small- 
scale producers. See F. de Paula, "Costa Rica: Intermediación Financiera y Asignación de 
Recursos", in C. Massad and G. Held eds., Sistema Financiero y Asignación de Recursos, (Buenos 
Aires, GEL, 1990).
62 Full-risk provisioning was a goal to be achieved in the forthcoming years.
282 G ü n t h e r  H e ld  Y.
of bank-performance indicators of which depositors and the public were 
to be informed. Financial reform also opened the door to "free" financial 
establishments which soon started to grow in number, operating at high 
real rates of interest in the more risk-prone segments of the credit market.
The results of stabilization and adjustment policies were encouraging. 
GDP grew on an average of 4.3 per cent a year in 1983-87 while annual 
inflation dropped from 33 per cent in 1983 to an average of 15 per cent 
in 1984-87. At the end of 1987 a tightening of monetary policy led to liqui­
dity shortages and to the breakdown of all (non-regulated) financial esta­
blishments. However, no supervised bank became insolvent in this finan­
cial debacle.63
The financial liberalization experiences of Bolivia and Peru typify the 
extent to which solvency problems are brought out into the open by 
macroeconomic upheavals. However, macroeconomic conditions and poli­
cies have also overshadowed the shortcomings of prudential regulation and 
supervision.
In August 1985, the government of Bolivia adopted a radical stabi­
lization policy and structural reforms aimed at an open market economy. 
The reduction of the fiscal deficit from 25 per cent of GDP in 1984 to 
2.5 per cent in 198664 was decisive in controlling hyperinflation. Inflation 
fell from 8,200 per cent in 1985 to 11 per cent in 1986 and has since remained 
in the 10-20 per cent range. Trade reform reduced tariff barriers from an 
average of 40 per cent in 1985 to 10 per cent in 1990.65
As part of the new policy régime, prices, interest rates, the rate of 
exchange66 and bank credit were liberalized in August 1985. Prevailing 
uncertainty as to the behaviour of prices led first to an unprecedented real 
interest rate jump and then to a decline in interest rates as inflation drop­
63 R. Díaz "Regulación y Supervision de la Solvencia Bancaria en Costa Rica", in G. Held and 
R. Szalachman eds. Regulación y Supervision de k  Banca. Experiencks en América Latina y el 
Carée, (Santiago, Chile, ECLAC/UNDP, 1991).
M A tax reform was introduced in 1986 to increase fiscal revenue.
65 J.A. Morales et. a l, Bolivk: Ajuste Estructural. Equidad y Crecimiento (La Paz, Baremo, 1991), 
Introducción.
66 The rate of exchange was liberalized through auctions of foreign exchange by the Central 
Bank.
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ped. The real lending interest rates of banks went from around minus 80 
per cent a year in 1984 (when interest rates were still set by the Central 
Bank) to nearly 100 per cent in 1985, 70 per cent in 1986, 40 per cent 
in 1987 and an average of 20 per cent in 1989-91. Though real lending 
rates of interest have fallen, they have none the less remained at high 
levels.
Solvency problems led to the closure of four banks in 1987. The very 
high real interest rates and the changes in relative prices and sectoral 
profitabilities brought about by rapid disinflation and the trade reform 
loom large in this situation. Inadequate norms controlling credit risk, an 
implicit State guarantee on deposits, and week supervision also played a 
role. Since 1987, a number of measures have been taken to limit credit 
concentration and related credit, increase provisions on risky credit, and 
shore up supervision. Yet, overdue loans still stood at 14 per cent of the 
loan portfolio of banks in 1989.67 The prevailing high real lending rates 
of interest may thus partly reflect remaining high credit risks in bank 
portfolios.
A handful of bank insolvencies in the first half of the 1980s alerted 
public-sector financial authorities in Peru as to defective norms controlling 
solvency and the risks stemming from an implicit State guarantee on de­
posits. Accordingly, a number of measures considerably improved pruden­
tial regulation in the second half of the 1980s. Credit classification to risk 
categories and stricter limits on individual and related loans became offi­
cial in 1989. The new banking law of 1991 expanded capital requirements, 
introduced the sharing of information on debtors among banks, required 
banks to provide the public with information regarding the quality of their 
portfolios and capital positions, and empowered Supervisory authorities to 
levy clearly defined sanctions. At the same time, the banking law of 1991 
set up an explicit and compulsory deposit insurance fund. The fund gua­
rantees bank deposits up to US$ 3,500 (at the rate of exchange prevail­
ing in 1991) against a premium payable by banks. The latter are to be 
differentiated according to the risk of their portfolios.68
67 G. Afcha de la Parra, "Desintermediarión y Liberalization Financiera en Bolivia: 1980-88", in 
G. Held and R. Szalachman eds., Ahorro y Asignación de Recursos Financieros, (Buenos Aires, 
GEL, 1990).
68 G. González Arríela, "Regulación y Supervisión de la Solvencia del Sistema Financiero en el
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The Peruvian economy moved towards hyperinflation and severe 
macroeconomic imbalances in the second half of the 1980s. Inflation reached 
2,800 per cent in 1989 while GDP fell 21 per cent in 1988-89. In August 
1990 the government implemented a drastic stabilization policy and started 
structural reforms directed towards an open market economy as Bolivia 
had done in 1985. As part of the new policy regime, prices, interest rates, 
the rate of exchange and private sector bank credit were quickly libera­
lized. Inflation peaked at 7,600 per cent in 1990 while GDP dropped another 
5 per cent. Since then, disinflation made less progress, the interest jump 
has been higher, and the decline in interest rates has been slower as com­
pared to the Bolivian experience. In the first halves of 1991, 92 and 93 
the yearly inflation rates were 200 percent, 65 percent and 55 percent, whi­
le the real annualized lending rates stood at around 170 per cent, 50 per 
cent and 35 per cent.69
The above macroeconomic conditions were bound to create solvency 
problems for banks and debtors. In March of 1993 overdue loans of do­
mestic commercial banks were a 22 percent of their loan portfolios. Howe­
ver provisions for risky loans stood at only 12 percent pointing also to 
defective norms on provisioning and on a timely recapitalization of banks, 
in view of the severe erosion of their capital bases. A weakened supervision 
may have contributed to this outcome on account of the loss of qualified 
professional staff stemming from the drastic adjustment of public sector 
expenditure.
2. Defective bank regulation and supervision
as a factor o f financial instability
Severe shortcomings in prudential regulation and supervision are a 
common feature of all banking crises mentioned in Table 5. Faults regard­
ing solvency controls on risks, provisions, public information on banks, and 
supervision, together with a implicit or explicit State guarantee on depo­
Perú", en G. Held and R. Szalachman eds., Regulación y Supervision de la Banca. Experiencias de 
América Latina y el Caribe, (Santiago, ECLAC/UNDP, 1992).
69 On loans in domestic currency due in less than a year. See: Banco Central de Reservas del 
Perú, 'Tasas de Interés Activas y Pasivas de la Banca Comercial" (Lima, May 1993).
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sits, placed virtually all macroeconomic and financial policies in a context 
of "uncontrolled" banking as regards solvency.
The banking crisis in Colombia at the beginning of the 1980s illus­
trates how uncontrolled banking alone can create high credit risks and 
unsustainable capital losses even under quite stable macroeconomic con­
ditions.
The liberalization of bank credit, interest rates and other financial va­
riables in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay in the 1970s were all carried out 
under very unfavourable conditions for the stability and efficiency of the 
banking system. Uncontrolled banking together with unstable macroeco­
nomic conditions and policy inconsistencies led to greatly unbalanced 
exchange and interest rates and to relative price and profit shifts among 
economic activities. Although it is difficult to rank the importance of the­
se factors in explaining the banking aises which exploded in the three 
Southern Cone countries at the beginning of the 1980s, the severe short­
comings in prudential regulation and supervision count for a great deal 
in all of them. It is significant that in Argentina and Chile, and partly 
in Uruguay, solvency problems erupted before balance-of-payments and 
foreign-debt crises led to the need for major macroeconomic adjustments.
In the mid-1980s, Bolivia liberalized interest rates, bank credit, and 
other financial variables in light of macroeconomic turbulence and uncon­
trolled banking. Peru took the same steps in 1990, in conditions of soft 
risk provisioning and recapitalization norms. The magnitude of the stabili­
zation and adjustment effort, together with very high real rates of interest 
in the commercial banking sector, appear to be the leading causes of the 
solvency problems which have surfaced so far. However, high real lending 
rates of interest also signal high credit risks in the loan portfolios of banks 
and shortcomings in provisions and in the write-off of bad loans from their 
asset portfolios.
Defective prudential regulation and supervision have also created sol­
vency problems under conditions of financial repression, such as in El Sal­
vador and the Dominican Republic in the 1980s. The same holds true in 
the case of "free" financial institutions in Costa Rica and in the Domini­
can Republic in the second half of the 1980s.
Of all the countries mentioned in Table 5, Costa Rica is the only one 
where the liberalization of bank credit and the (gradual) liberalization of
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interest rates in the 1980s did not cause financial problems in the regulated 
banking system. It is also the only case where prudential regulation and 
supervision had been substantialy improved.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
A. Prudential regulation and supervision have played an outstanding role 
in determining the solvency (and efficiency) of banks and financial 
institutions undergoing various financial experiences in Latin Ame­
rican and Caribbean countries during the last two decades. Severe 
shortcomings in prudential regulation and/or supervision, as exem­
plified by the arrangement of uncontrolled banking, has caused or 
fueled banking aises and financial instability during times of finan­
cial liberalization, financial repression and free financial activities.
B. The outcome of the liberalization of interest rates, aedit and other 
financial variables, as regards rendering banks solvent and efficient 
while fostering an efficient allocation of resources, depends on the 
fulfillment of a number of conditions. Among these, the following 
stand out in Latin American and Caribbean countries:
1. A sufficiently stabilized maaoeconomy based on a strong finan­
cial position of the public sector and a real exchange rate and real 
rates of interest in line with medium and longer term economic 
conditions.
2. Prudential regulation and supervision capable of limiting and con­
trolling aedit risks, foreign-exchange and other risks which banks 
and economic agents have to face in freer or more liberalized a e ­
dit, foreign exchange and other markets.70
3. An "industrial" banking organization whereby banks can engage in 
multiple financial services with a view toward competitiveness; 
taking advantage of economies stemming from complementarities 
among financial services, the scale of operation and other factors;
70 It is also important to make sure that banks are solvent at the outset of finandal liberali­
zation.
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and achieving financial "deepening" as the volume of funds in­
creases (through financial instruments extending the period of tran­
sactions and spreading and transforming risks).
While the financial liberalization approach has stressed the first of 
the above conditions, it has certainly overlooked the meaning of pru­
dential regulation and supervision.
C. The liberalization of bank credit and of interest rates under conditions 
of severe shortcomings in prudential regulation and/or supervision 
and of a high macroeconomic instability can easily end up adding 
risk to loan portfolios and creating unduly high real lending rates 
of interest, frequently in the form of a credit "bubble". These were 
common features of financial liberalization in the Southern-Cone coun­
tries in the 1970s. However, later experiences have also shown financial 
liberalization not to be accompanied by prudential regulation, stron­
ger bank supervision, and sufficiently stabilized macroeconomic envi­
ronments. Moreover, the often prevailing arrangement of "uncontro­
lled" banking as regards solvency has by itself been conducive to fi­
nancial instability.
D. High real lending rates of interest have been a common feature of 
most financial liberalization experiences in Latin American and Cari­
bbean countries during the last two decades. While a number of fac­
tors may contribute to these rates, one stands out in relation to insol­
vency: extremely high real "accrued" lending rates which are not 
paid by debtors but are instead rolled over, thus giving rise to a 
very rapid increase in the volume of credit and adding to its riski­
ness.
E. Many of the countries mentioned in Table 5 have in the meantime 
taken measures to strengthen prudential regulation and supervision 
of their banking systems and to expand the scope of their activi­
ties to include multibanking. However, prudential regulation measu­
res have generally not included freely informing depositors and the 
public with regard to credit and asset risk and the effective capital 
positions of banks (as Chile did in 1986). They have thus opted for
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banking controlled by the public sector (see Table 2), though some 
countries have explicitly limited the guarantee or insurance on de­
posits.
F. Unstable macroeconomic conditions and defective prudential regula­
tion and supervision do not provide a testing ground for financial 
liberalization in most of the financial liberalization experiences of La­
tin American countries during the last two decades. However, im­
proved prudential regulation and supervision, along 'with more sta­
ble macroeconomic conditions in a number of countries of the region, 
may do so in the 1990s. Among the countries mentioned in Table 
5, Chile has advanced the most as regards financial liberalization of 
credit and capital markets emphasizing prudential regulation and 
supervision. The financial and real sector results which have been 
achieved since the mid-1980s deserve close attention.
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ANNEX
Decomposition of credit growth in 1978-80 in 
the financial liberalization experience of Chile
An important argument can be derived from the performance of The Sta­
te Bank when simulating a decomposition of the 39 per cent yearly 
growth of the loan and financial asset portfolio of the Chilean banking 
system in 1978-80. The share of the State Bank in the banking-system loan 
portfolio stood at a substancial 20 per cent in 1978, its loans grew at a 
yearly rate of 22 per cent in real terms in 1978-80, and it did not have 
to sell bad loans to the Central Bank.3 Its rate of growth can therefore 
be taken as representative of the growth rate of normal risk or "legiti­
mate" credit in the banking system. Under this assumption, the latter
would have expanded at around three times the GDP growth rate, while 
"false" or very high risk aedit would have grown twice as fast as GDP, 
or at 17 per cent in real terms annually.
The rate of growth or "false" aedit can be broken down making use 
of the fact that the real lending rates of interest shown in the second and 
third column of table 3 fell to around a half, once the accumulated stock 
of bad loans had been sold to the Central Bank and risk-prone loans 
reprogrammed. Since solvency norms as of 1987 required ¿ a t  interest 
accruals also meant cash income, nearly half of accrued interest on loans 
in 1970-80 may have been capitalized, that is, (1 - a)r = 0.5 x 19.6 = 10%. 
The remainder of high-risk loan growth would stand for the yearly 
growth of new "false" credit (f1 = 7%). Thus:
p = 1 + fj + (1 - a)r = 22% + 7% + 10% = 39% (la)
* The State Bank was not authorized to sell bad loans, but it did not require Central Bank 
assistance to overcome its loan-portfolio probles.
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The corresponding growth rate of deposits and other liabilities which 
finances the growth of the loan and financial asset portfolio isb:
d = 1 /e  (i + 1 + fj + g - a.r) (2)
where "a.r" stands for the proportion of interest accruals on loans paid 
in cash and where non previously mentioned symbols mean:
e = average ratio of reserve requirements on deposit and other lia­
bilities.
i = Average real rate of interest on deposits and liabilities,
g = Administration and other current cash expenses as a percentage
of the loan (and financial assets) portfolio.
Filling in the variables of this equation with 1978-80 data on the bank­
ing systems yields a rate of growth similar to that of the loan and finan­
cial asset portfolio of the banking system:
d = 1/0.98 (13% + 22% + 7% + 6% - 0.5 x 19.6%) = 39% (2a)
b A simple bank model is assumed where loans and financial assets are equal to deposits and 
liabilities. See G. Held and R. Szalachman, Regulación y Supervisión de la Banca en la Expérien- 
cia de Liberalización Financiera en Chile (1974-1988), (Santiago, ECLAC, 1989), Annex B.
NOTE ON THE AUTHORS






Leo Model Professor of Economics, New School for 
Social Resarch, New York.
Chief, Macroeconomic Section, Global Interdependen­
ce Division, UNCTAD, Geneva.
Senior Economist, World Bank, Resident Staff, Jakarta, 
Indonesia.
Coordinator, Regional Joint Project ECLAC/UNDP 
"Financial Policies for Development", ECLAC, Santia­
go, Chile.
Senior Researcher, Overseas Development Institute, 
London; School of Oriental and African Studies, Uni­
versity of London.
Regional Adviser on Monetary and Financial Policy, 
ECLAC, Santiago, Chile.

